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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the impact of taxation and financial factors on the
level of investment in fixed assets by quoted manufacturing companies in
the United Kingdom between 1971 and 1986. Its most important theme is
that there exist substantial differences between companies in the way
that they are affected by both taxation and financial factors. The
empirical work therefore uses individual company accounting and stock
market data (described in Appendix A) together with a detailed model of
the corporation tax system (described in Appendix B) in order to exploit
cross sectional as well as time series variation.
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the role played by taxation in the
investment decision. Part of the cross sectional variation in taxation
arises through "tax exhaustion", caused by the asymmetric treatment of
taxable profit and loss in UK corporation tax and restrictions on the
use of the imputation system. Two investment equations, the first based
on Tobin's Q and the second on the cost of capital in an Euler equation
framework are developed from the same neoclassical model of the firm
which explicitly models tax exhaustion and the role played by
expectations. Each is a forward-looking model, which could be used for
the purposes of simulating the effects of tax reform on investment,
whether the reform is announced or unannounced, permanent or temporary.
The results confirm that tax does play a role in the determination of
investment, although, for various reasons, the precise effect is
difficult to quantify. They also suggest that the Q model is a poor
means of assessing the impact of taxation on investment and that it is
dominated by the second model.
Chapters 2 and 3 also consider the impact of taxation on company
financial policy, and, in particular consider various regimes in which
the company may find itself which depend on tax exhaustion and agency
costs of debt. The stability of these regimes is more complex than
commonly argued in the literature. The appropriate definition of the
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cost of capital is also developed further, under similar conditions, and
a matrix of nine possible values is constructed, depending on the
marginal source of finance in this period and the next period.
Chapter 4 discusses the role played by financial factors. A model with
legal constraints on financial behaviour and agency costs on debt is
developed which predicts that, for all firms, investment depends on the
level of cash generated, as well as Tobin's Q. The importance of cash
flow for firms of different size and age is investigated. The results
support the hypothesis that cash flow is a significant determinant of
investment for all firms. Cash flow has the highest impact for large and
new firms.
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CHAPTER 1
Micro data, tax exhaustion and financial factors
1.1 Introduction
This thesis examines the impact of taxation and financial factors on the
level of investment in fixed assets by quoted companies in the United
Kingdom between 1971 and 1986. Its most important innovation, compared
with most previous studies, is to examine the nature of differences
between companies in the way that they are affected by both taxation and
financial factors. The empirical work presented here therefore uses
individual company accounting and stock market data in order to exploit
cross sectional as well as time series variation. The model which is
developed to analyse investment decisions is also used to examine
company financial decisions.
Cross sectional variation in taxation arises partly through the
phenomenon of tax exhaustion. The UK corporation tax system, especially
during the 1970s and early 1980s, operated a system of generous reliefs
and allowances particularly with regard to allowances for the cost of
depreciation of fixed assets (capital allowances). The rate of these
allowances was much higher than depreciation rates commonly charged by
companies against accounting profit, with the result that taxable profit
was often considerably lower than accounting profit. However, the
asymmetric nature of the corporation tax system is such that, although
positive taxable profit incurs an immediate tax charge, negative taxable
profit does not lead to an immediate rebate (apart from in some cases in
which the loss can be "carried back" to be set against profit from
earlier years); rather the loss must be "carried forward", without
compensation, to be set against the profit of future years. The term
"fully tax exhausted" is used to describe companies in this position.
This asymmetry is a common feature of most corporation tax systems;
however its importance depends on the the definition of the tax base
since it is this which determines whether a company makes a taxable
profit or loss.
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A second form of tax exhaustion arises from the imputation system in the
UK and in other European countries. This Imputes part of the corporation
tax charge paid by a company to be a prepayment of the shareholders'
income tax due on dividends received from the company. Essentially, the
company withholds part of the income tax due on dividends which It pays
(this is known as advance corporation tax or ACT) and it is allowed to
reduce Its corporation tax charge by the amount withheld. However, if
taxable profit is insufficiently high, not all of the amount withheld
can be set against corporation tax. The amount not used can, in some
circumstances be offset against taxable profit earned in earlier years,
but otherwise must again be carried forward without compensation to
offset against future corporation tax liabilities. The term "ACT
exhausted" is used to describe companies in this position.
Cross sectional variation in financial factors may arise for two groups
of reasons. The first is the personal tax rates on income and capital
gains which apply to the marginal shareholder of the firm. Since these
tax rates differ between individuals, It Is likely that they will differ
between the relevant shareholders. But the optimal financial policy of
the company may well depend on these personal tax rates, and hence may
vary between companies. One strand of the literature suggeststhat
'clientele effects' will be created by differences in tax rates, with
some shareholders preferring returns in the form of capital gains and
some preferring dividends. This may lead to difference between
companies in their dividend payout ratios, with shareholders choosing
companies according to their individual tax position1.
A second form of variation may arise through Imperfections in capital
markets. Essentially, the existence of asymmetric Information between
managers in the company and outside investors, and incentive problems,
whereby existing shareholders and debtholders do not trust the managers
to act in the interests of the investors, both combine to make external
finance more expensive than internal finance. In extreme cases, it is
possible that rationing exists; some companies may not be able to raise
external finance whatever rate of return they are willing to pay.
1Although as Miller (1977) argued, this does not necessarily mean that
the company is not indifferent to its payout ratio.
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The extent of the difference in cost between internal and external
finance, or the existence of rationing, may depend on many different
factors. Obvious candidates are publicly available accounting data on
profit and gearing within the firm. Thus a high profit, low geared firm
may find it cheaper to raise debt than a low profit, highly geared firm.
Other factors may include particular characteristics of the firm, such
as its size or age. At first sight, it may appear that small firms would
be more likely to face problems of asymmetric information than large
firms, simply because the latter have more analysts following their
performance. However, more sophisticated arguments might even point in
the opposite direction; the larger the firm, the more dispersed its
ownership is likely to be and hence the greater the problems of
shareholders exercising control over the managers. Whatever the relative
merits of these arguments, the point here is simply that such issues may
induce cross section variation between companies in the cost of
different forms of finance, which may influence not only optimal
financial policy, but also optimal investment policy.
Closely related to this issue of cross sectional variation between
companies is the need for careful econometric analysis. Of the huge
literature which has examined the impact of tax on investment decisions
the vast majority of empirical studies have used time series data
(virtually all have ignored tax exhaustion) and estimated equations by
ordinary least squares. Not only does the availability of a large panel
of data allow the investigation of cross sectional variation and improve
the precision with which parameters may be estimated; it also permits
fuller investigation of the nature of stochastic shocks to the
investment process.
So far the discussion has concentrated on the reasons for cross
sectional variation between companies. These issues are discussed
further below in section 1.2 which is a brief survey of the relevant
literature and section 1.3 which describes the UK corporation tax system
in more detail. It is also worth noting the main features of the
investment model developed in chapter 3.
The literature on the impact of taxation on investment has followed two,
8
closely related, approaches. The first, associated primarily with
Jorgensen relates the 'desired' capital stock to the cost of capital and
output. The empirical form of this model generally takes an ad hoc
approach to the dynamic properties of the investment process, adding
lags of investment and other variables to the estimated equation to
allow for adjustment costs and various forms of lags which may occur
between the decision to invest and the new capital being productive.
However, since this is a backward-looking model, and, although possibly
data coherent, not derived from an explicit optimising model, it suffers
from the Lucas critique in being unable to adequately examine the impact
of taxation on investment.
By contrast, the Q model adds adjustment costs to the underlying model
and consequently arrives at a theoretically consistent model where the
rate of investment depends on Tobin's Q, the ratio of the market value
of the company to the replacement value of its capital stock. The
problem with the Q model is that its empirical performance is poor. The
coefficient on Q is generally extremely low (implying very high
adjustment costs), the model exhibits serial correlation and, contrary
to the standard model, other variables are significant when added.
One possible reason for the poor empirical performance of Q is its
reliance on the assumption of perfect capital markets, so that the
market value of the firm can be taken to be the 'true' value, reflecting
all currently held expectations of future events. The poor performance
of Q is consistent with the stock market being too volatile. The model
generated here therefore derives an alternative investment equation from
the same underlying model, in which the rate of investment depends on
the rate of investment and the marginal product of capital in the
following period, as well as the Jorgensen cost of capital. The
advantage of this approach is that, like the Q model, it does not suffer
from the Lucas critique, but it also does not have to rely on the market
value of the firm.
This thesis is organised as follows. This introductory chapter has two
main purposes. The first is to briefly review the literature relevant to
the issues discussed here. The literature on investment and taxation has
already been the subject of several extensive surveys, and only a highly
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selective review Is presented here, mostly covering papers which examine
the role of tax exhaustion or which use panel data In estimation. Some
discussion is also presented regarding the literature on the
interactions of real and financial decisions of the firms, covering
particularly papers which examine the impact of financial factors on the
level of investment.
The second purpose of this introductory chapter is to describe the
nature of the UK corporation tax system. The lack of relevant
information regarding the extent of tax exhaustion prevents this from
being simply a description of tax rules, however. Rather, it has proved
necessary to construct a model of the corporation tax system in order to
provide estimates of tax liabilities and tax exhaustion. This model
provides such estimates by applying the rules of the tax system to
company accounting data such as the level of profit and investment. The
precise equations in the model are presented in Appendix B. This chapter
summarises the approach and provides some results indicating the extent
to which companies in the sample experienced tax exhaustion.
Chapter 2 presents a detailed theoretical model of the firm. It assumes
that companies attempt to maximise the present value of the
shareholders' wealth. The principal innovation is that it explicitly
models the role played by tax exhaustion. In addition, the role played
by leasing, rather than purchasing, fixed assets (the lessor being able
to claim capital allowances, but likely to pass on some of the benefit
to the lessee) is examined. The model also examines In detail the
financial side of the company's activities by including personal tax
parameters, constraints on new equity issues and dividends and adding
agency costs which arise in issuing debt and which depend positively on
the level of debt and negatively on the size of the firm (measured by
the capital stock).
The main aim in Chapter 2 is to derive a Q model of investment which
explicitly allows for tax exhaustion. This is done, and then estimates
of tax-adjusted Q are presented using accounting and market data from a
panel of 729 UK manufacturing companies between 1968 and 1986, together
with estimates of tax exhaustion provided by the tax model. The data is
described in detail in Appendix A. Chapter 2 then presents estimates of
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the Q investment equation using this data. It examines in some detail
the specification of the model for empirical purposes and also
investigates the impact of tax and tax exhaustion on investment.
In addition, various financial regimes which the company might encounter
are examined in some detail. The main determinants of the financial
regime are corporate and personal taxes, non-negativity constraints
on dividends and new equity issues and agency costs of debt. This
analysis merges two strands of the literature on financial regimes which
have looked separately at the impact of tax exhaustion and the impact of
capital market imperfections resulting in agency costs.
Chapter 3 develops the forward-looking investment model of the firm
based directly on the Euler equations from the optimisation process. The
underlying model is the same as that used in Chapter 2. The chapter
first develops a measure of the cost of capital which takes into account
tax exhaustion. This allows analysis of the impact of tax exhaustion on
the investment incentives facing the firm. The predictions of the model
for the effects of different kinds of tax reform are then discussed. In
particular, the model can be used to analyse the impact of permanent and
temporary, and announced and unannounced, tax reforms. The investment
equation is then estimated on the panel of company data, and a
comparison is made between the performance of the model with and without
tax exhaustion.
Chapter 4 turns attention towards other financial factors and in
particular attempts to examine whether companies are in some way
constrained in their investment decision the cost of external finance
and by lack of internal funds. This chapter once more uses a similar
model to that presented in Chapter 2, but concentrates more on
identifying the nature of possible constraints. The theoretical model
generates the result that cash flow can be a significant determinant of
investment for all companies, not just those which are at a particular
point in a financing hierarchy. The model is then tested to discover
whether cash flow does play a significant role for all firms, and
whether it is more important for some firms than others. This chapter
also investigates whether these results might be due to factors other
than financial constraints.
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2. Brief Survey of Literature
As outlined above, the key elements of this thesis are the impact of
taxation on firms' investment and financial decisions, the possible
impact of financial constraints on firms' Investment decisions, and the
role of micro data in examining these issues. While the following
chapters do investigate the more general question of the effects of
taxes on firms' behaviour, there are two reasons why this more general
question is not surveyed in any detail here. The first is to keep the
survey to a reasonable length by concentrating on the more Innovative
features of this study. The second is that there already exist several
excellent surveys of the relationship between taxes and investment (see,
for example, Chirinko (1987) and (1988) and Nickell (1978) for general
surveys, Chirinko and Eisner (1983) for a comparison of empirical
estimates from several US macroeconomic models of the impact of taxes on
investment and Auerbach (1983) for a survey of the literature on the
cost of capital which includes discussion of the relationship between
taxation and financial policy).
Investment and Taxation
The investigation here is based closely on the main two approaches in
the literature, with taxes having an effect on investment via Tobin's Q
(Tobln, 1969) or the cost of capital. Of course, as shown first by Abel
(1979), both of these approaches are based on essentially the same
neoclassical model of firm behaviour (and this is reflected below in
that the two approaches are derived from the same model, specified in
Chapter 2). This basic neoclassical model has been the basis of most
theoretical work on investment since Jorgensen (1963).
The original formulation of the model predicted that investment should
depend primarily on the cost of capital and output. The cost of capital,
in turn, depends on interest rates, depreciation rates and taxes.
Jorgensen and Hall (1967), produced promising results which suggested
that the cost of capital was an important determinant of investment.
However, Eisner and Nadiri. (1968) showed that this result depended on
the impact of the cost of capital being jointly estimated with the
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impact of output. When the two terms were separated, the impact of the
cost of capital was weak. It is probably fair to say that It Is this
latter result which has been dominant ever since.
Heated debates took place in the late 1960s and 1970s between Jorgensen
and many of his contemporaries concerning several aspects of the model.
These issues concerned such factors as the structure of the production
function and hence the role of the elasticity of substitution between
different factors of production (Eisner and Nadirl (1970), Eisner
(1969)), the role and interpretation of distributed lags in the
estimated equations - and, in particular, the nature of adjustment
costs: whether they should be treated as internal (eg. Lucas (1967),
Gould (1968) and Treadway (1969) or external (eg. Eisner and Strotz
(1963) and Precious (1987)), or, more fundamentally whether the effects
attributed to them should be attributed instead to delivery lags and the
irreversibility of investment decisions (eg. Nickell, 1974)).
Most fundamentally, however, the main problems arising from usual
formulations of the cost of capital model concern expectations and the
Lucas critique. Investment, by its very nature, is a forward-looking
decision; it must depend on what managers think will happen in the
future. But by forcing any expectational variable to be a function of
its past values as the usual formulation does, any news cannot be
incorporated into the equation. For example, If the government announces
a change in the corporation tax system to come into effect in one year's
time (as happened In the UK in 1984), this cannot be analysed in the
context of the usual cost of capital model. Neither can the model deal
with temporary changes to the tax system. Furthermore, the parameters on
past investment, output and the cost of capital reflect policy variables
rather than just structural parameters and so they suffer from the Lucas
(1976) critique.
The popularity of the Q model in the 1980s arose largely because it
apparently deals with these problems. However although the theoretical
marginal Q model generates an investment equation in which only
structural parameters are estimated (if one is prepared to accept one
particular form of adjustment costs), marginal Q is, in general
unobservable. The empirical specification which equates marginal and
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average Q is only valid under strong assumptions of constant returns to
scale, perfect competition in the output market and a perfect capital
market (Hayashi (1982)). However, it is an important theoretical
advantage of the average Q model that the stock market value of the firm
(the numerator of average Q) in principle incorporates all currently
held expectations about the firm's future performance.
Despite these advantages, however, average Q models have tended to
perform badly in their empirical implementation (for typical results,
see for example von Furstenburg (1977), Summers (1981), Poterba and
Summers (1983) and Poret and Torres (1989)). In general, the explanatory
power of the Q model is weak, serial correlation or dynamic structures
including the lagged dependent variable are common, and other variables,
contrary to the basic Q model, enter the equation significantly. It
might be noted also that Abel and Blanchard (1986) attempted to estimate
a model based on the Q approach which did not substitute average for
marginal Q. However, their results were in line with those found in
using average Q.
One other approach to modelling investment behaviour has been to
estimate simple, ad hoc, models without any explicit overidentifying
restrictions. Some such simple models (for example, Feldstein (1982))
have predicted a powerful role for taxation. However, parameter
estimates have been found to be sensitive to small changes of
specification (Chirinko (1986)). More important, though, is the absence
of any structural interpretation of such models. To this extent, they
suffer, like the basic cost of capital models, by being unable to
predict the impact of tax reform because it is not known whether the
parameters will change with the tax reform.
The approach followed in Chapter 3 of this thesis is to estimate the
Euler equations for the optimising model of the firm behaviour. This
follows the approach of Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) and Shapiro (1986).
However, while each of these papers included a measure of the rental
price of capital, neither allowed for anticipated changes In the tax
regime or of the tax position of firms.
It should be also be noted that almost all published empirical work on
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investment models has used aggregate data and have therefore not
exploited cross section variation between firms. One of the aims of this
thesis is therefore to examine whether the poor results found in the
estimation of average Q equations may be due to problems of aggregation.
It should be noted, though, that previous results using panel data for Q
models, at best, are mixed. Salinger and Summers (1983) find that the
coefficient on Q in time series regressions for individual US firms
takes the expected sign in almost all cases but is statistically
insignificant nearly half the time. Hayashi and Inoue (1989), using a
panel of Japanese firms find Q to be a significant determinant of
investment, but also find that cash flow is also significant. Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) find similar results for US firms.
Another failing of the literature on the effect of taxation on
investment behaviour is that no paper deals adequately with differences
in the structure of the tax incentives between firms. Part of these
differences arise because of the different asset mix required for
particular investments. In the UK, for example, a firm in a service
industry seeking to acquire commercial property receives no capital
allowances to match the depreciation of that property while a
manufacturing firm purchasing a mixture of plant and machinery and
industrial buildings receives a relatively high allowance - it is
difficult to attribute these differences solely to differing
depreciation rates.
In addition to these factors, the prevalence of tax exhaustion adds to
cross sectional variation. This has certainly long been recognised in
principle. For example, Domar and Musgrave (1944) and Stiglitz (1969)
argued that tax asymmetries of the kind described above would discourage
risk taking because the government does not share in the 'downside'
risks. Thus, riskier firms would be less likely to undertake Investment.
However, this argument is too simple, as has been pointed out by
Auerbach (1986) in the context of tax systems which would have been
neutral with full loss offset. The reason is that the incentives facing
firms depend crucially on the dynamics of tax exhaustion. Thus a firm
approaching tax exhaustion may have a higher incentive to invest since
some allowance can be claimed on the purchase of the asset in the
current period, but payment of tax on the returns to the investment In
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subsequent periods may be delayed. The calculations in Chapter 3 confirm
that this factor can lead to marked variations in the cost of capital
even under non-neutral tax systems.
The few empirical papers which have allowed for the impact of tax
exhaustion on investment have Invariably done so in a very simplified
fashion, by setting the tax rate to zero in periods of tax exhaustion
(for example, Anderson (1987) and Hayashl and Inoue (1989)). However, as
should be clear, this implies the very strong assumption that the firm
never expects to resume a tax paying position; if It does expect to
resume paying tax the effect of tax exhaustion is only to delay tax
effects rather than to cancel them altogether.
The most well known studies which attempt to quantify the extent of tax
exhaustion are Cordes and Sheffrin (1983), Auerbach and Poterba (1986)
and Altschuler and Auerbach (1987). Cordes and Sheffrin and Altschuler
and Auerbach used confidential tax return data to estimate the
importance of tax exhaustion in the US; the former have only a single
cross section whereas the latter have a panel of around 2800 firms
between 1971 and 1982. Auerbach and Poterba used accounting data to
perform the same task but concluded that their estimates may have
seriously underestimated the magnitude of aggregate loss carryforwards.
The most detailed study then, Altschuler and Auerbach, conclude that tax
exhaustion is of major importance for US firms. They find that about 50%
of firms in 1982 had unused tax benefits that were being carried forward
(slightly less than half of these unused benefits were tax losses; the
rest were unused tax credits). Altschuler and Auerbach also estimated
marginal tax rates on different forms of investment. They did so by
using an autoregressive model to forecast future period of tax
exhaustion facing firms (this contrasts with the approach used below In
which (estimated) actual outturns are used. Using this approach they
calculate that the effective average tax rate (essentially the statutory
tax rate multiplied by a discount factor to represent the period over
which losses are carried forwards) was only 2/3 of the full statutory
rate. It should be noted that, at reasonable discount rates this implies
very long periods of tax exhaustion. They also confirm that marginal tax
rates are complex and may actually be reduced by tax exhaustion, as
explained above.
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Investment and Financial Factors
Most empirical models of company investment rely on the assumption of
perfect capital markets. As is well known, in a world without taxes, one
implication of this assumption is that firms are indifferent to funding
their investment programmes from internal or external funds (Modigliani
and Miller (1958)). However, there is a rapidly growing body of
literature examining the possible existence of imperfections in capital
markets and their effects on firms' financial and real decisions. The
common theme underlying the various contributions is the lack of perfect
substitutability between inside and outside financing. The existence of
differential information and incentive problems make external finance
more costly than internal finance. In this setting the availability of
internally generated funds and possibly of assets that can be used as
collateral may have an effect on investment decisions.
There may be advantages and disadvantages of both forms of external
finance, debt and new equity, which we now discuss in turn, beginning
with debt finance. There are different reasons why there may be a
conflict between shareholders and debtholders, giving rise to agency
costs of debt. In a seminal paper, Jensen and Mecklirig (1976) suggest
that shareholders have an incentive to engage in projects that are too
risky and so increase the possibility of financial distress and
bankruptcy. If successful, the payoff to the owners of the firm is
large. If unsuccessful, the limited liability provision of debt
contracts implies that the creditors bear most of the cost. Myers (1977)
suggests that if the firm is partly debt-financed, it may underinvest in
the sense that it foregoes projects with a positive net present value.
This problem is particularly severe when assets in place are a small
proportion of the total value of the firm. Other areas of conflict
between bondholders and shareholders are represented by the claim
dilution resulting from the issue of additional debt and by the
possibility that the firm may pay out excessive dividends financed by
reduced investment.
Since potential creditors are assumed (by Jensen and Meckling, for
example) to understand the incentives facing stockholders and are aware
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of the risk of bankruptcy when loans are negotiated, ultimately the
owner will bear the consequences of these agency problems in terms of a
higher cost of debt. With asymmetric information about borrower quality,
rationing may also occur (see, for example, Jaffe and Russell (1976) and
Stiglitz and Weiss, (1981)). As a way to control the conflict between
bondholders and shareholders and to minimise the agency cost of debt,
bond covenants are observed, limiting the discretionary action of the
owners regarding dividends, future debt issues, and maintenance of
working capital (Smith and Warner (1979)). Debt covenants usually
contain a maximum limit on the amount of dividends that can be paid out
which depends positively upon accumulated earnings. Restrictions on the
minimum value of the ratio between tangible assets and debt, working
capital and debt and, finally, between interest payments and cash flow
are also common. The greater is the amount of debt in the firm's capital
structure, the more severe the incentive problems become, and the more
likely it is that the firm will face financial distress and ultimately
bankruptcy. Because of the less favourable terms on which debt can be
obtained and because of the cost associated with tighter monitoring and
bonding activities, agency costs are therefore likely to be increasing
in the level of debt. On the other hand it is likely that such costs are
a decreasing function of the level of past and present earnings and of
assets, particularly if they are liquid, that can be used as collateral.
While agency costs make debt less attractive, the tax deductibility of
interest payments make it more attractive. In the absence of such costs,
and neglecting tax exhaustion, debt is preferred to retentions if
(1-m)/(1-z) > 1-rn , where m is the marginal personal tax rate on Interest
income, z the tax rate on capital gains and t the corporate tax rate
(King, 1977). In the UK this inequality has usually been satisfied for
most investors; while the highest rate of income tax has generally been
above the corporate tax rate, higher rate taxpayers commonly also pay
capital gains tax2 - moreover, a large proportion of equity is now held
by financial institutions which have either no further tax liability
(pension funds) or only relatively low liability (insurance companies).
2The existence of a high allowance for capital gains results in a zero
marginal tax rate for investors earning less than £5,000 per year (in
1990) in the form of capital gains.
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Turning to new share issues, they may disadvantageous because of
transaction costs or asymmetric information and either advantageous or
disadvantageous due to taxation. Informal evidence on transactions costs
In the UK suggests that there are large fixed costs in issuing new
equity (for example, typical transactions costs in raising £5 million
would be around £250,000 compared to only £500,000 for raising £50
million). Ignoring issues of tax exhaustion, the tax advantage or
disadvantage of new share issues relative to retentions depends on the
system of company taxation and personal tax rates. Under a classical
system, if the personal tax rate on dividends, m, is greater than that
on capital gains, z, as is usually the case, new equity issues are more
expensive (see, for example, King, 1977). In an imputation system, like
the one in existence in the UK since 1973, the situation Is more
complex. New share issues are a cheaper source of finance for a full tax
paying firm if r=(1-m)/((1-z)(1-c)) > 1, where c is the rate of
imputation. This condition will be satisfied for institutional investors
for whom m=z=0 and for other investors with a low marginal tax rate on
dividends.
Finally, new share Issues may be more costly because of asymmetric
information. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that, if managers have
inside information, it may happen that it is so favourable that
management, acting in the interest of old shareholders, will not issue
new shares because they perceive them as being underpriced. Investors
will therefore interpret the decision to issue new shares as a bad
signal. In this case new equity finance can only be obtained at a
premium, because of the adverse selection problem.
Up to this point in the discussion we have implicitly assumed that
management acts in the interest of shareholders. Allowing for the
possible divergence of interest between managers and outside
shareholders provides an additional rationale for the disadvantage of
external finance. If managers have a less than 100% ownership stake in
the company, they will be encouraged to use a greater than optimal
amount of the firm's resources in the form of perquisites (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). Such activities can be monitored by the outside
shareholders, but such monitoring is costly and the insiders will
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ultimately bear the cost in terms of a reduced price that prospective
outside shareholders are willing to pay for a stake in the firm. This
consideration suggests that the cost of outside financing is related to
the stake of insiders and to the dispersion of outside ownership (since
greater dispersion of ownership will increase the cost of monitoring).
One result of this (as suggested by Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook
(1984)) is that firms may be obliged to pay higher dividends than they
would otherwise wish to, so that the shareholders force the firm to
submit itself to greater scrutiny from outside investors.
This raises the issue of whether factors such as the size of the firm or
the age of the firm may influence the relative cost of external finance.
While this has not yet been directly addressed in the literature, it
seems likely that informational problems will be greater for small firms
and young firms, because they are likely to be a small part of an
investor's portfolio and as such, the investor may have little knowledge
of them. Banks, for example, may have more information about larger and
more developed firms. On the other hand, it is possible that smaller
firms have a less diverse ownership, or that more of the firm is owned
by the managers.
In another group of papers the role and consequences for investment of
informational imperfections and control problems are more closely
analysed. In this context the amount of net assets that can be used as
collateral is a determinant of the agency cost of external finance and
has an effect of investment. The particular informational asymmetry and
the details about technology differ across papers, but the common theme
is that insiders have less incentive to cheat and more incentive to act
in the interest of outside investors when their stake in the project is
greater (see Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler (1988) and Gertler and
Hubbard (1988)). The link between the firm's value and the fraction of
entrepreneur wealth invested in the project is also emphasised by Leland
and Pyle (1977). Since changes in borrower's net worth are likely to be
procyclical, incentive problems may be particularly severe in a
recession. This may lead to an asymmetric effect of financial variables
on investment during the business cycle. The more precise modelling of
the informational asymmetries and of the possibility of bankruptcy Is
clearly a strength of these models. However, they do not yield an
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investment equation that explains how financial factors and expectations
about firms' prospects jointly determine investment.
These considerations suggest that credit availability, cash flow and
collateralisable assets may all have an effect on investment decisions.
The literature on these issues has been conducted in the context of
models with different structures concerning information and technology.
One group of papers adds financial considerations to standard investment
models based on the assumption of convex adjustment costs, usually
estimated usually in their Q form. For example, credit rationing with an
exogenously given ceiling can be easily added to Q models. If there are
tax advantages to debt, firms will borrow up to capacity. Under the
standard assumptions, outlined above, marginal Q will continue to equal
average Q, with the caveat that the present value of the interest
payments net of new debt issued should be added to the market value of
shares in defining average Q. The present value of these flows can be
approximated by the current value of the stock of debt. One could also
assume that the maximum amount of debt is a fixed proportion of the
capital stock (Summers, 1981) with basically the same result.
A more common approach is to include an additional cost term in the
objective function, increasing in the level of debt, that summarises
the agency or financial distress cost of debt, as in Auerbach (1984),
Chirinko (1987), Hayashi (1985) and King (1987); Steigum (1983) and
Bernstein and Nadiri (1986) make the cost of borrowing an increasing
function of the debt/equity ratio. In this case, an internal solution
for debt can be obtained. If the agency cost of debt is linear
homogeneous in its arguments and the change (as opposed to the level) of
debt does not enter the agency cost function, marginal Q again equals
average Q. If the change in debt does appear in the agency cost function
and the latter is not linear homogeneous, the difference between
marginal and average Q depends upon the present and future values of the
change and level of debt (Chirinko, 1987).
When personal taxation is taken into account and if capital gains are
taxed less heavily than dividends, it is possible to distinguish between
three financing regimes (see, for example, Auerbach (1984) and Hayashi
(1985)). In regime 1, investment can be financed at the margin by
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retentions, positive dividends are paid and no new shares are issued. In
regime 3, the firm issues new shares and pays no dividend. In the
intermediate case, regime 2, both dividends and new share issues are
zero and the marginal source of finance is debt. A relationship between
investment and tax-adjusted average Q, can be derived only in the
regimes 1 and 3 (Hayashi (1985)). In regime 2 no such relationship
exists and investment equals cash flow plus new debt issued. In this
context, an increase in cash flow makes the probability that investment
is financed at the margin by retentions more likely and this can be
shown to increase investment. However, in this model conditional on Q,
cash flow does not have an additional explanatory power in the regimes 1
and 3. In regime 2, increases in cash flow (and debt) translate into a
one to one increase in investment and Q does not matter.
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) extended this analysis by including
a premium for issuing new shares, based on the adverse selection
argument put forward by Myers and Majluf (1984). The existence of this
premium increases the cost differential between internal finance and new
equity and it increases the likelihood that the firm will find itself at
the point of discontinuity where all profits are retained, no dividends
are paid and firm's future prospects are not good enough to induce it to
issue new shares.
If a firm is in regime 1, the equilibrium value of marginal q is less
than 1, which is the basis of the 'tax capitalisation' hypothesis
associated, among others, with Auerbach (1979a) and (1979b) and Bradford
(1981). King (1987) uses this result to derive a model of takeovers and
mergers: essentially if equity is valued at less than the replacement
cost of the assets held by the firm, a firm wishing to expand would find
it cheaper to purchase assets by taking over another firm, rather than
by doing so directly. In this paper, King assumes that a clientele
effect holds in which for the marginal investor (1-m)/(1-z)(1-t).
Investors for whom (1-m)/(1-z) > (1-t) will prefer to purchase debt
rather than equity, and those for whom (1-m)/(1-z) < (1-x) will prefer
to purchase debt. This is therefore a Miller (1977) equilibrium, in
which the firm is indifferent to issuing debt or equity, but there is a
global optimum depending on the wealth and tax rates of investors.
22
An alternative method of deriving an internal optimum for debt is to
rely on the possibility of tax exhaustion. Thus, De Angelo and Masulis
(1981) and Mayer (1986) show that, under a classical corporation tax,
*
the possibility of tax exhaustion tends to reduce the value of r, to w
say. If initially (1-m)/(1-z) > (1-t), an increase in debt will reduce
*
t because of the deductibility of interest payments. Eventually an
optimum is reached where (1-m)/(1-z)=(1-t ). This is not a Miller
equilibrium: the optimum is reached only at a unique level of debt. Keen
and Schiantarelli (1988) have, however, shown that under an imputation
system the possibility of tax exhaustion cannot lead to an internal
*
optimum for debt and for new equity issues unless t =0, which implies
that the firm is permanently tax exhausted with certainty - effectively
there is no tax.
However, the Keen and Schiantarelli paper only considered whether tax
exhaustion on its own could lead to an internal optimum. It did not
allow for the possibility of other constraints on the firm, or for the
possibility that the firm encounters agency costs of debt or new equity.
Chapter 2 includes a discussion which merges these two strands of the
literature to examine the financial regimes in which a firm may operate
under an imputation system, with the possibility of tax exhaustion, and
with the possibility of agency costs on debt.
3. Modelling the UK corporation tax
Since the 1960s the UK has witnessed a series of reforms to its
corporation tax system. These include the creation of corporation tax as
an independent tax in 1965, the gradual introduction of generous
capital allowances in the early 1970s, the introduction of the partial
imputation system in 1973 and stock relief in 1975, and the 1984 reforms
which reduced the tax rate and capital allowances and abolished stock
relief. A number of these reforms were designed with the specific
intention of influencing the investment and financial decisions of firms.
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These changes in the statutory tax system have been one reason why
incentives facing firms in the UK have varied over time. One additional
factor is the asymmetric treatment of taxable profits and losses and the
possibility of not being fully able to utilise the imputation system
because taxable profits are too low. These two forms of tax exhaustion
have already been described. It should be noted here both that they were
more common when the statutory tax system had relatively generous
allowances (and so taxable profit was lower), and that they introduce a
second source of variation in the incentives facing firms in both time
series and cross section dimensions.
In order to study the impact of cross section variation in taxes on
firms' decisions, it is necessary to use individual firm data. The most
obvious source of such data is company accounting records.
Unfortunately, however, company accounts generally do not record actual
tax payments or liabilities; instead, they record some notional tax
charge estimated by accountants. The most important feature of this
notional tax charge is that it includes 'deferred' tax. The general
principle here is that accountants wish to make provision for any tax
which will eventually become due on the accounting 'profit' earned in
the current period. If accountants' profit exceeds taxable profit
(because, for example, of accelerated depreciation provisions under the
tax system), the tax rate is applied to the former in order to calculate
the charge recorded in accounts - the difference between that and the
actual tax liability is deferred until some later date.
In order to estimate actual tax liabilities, it has therefore proved
necessary to develop a model of the tax system. The aim is simply to
apply the rules of the tax system to relevant accounting data on, for
example, profit, investment and interest and dividend payments. This
procedure permits estimates to be drawn, for each company in each year
in which data is available, not only of the tax liability but also
whether the company is either fully tax exhausted or ACT exhausted and
the size of the losses and unrelieved ACT carried forward. It should be
noted immediately that such an approach cannot give precise estimates of
these items. The main difficulty is that, although it is in principle
possible to model any complexity in the tax system, often the required
data is not available, even in company accounts.
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Some comparison with alternative methods of estimating tax liabilities
should be made. The most common is simply to calculate the liability for
some 'typical' firm (eg. OECD (1985) and King (1986)). The problem with
this approach is that the rich cross sectional variation captured by the
approach used here is lost, since there is no way of distinguishing
firms in different tax positions. A second approach is used by the
Inland Revenue (1982), who have developed a model for forecasting
purposes based on actual tax returns. This approach is, unfortunately,
unavailable since the data used is held to be confidential. In any case,
since the Inland Revenue model needs to estimate accounting measures
given tax returns and knowledge of the tax system, It does not have any
real advantage over the model described here (a better model would
combine both sources of data). In addition, Higson (1986) has pointed
out that, under certain circumstances, tax liabilities can be estimated
directly from the tax data in accounts. While this gives reasonable
estimates of tax liabilities for a number of years, it is not as general
as the model described in Appendix B (in particular, it cannot be used
for forecasting the tax positions of firms). Nevertheless, this method
has been used as a means of checking the estimates provided by the model
used here, and the measures of the cost of capital and tax-adjusted Q
from chapters 2 and 3 have also been computed using the estimates
provided from this methodology. The general result of this comparison is
that, where comparisons can be made, the results from the model used
here appear reasonable. Finally, it should be noted that the kind of
model described in Appendix B has been attempted elsewhere, although not
in as great detail (see, for example, Goudie (1984), Robson (1985) and
Leavis and Morgan (1985)).
The remainder of this section details the main features of the UK
corporation tax system since 1968 and presents some results from the
model giving estimates of the scale of tax exhaustion over the period
1971 to 1986. The data covers 729 UK quoted manufacturing companies.
Each company has at least 4 years of data and 125 companies have data
for all 16 years. The data is described in detail in Appendix A.
Table 1.1 gives the main features of the UK corporation tax system. It
can be seen that apart from a relatively stable period for 10 years in
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the middle of the period, there has been substantial change. In
particular, the system began and ended as an approximation to economic
profit, with allowance rates roughly equal to economic depreciation, but
the stable period could be characterised as being closer to a tax on
company cash flow. The classical system was replaced by the imputation
system in 1973.
Table 1.1 Main Features of the UK Corporation Tax, 1968-1986
Financial Corporation Imputation Plant and Machinery Industrial Buildings
year	 tax rate	 rate	 FYA	 WDA	 FYA	 WDA
1968
	
45
	 0
	
20
	 0
	
4
1969
	
42. 5
	 0
	
20
	
0
	
4
1970
	
40
	 60
	
25
	 30
	
4
1971
	
40
	 80
	
25
	
30
	
4
1972
	
40
	
100
	
25
	
40
	
4
1973
	
52
	
30
	
100
	
25
	
40
	
4
1974
	
52
	
33
	
100
	
25
	
50
	
4
1975
	
52
	
35
	
100
	
25
	
50
	
4
1976
	
52
	
34
	
100
	 25
	
50
	
4
1977
	
52
	
34
	
100
	
25
	
50
	 4
1978
	
52
	 33
	
100
	 25
	
50
	
4
1979
	
52
	 30
	 100
	 25
	
50
	 4
1980
	
52
	
30
	
100
	
25
	
50
	
4
1981
	
52
	
30
	
100
	
25
	
75
	
4
1982
	
52
	 30
	
100
	
25
	
75
	
4
1983
	
50
	
30
	
100
	
25
	
75
	
4
1984
	
45
	
30
	
75
	
25
	 50
	
4
1985
	
40
	
30
	
50
	
25
	
25
	
4
1986
	
35
	
29
	
0
	
25
	 0
	
4
Notes:
1. 'FYA' refers to that percentage of capital expenditure which can be
treated as an immediate expense and 'WDA' the percentage rate at which
the remainder can be written off against tax. The 'WDA' for plant and
machinery is on a 'reducing balance' or exponential basis, and that for
industrial buildings is on a 'straight line' basis.
2. Commercial buildings have never received any capital allowances.
3. Stock relief was introduced in 1975, retroactive to 1973. The system
was changed in 1981 and abolished in 1984.
4. The partial imputation system was introduced in 1973. Before that a
classical system was in operation.
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Table 1.2 confirms that tax exhaustion was most important during the
period of generous allowances. The precise description of full tax
exhaustion and ACT exhaustion are left to Chapter 2. The basic
definitions are that, in the former case, the firm is in the position of
carrying forward unused tax losses to offset against subsequent profits,
and in the latter case, it is carrying forward unrelieved ACT since its
gross dividend payment is higher than taxable profit. Firms which have
been able to carry taxable losses or unused ACT back to offset against
earlier profits are therefore excluded from this definition (because for
them the tax system is essentially acting symmetrically in that they are
able to receive an immediate rebate on their losses, or are able to
claim all the benefit of the ACT offset).
Table 1.2 Importance of tax exhaustion in the UK
Case 1: Fully tax exhausted in year shown
Case 2: Fully tax exhausted in year shown, but not in previous year
Case 3: ACT exhausted in year shown
Case 4: ACT exhausted in year shown, but not in previous year
Year	 Size of	 Percentage of sample	 ('I.)
sample	 Case 1
	
Case 2	 Case 3	 Case 4
1971
	
190
	
1.3
	
0.5
1972
	
297
	
5.0
	
4.7
1973
	
374
	
4.9
	
2. 8
	
10. 1
	
10. 1
1974
	
409
	
23.4
	
19. 9
	
47. 9
	 39.2
1975
	
431
	
20 1
	
5.3
	 36.6
	
8. 5
1976
	
655
	
18. 1
	
7. 1
	 35.2
	
10. 0
1977
	
673
	
21.6
	
7. 9
	 39.7
	
11. 1
1978
	
685
	
19.7
	
4. 9
	 37.7
	
7. 9
1979
	
693
	
26.3
	
10. 2
	
44.3
	
11.0
1980
	
690	 27.2
	
8. 6
	
46.5
	 8. 4
1981
	
673
	
26. 1
	
6. 3
	
43.6
	
4.7
1982
	
660	 27.2
	
5. 1
	 41.8
	
4. 5
1983
	
639
	
26. 1
	
2. 4
	
40. 3
	 3. 8
1984
	
602	 24. 1
	
1.6
	 35.0
	
4. 0
1985
	
565
	
20.7
	
1.7
	
28.3
	
2. 1
1986
	
492
	
14.9
	
1.3
	
20 3
	
1.1
Notes.
1. Estimates refer to accounting years ending in the calendar year
shown.
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Table 1.2 provides some justification for examining the role of tax
exhaustion an company investment and financial behaviour. In 1980, for
example, it is estimated that 27% of the companies in the sample were
fully tax exhausted and 47% ACT exhausted. Even allowing for some margin
of error, this suggests that tax exhaustion was at that time an
important feature of the tax system. Further, these numbers are not
untypical of the proportions in nearby years. Indeed, such was the stock
of losses carried forward that it is estimated that 15'!. of the sample
were still fully tax exhausted and 20% ACT exhausted even by 1986, two
years after the tax base was dramatically increased.
The analysis in Chapter 3 suggests that the most important aspect of tax
exhaustion for the cost of capital is that firms move into and out of
positions in which they pay tax (for example, they may gain an allowance
from purchasing an asset in one year, but face a delayed tax payment on
the return earned a year later). Table 1.2 therefore also gives an
indication of the number of companies moving into and out of tax
exhaustion. While these proportions of the sample are rather
lower, they do indicate that there has been considerable
movement into and out of tax exhaustion. Finally, it is interesting to
note that, on the estimates of the model, less than 10% of companies
were at no point either fully tax exhausted or ACT exhausted.
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CHAPTER 2
INVESTMENT, Q AND FINANCIAL REGIMES
2.1 Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis are concerned with the Impact of
taxation on the investment decision and the financial structure of the
firm. They are linked, not just by subject matter, but by a common
underlying model. The main innovative feature of this model is that it
explicitly allows for variation in the effective tax rate and the
effective price of capital goods across firms by introducing the
possibility of tax exhaustion. In addition, since the model is tested on
UK data, it also incorporates the imputation system of taxing dividend
payments, which has been in operation in the UK since 1973 (and which
introduces a second form of tax exhaustion) 1 . Apart from the detailed
analysis of the tax system, the model makes the standard assumption that
firms aim to maximise the wealth of the existing shareholders. In order
to concentrate on tax effects, it generally assumes that the firm is a
price-taker, both for the output price and the price of capital goods.
However, the model does include the possibility that the firm faces
agency costs in issuing debt, and in Chapter 3, it also allows for the
possibility of imperfect competeion in the product market.
This chapter first uses the model to analyse the possible financial
regimes which the firm may face. As discussed in Chapter 1, It is now
standard in the literature to consider three possible regimes,
corresponding to the marginal source of finance being retained earnings,
1 lmputation systems are very common in Europe, being in existence, for
example, in Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain
as well as the UK, but have not so far been introduced in the US. Note
also that 'ACT exhaustion', defined below, is normally a feature of such
systems; this is the role of the precompte in France, for example.
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debt or new equity (see, for example, Auerbach (1984) and Hayashi
(1985)). Allowing for tax exhaustion and the imputation system adds
several complications to this basic analysis. The most obvious of these
is that the common view that retained earnings are a cheaper source of
finance than new equity because of the taxation of dividend payments may
not hold under the imputation system. This is because it is quite
possible that the effective tax rate on dividends is, in effect,
negative2.
This possibility turns the usual 'dividend puzzle' on its head. Under
certain values of personal tax parameters, the puzzle is no longer 'why
do firms simultaneously issue new shares and pay dividends?', but rather
'why do firms not continuously issue new shares and pay out the funds
raised as dividends?'. This question has rarely been addressed in the
literature, and when it has been, it is usually dealt with by adding
some upper bound to dividend payments. For example, Edwards and Keen
(1985) justify such an upper bound by reference to legal restrictions on
dividend payments. However, the problem with this approach is that firms
are rarely, if ever, observed to be at this upper bound. An alternative
explanation is therefore explored here, namely that the possibility of
tax exhaustion creates an internal optimum at which firms may be
observed issuing a finite amount of new shares while simultaneously
paying dividends. However, the role played by tax exhaustion is wider
than this, and together with the presence of agency costs can lead to a
fourth regime in which the marginal cost of each source of finance is
the same.
This chapter goes on to consider the Q model of investment, which can be
derived from the basic wealth-maximising approach. Once more, the
inclusion of tax exhaustion adds a number of new features to the model,
2For example, in the UK the payment of a dividend by a company which is
not tax exhausted to a pension fund will not affect the total tax
liability of the company since the additional tax on the dividend (seen
as a prepayment of the shareholder's income tax) can be ofset against
the corporation tax charge. However, because the pension fund is not
taxed, it can also reclaim the tax associated with the dividend. The net
effect of the dividend is therefore to reduce total taxation.
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notably concerning the role played by expectations. In the standard Q
model, marginal Q is equal to average Q and can therefore be proxied by
the ratio of the observable market value of the firm to the replacement
value of the capital stock, where the market value of the firm is
assumed to incorporate all currently held expectations of the firm's
future performance. However, the presence of tax exhaustion adds two
other state variables (different losses carried forward by the firm),
the shadow value of which must be deducted from the numerator of average
Q to arrive at marginal Q. In the empirical testing of the Q model,
then, much attention is paid to the empirical modelling of these terms
(which also appear in the measures of the effective tax rate and the
effective price of capital goods).
Obviously, the main aim of the empirical work is to assess the impact of
taxation on investment via the Q model using a large panel of firms over
a reasonably long period. However, part of the importance of using panel
data is to allow for cross section variation in effective tax rates, and
so to be able to test the importance of tax exhaustion for investment
decisions by firms. As discussed below, however, it is not clear that
the Q model is well-suited to this task. The main problem is that all
tax effects are incorporated into the single variable, Q, along with all
other effects concerning, for example, expectations of future demand and
supply conditions. Quite large variations in tax parameters can
nevertheless be dwarfed by the variation in the stock market value of
the firm.
Section 2.2 describes the model used in this chapter and in Chapter 3.
Section 2.3 examines the first order conditions for investment and the
capital stock to derive a Q model of investment. The role of tax
exhaustion in affecting the tax parameters, as well as the role of
leasing, is discussed. Section 2.4 turns to the optimal financial policy
of the firm in the model. A number of financial regimes are explored,
which depend on the interaction of the tax system, especially through
tax exhaustion, and agency costs of debt. Section 2.5 considers some of
the empirical issues involved in constructing values of Q and tax
parameters, especially the complications due to effective tax rates
which depend on expected future profitability. Section 2.6 presents some
descriptive data on Q and the various tax parameters in the model and
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section 2.7 presents the empirical results derived from estimating the Q
model on the panel of 729 companies. Section 2.8 briefly concludes.
2.2 Maximisation with Tax Asyninetries and Leasing
The model used here to analyse firms' investment and financial decisions
is based on the standard assumption of wealth maximisation for the
existing group of shareholders. In characterising the firms'
maximisation problem we start from the identity of sources and uses of
funds:
D =p '1T -p1 +VN+B	 -(1+i)B -x _A(B,K)_pRLKL	 (2.1)
t	 tt	 tt	 t	 t+1	 t t.	 t	 t t	 ttt
where	 denotes dividends paid,	 pre-tax profits, p the price of
output and 
Pt 
the price of investment goods, 1 the number of new
machines purchased,	 new equity issues, B 1 the amount of one period
debt issued during period t and redeemed during period t+1, i the
interest rate, X corporation tax payments, A agency costs on debt,
the rental rate on leased machines and K' their stock (note that K may
be negative, implying that the firm Is a lessor), all in period t.
Agency costs are written as A(B K) where it is assumed that AB > 0,
> 0, AK < 0. Their introduction can be justified on the basis of the
arguments developed in the finance literature concerning asymmetric
information about the firm (managers know more than potential investors)
and problems of management control (investors want to force managers to
act in the interests of the investors, rather than the managers), which
were briefly reviewed in Chapter 1. Their main role in this model will
be in the discussion of financial structure.
The firm is, for the moment assumed to operate in a perfectly
competitive product market and is assumed to face internal costs in
adjusting the capital stock, G(I,IL, K) which are convex in the total
32
level of investment goods acquired by the firm through direct purchase
or leasing (1L) If the firm is a lessee, so that I is positive, then
the difference between leasing and purchasing capital is assumed to be
purely financial: thus and I enter the adjustment cost function in
the same way. However, if the firm is a lessor, so that 1L is negative,
it is possible that I has a different impact on adjustment costs
compared to I. Note that K is the sum of both purchased and leased
capital.
Production during period t depends upon the capital stock available at
the beginning of the period, K and, following Auerbach (1986) and
Edwards and Mayer (1987), is subject to a random shock that is not
observed at the beginning of the period when decisions are taken. For
simplicity is assumed to be i.i.d. with known density function h(a).
It is assumed that variables factors (in particular labour) are paid
their marginal product and hence are optimised out of this model 3, which
concentrates only on capital. Hence, the definition of pre-tax profits,
is defined from:
ii = U (a ,K ) - G (I 	 K)t t t	 t t	 t
where U > 0. The equation of motion for K is
a	 t
K	 = (1-)K + i +t+1	 t	 t	 t
L
and for K ist
KL = (l_)KL +
t+1	 t	 t
(2.2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
The formalisation of the tax system here builds on the description in
Edwards and Keen (1985) and Mayer (1986). Under an imputation system,
corporate tax liabilities arise from two sources. First, the firm must
pay corporation tax on Its operating profit minus current allowances,
3Although the total wage bill becomes relevant when imperfect
competition is introduced in Chapter 3.
33
whenever this taxable profit, 	 , is positive. qi is defined as:
-r -iB -L _pRLKLt	 t	 tt	 t	 ttt
(2.5)
where r represents depreciation allowances for tax purposes and L
losses brought forward from the previous period. More precisely, I'
equals the si.im of first year allowances and depreciation allowances on
the tax written down value for tax purposes of the accumulated capital
stock at the beginning of the period, K. Thus,
r = ( i-j)p i + TKT	 (2.6)tt	 tt
where (1-j) is the fraction of investment expenditure that can be
subtracted from profits in the year in which it is incurred, is the
rate at which past investment can be depreciated for tax purposes and
KT 1 = ( ioT)KT +
	
(2.7)
Losses represent the first non-linearity in the corporate tax system: if
then generally an immediate tax rebate is not paid, but the
taxable loss must be carried forward indefinitely, and withut an
interest markup, to set against future taxable prof its45.
Second, under the UK imputation system, the firm makes an advance
payment of a fraction of the shareholder's income tax at a rate c (the
imputation rate) on grossed up dividends ie. D/(i-c). This payment is
4Strictly, under the UK corporation tax system, losses can be carried
back one period to set against the previous year's profit. In this case
the system is essentially symmetrical in that an immediate rebate may be
claimed. Losses due to capital allowances may be carried back up to
three years. These carry back provisions are ignored in the model,
although they are incorporated in the empirical work, where the crucial
issue is whether losses are carried forward.
51n the UK, losses may be carried forward indefinitely, and this is what
has been modelled here. However, this is not always the case: for
example, losses may only be carried forward 15 years in the US and 5
years in France, Italy and Germany (until 1990, when indefinite loss
carry forward was introduced).
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termed Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT). ACT can be deducted from the main
component of the corporation tax if gross dividends do not exceed
taxable profits. This upper limit introduces a second type of
non-linearity in the tax system which is of particular interest
concerning the choice between raising funds through retentions or new
equity issues. If gross dividends exceed taxable profits, the
"unrelieved ACT" (defined here as U1) must again be carried forward
indefinitely, without an interest markup, to be set against the main
component of corporation tax in later years6.
The main features of the tax system can therefore be summarised by the
following expressions for X , L	 and U
t	 t+1	 t+1
C
D - mm I C Dt + U, c.max [0]}+X = t.max	 1-c t	 1-c
L	 = max [-vi ,0]t+1	 t
(2.8)
(2.9)
cU =max-D
t+i	 1-c t + U - c.max [,0], (2. 10)
where t is the statutory rate of corporation tax. In (2.8), the first
term represents the principal corporation tax charge and the second is
ACT. The third term shows the reduction in the corporation tax charge
available under the imputation system. The first term net of the third
term is known as the "mainstream corporation tax" charge (MCT). If
losses, L1, are carried forward. Similarly, unrelieved ACT, U1 is
carried forward if gross dividends exceed taxable profits. Note that
classical corporation tax (in force in the US, for example) is a special
case of (2.8)-(2.10) in which c = 0. Clearly taxable losses, L1, and
unrelieved ACT, U, represent two state variables additional to the
standard model.
for losses, in the UK ACT not offset against current taxable profit
may be set against taxable profit of earlier periods (since 1984 up to 6
years earlier). Again, these carry back provisions are ignored in the
model, but are allowed for in the empirical work.
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Given this characterisation of the tax system, there are three possible
tax positions in which the firm might find itself.
(a) Full Tax Exhaustion:
Full tax exhaustion occurs when 0. The firm has no mainstream tax
liability and therefore, since ACT cannot be set against corporation
tax, it simply adds to the stock of unrelieved ACT, U 1 . Using (2.1),
(2.2), (2.5) and (2.8), the net dividend paid is:
(2. ha)
while, using (2.9) and (2.10), tax losses and unrelieved ACT evolve
according to:
L 1 = -
	
+	 + iB + L - pRK
	
(2. 12a)
	
= u + cJp -p i +vN+B -(1+i )B -A(B ,K )-p R L 1	 (2. 13a)t+1	 t	 1tt tt t t+1	 t t	 t t	 tt tJ
From (2.2), (2.5) and (2.hla) this case arises for values of the
stochastic component of profits, , for which a, where a is
defined from
p1T(a,K )=r' + L + i B -A(B ,K ) - pRLKL - p'G(I,I',K)
	
(2.14)t	 t	 t	 tt	 t t	 ttt
(b) ACT exhaustion:
ACT exhaustion occurs when the mainstream corporation tax liability is
positive (ie.
	
> 0) but is insufficient to absorb all current and
accumulated unrecovered ACT: ie. cD /(1-c)+U 	 > ci . In this caset	 t+1	 t
D = (1_c){[1_(r_c)1P	
-	
I +	 + Bjtt	 tt	 t	 t+1t
-A(B ,K )- [1_(t-c)1P RL + (t-c)(r +L )	 (2. lib)t t Jtt t	 t tJ
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L	 =0
	
(2. 12b)
t+1
and
=	 +	 +	 + B- (1t_it)Bt
-A(BK) + (t_c)ptRLt + (1+t_c)(r+L)}	 (2.13b)
Using (2.1), (2.2), (2.5), (2.8) and (2.10), this is the outcome if
7
a >b , where b is defined from
t t
	
t
c(t-c)pU(b,K) =	 + c{_tit + v + B 1- (1-er-c)i)B
-A(B,K) +(T_c)ptR Lt +(1+t-c)(r+L)	 (2.15)
(c) Full tax-paying:
The only remaining possibility is that 	 and cD/(1-c)+U	 which
occurs when a>b. The firm is then a full taxpayer. In this case
D = (l—r)p 'ui -
	
+ vN + B	 - [1+(t-c)]i B + Ut	 tt	 tt	 t	 t+1	 tt	 t
	
-A(BK) - pRk	 + r(r+L)	 (2.11c)
and
L	 =U	 =0
	 (2. 12c,2. 13c)
t+1	 t+1
In addition to describing the corporate tax system in detail, we also
wish to examine the role of other financial factors In firms' decisions.
Agency costs on debt have already been included in the model. In
71t can be shown that DO baa. Since below we impose the condition
that	 0, we can therefore ignore the possibility that b<a.
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addition to these agency costs, it is necessary to specify the legal
constraints under which firms operate. Following much of the literature
(see, for example, King, 1974 and 1977, and Edwards and Keen, 1985), the
conditions of non-negative dividends and share issues are imposed. Under
UK law, the former are prohibited. The latter were also prohibited until
1981; since then, payments for repurchase are taxed as capital gains
rather than income only if certain stringent conditions are met (Gaminie,
1982). As discussed in King (1977), the constraint that debt is
non-negative is also imposed. This is more problematic, but without it,
for some possible configurations of tax parameters, the firm would set
and V infinitely large.
More generally, there exists a large literature examining why dividends
are paid given that they are tax disadvantaged (especially in the US
which operates a classical system). Several reasons have been offered,
such as that dividends play a role in signalling the prospects of the
firms to investors, or that by paying dividends, firms are forced to
subject themselves to the scrutiny of the market (Easterbrook, 1984, and
Rozeff, 1982). For a critical survey of this literature see Edwards
(1987). The important point here, though, is simply that firms may be
forced to pay some positive level of dividends, for reasons which are
not fully understood. (As shown in chapter 4, for the sample of
companies analysed in this study, dividends were positive 94% of the
time.) For the purposes of this model, we simply impose the constraints
that:
D	 d ;
	
VO;	 B	 O	 (2.16)
t	 t	 t	 t+1
Ignoring the Issues which lead to the possibility that these
constraints can be written simply with d=O on the grounds of the legal
constraints. This has no effect on the results.
A final feature of the financial side of the company which is introduced
into the model Is to add costs of issuing new shares. In particular, it
is assumed that there is a premium on new share issues which is a
proportion w of the value of the new shares. This premium may reflect
transactions costs or it may reflect the possibility that issuing new
shares signals that the company is a lemon, based on the arguments of
Myers and Majiuf (1984), discussed in Chapter 1.
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To complete the specification of the firm maximisation problem we add
the usual capital market equilibrium condition:
(1-m)RV = 0 E(D) + (1-z) {E(v) - V + VN(l+w)}	 (2.17)
where V is the market value of equity at the beginning of period t,
is the (gross) return on comparable assets, m the marginal rate of
personal income taxation, z the tax rate on capital gains, 0 is a
parameter representing the tax on net dividend payments (so that (1-0)
is the tax rate payable by shareholders on net dividends received; note
that (1-0) is not constrained to be positive), and E[ ] denotes
conditional expectations given the information set available at the
beginning of period t. Note that it is convenient to assume that is
the only item occurring in period t not known at the beginning of the
period. Thus all decisions regarding investment and leasing are taken at
the beginning of the period. This implies that K1. K T1 and K L1 are
all known at the beginning of period t. It is also convenient to assume
that dividends do not depend on 8; it is therefore assumed that new
debt Issues are adjusted to maintain the equality of sources and uses of
funds.
If V is the maximum value function defined on the predetermined
variables at the beginning of the period, then rearranging (2.17), the
firm's problem is to maximise:
V
M -
	
= E(D )_VN(l+w )+E 1V (K ,K T ,K L1 ,L ,U	 B1)} (2.18)
t+1 t+1t Pt	 t	 t	 t	 4 t+i t+i t+i
subject to the definitions (2.1), (2.2), (2.5), (2.6), (2.8), the
equations of motions (2.3), (2.4), (2.7), (2.9), (2.10), and the
constraints (2.16). The latter are associated with multipliers X, A
8Th1s assumption avoids complications in the section below on optimal
financial policy, which would arise if 	 were state dependent.
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and AB.In (2.18),	 is sometimes referred to as the tax discrimination
variable, since it is essentially the tax paid on a unit of dividends
compared to the tax paid on a unit of new equity. It, and the discount
factor, p. are defined as
i=(1-m)/(1-c) (1-z)
_____•1_i
and p-1 + ( l_z)f
For simplicity, we assume that R is equal to the market rate of
interest, i. Weighting (2.12a)-(2.12c) by their corresponding
probabilities and collecting terms, expected dividends can be written
9
as
+cH(bE CD )-1(1-t)+(t-c) [(1-t)H(a)	 ]}[_PGu ILK )-p Ri Bt t	 ttt ttIttt4t
+ {1-CH(b )}[v + B -B-pI-A(BK)] + {1-H(b)}u
+ {t_c[1+T_c]HCbt)_(1_c)(x_c)H(at)}[(i_i)PtIt+6TK+Lt1
+ N(t,c,a ,b )pY11 (x ,Kt t ta t t (2. 19)
where H denotes the cumulative density function for a. The value
function, E (V C.)) in (2.18) can also be written as the sum of three
t t+1
components, each relating to one of the possible tax regimes, and
substituting for L	 and U	 the expressions in (2.13a)-C2.13c) and
t+1	 t+1
(2.14a)-(2.14c). Thus,
a
where N(r,c,a ,b )p'Tf (,K) = (1_c)J
+ Ci_c)Cl_r+c)J	 + (1_t)J	 p'rf(,K)h(a)da.
Below we make the assumption that fl is separable.
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(l_oT)KL+jp	
, (l)K+I,
t	 tt	 t t1
t
0, 0, Bi] h(a)dc
ESV (K ,K T ,K L1 ,L ,U
t+1 t+1tl. t+1 t+1 t+1
a
rt	 I
= I	 v	 I (1-)K +1 1L (l_oT)KL+Jp I , (l_3)KL+IL,I	 t+iI	 t t t	 t	 tt	 t	 t
J_	 L
-p'U(,K)+p'G(I, I,K )+r +1 B +L +p RLKL,t	 t tt t ttt
Ut+c{PTI(atKt)_PG(It
B	 h(a )dot+1	 t	 t
b
It	 I
+ I	 I (i-ó)K +1 1L (l_.5T )K+JpI, (1-.5)K+I, 0,I	 t+iI	 t t t
I
t
Ii +cl_(t_c)pr1(c t ,Kt )_(t_c)pG(It ,I 1_ ,K )-p I +VN+B -(l+(t-c)i )Bt t	 tt t t+1	 t tt I
Bti] h()da
(2.20)
2.3 The Choice of Optimal Investment
This section illustrates the marginal conditions for investment and
discusses the equilibrium condition that must hold between the rental
cost of leased capital and the cost of purchased capital. The concepts
of the "effective" tax rate and the "effective" price of new machines
are defined and illustrated.
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(a) Investment
Differentiating (2.18) with respect to 	 and rearranging, the first
order conditions for new machines bought can be written as:
av
r	 +i D**	 ILK ) + (+A)p	 (2.21)El ÔK
	
I = 
(,+XD)(l_r)G1(I, .
	 .L	 t+i
G1 denotes the derivative of the adjustment cost function with respect
to investment (new fixed assets purchased). E [aV /8K ] is thet	 t+1	 t+1
shadow value of capital used in production at time t+1 expected inperiod
t, where the timing here depends upon the assumption that there is a one
period gestation lag for new investment. rand p denote respectively
the "effective" corporate tax rate and the "effective" price of
investment goods and are defined below. Apart from and p the
structure of condition (2.19) is quite standard and it states that the
number of new machines purchased depends upon the difference between
their shadow value and their effective replacement cost (including
adjustment costs).
*	 *
The definitions of t and p are quite forbidding but have simple
intuitive explanations. Beginning with t, it is defined as
rt {1-H(b}
8v
c(r-c)	 I	 t+i
+	 - c(t-c) +
	
D E I au	
a <a <b ii {H(b)-H(a}
L	 +j	
tttij
jab I+{c +	 1	 E [
	
D)Et	 a b	 H(a )	 (2.22)_______	
t+i I	
1 - _______	
t+1
[	 .(+A1) t 8L	 t tj
Note that E [8V /8L ] and E Lay iaii I appear in the definition
*	 t	 t+1	 t+1	 t	 t+1	 t+1
of These are the shadow values of the new state variables, taxable
losses and unrelieved ACT respectively. Clearly, in the empirical
application below, some measure of these terms will be needed. To
interpret the expression in (2.22) in period t, consider the case in
which the profit of the firm is increased by g.t. It is possible to show
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that evaluating the derivative of Vt at
(	
j+if	 (D	 ) - vN ) ) 1 	(2.23)
*	 1
=	 -
t.	 jj
*
Thus t is an "effective" rate of corporation tax in the sense that
(1-t:) is the answer to the question: "How much would the present value
of net distributions to shareholders increase if the firm operating
profit in the current period (only) were to be one pound higher?".
The expression in (2.22) is made up of three parts, corresponding to the
probabilities of being in each of the tax regimes. With probability
1-H(b) the firm will be a full taxpayer, in which case = r. With
probability H(b )-H(a ), the firm is in a position of ACT exhaustion in
which case r depends on the shadow value of an increment to the stock
of unrelieved ACT. With probability H(a ) the firm is fully tax
exhausted, in which case depends on the shadow values of an increment
to taxable losses and unrelieved ACT. The effective corporate tax rate
is bounded below by the statutory rate of imputation c. The bound is
attained if the firm expects with probability of one to be tax exhausted
from time t onwards (so that any increment to taxable losses or to
unrelieved ACT is worthless).
Note that by setting c=O, and H(b) = H(a) and 	 it is possible to
obtain the effective tax rate under the classical system of company
taxation. In this case:
{ 1 H(b)}	
1	 ÔV
=	 -	 + —E 1 t+i	 asb] H(b )	 (2.24)
t.	 ' t[ÔL	 t t	 tt+1
10 1t is clear from (2.19) and (2.20) that -G(.) appears in the maximand
in exactly the same way as 11(.). Suppose that	 is added to U, and
regard	 as a state variable at the beginning of period t. The value
function can therefore be written as V (K ,...,i )=pM . Then,
(1 -t) and so (1 -t )	 8V/8.L.
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j	 av
- —E 1 t+i 1
t1T
t+1
(2.25)
This is identical to equation (1.16) in Mayer (1986), when dividend
payments are strictly positive, and it defines the effective tax rate as
a weighted average of the statutory rate and the value to the firm of
one more unit of losses carried forward, where the weights are the
probabilities of being a regular taxpayer or of being tax exhausted
respectively.
*
Pt is defined as
1	 r8V
I	 t+1l
1. +EI au	
b IIH(b )]
=	
[ i - c{
L	 tJj	 t
- (i_J)[ t{1-H(b}
I(1-c)(t-c) +	 E+ {
	 c(1+t-c)	 ____	
a a b i {H(bt)-H(a)}
'1	 t L	 t+	 t t tjj
1	 8V
+ —E
I _____	
a 1 H(a
L	 +'	 .	 .j
To consider its interpretation, consider the case in which the number of
new machines bought in period t is increased by but that the
additional machines incur no adjustment costs and generate no return (so
that G(.) and K are unaffected). Again, it can be shown that, for
*	 1	 8
p	 E (D ) - vN )}1	 (2.26)
Pt = - [-:-)	
.i+i{
t	 t t+J	 t+j 
j0
Thus p is the "effective" price of capital in the sense of being the
answer to the question: "suppose the firm were to buy one more physical
unit of capital, but this was never turned into productive capacity and
involved no adjustment costs; what would be the effect on the present
value of net distribution to shareholders?".
More directly, (2.25) has three elements. The first element is the cost
to the firm of purchasing the asset if there were no depreciation
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allowances for tax purposes. If the firm is a full tax payer, the cost
of an extra unit of investment goods is simply However if the firm
is ACT exhausted, the cost of purchasing the asset is actually lower.
This most easily seen in the case of retention finance, since being ACT
exhausted implies that cutting net dividends by 1-c generates a tax
saving of c (the ACT due on the dividend) and hence frees 1 for
additional investment. If the firm were a full tax payer, it would need
to reduce its dividends by the full amount. Of course, this effect is
only temporary: the reduction in unrelieved ACT will eventually increase
tax when the firm moves out of being ACT exhausted.
It is useful for further analysis below to define here s =c/(1-c) as the
rate of credit. It is then also useful to define
av*	
{1 H(b) + E	 ab1 H(b )}	 (2.27)
t[ÔU	 .
S =S -	 ___
t+i
to be the "effective" rate of credit. It is straightforward to show that
O ss. Intuitively, s may be lower than s if there is a possibility
that the firm may be ACT exhausted (H(b )>O). If H(b )0, so that thet	 *	 t
firm will definitely not be ACT exhausted, s =s. If the firm is certain
	
t	 *
to be ACT exhausted, with H(b ) =1 and a b , s =sE [ÔV i8U 1. Heret	 t t	 t	 t	 t+1	 t+1
the benefit of any ACT tax credit is postponed until the firm moves out
of the position of ACT exhaustion; in the current period, the tax credit
*
simply serves to increase the stock of unrelieved ACT, U . Using S
*	 t+1	 t
we can rewrite the first term of the expression for p as:
*
[ 1	 c{	
1	 r	
}]Hb	
(1+s
-	 1 +—E I	 t+1abl	
=	 t	 (2.28)
' tL ÔU	 t tJ	 (l+s)t+1
The second part of p reflects the fact that of each pound spent on
investment a fraction 1-j receives free depreciation. The value of this
relief clearly depends on the tax position of the firm in a similar way
to the effect of additional profit (it is not identical to the value of
additional profit, because an additional relief yields no return to the
shareholder until the firm can reduce its tax liability, whereas an
additional unit of profit yields an immediate return). The remainder, J,
is not available for tax depreciation purposes until period t+1, and so
simply adds to the pool of capital available for tax depreciation next
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period, KT . It is easy to see that if there is 100% depreciation (j=0)
t+1	 *
and the firm is a full tax payer, then Pt = pt(lt). The second two
parts of 
Pt 
are therefore familiar: they simply represent the present
value of allowances due on the purchase of one additional unit of
capital. If this present value is denoted (the * signifying the
effect of tax exhaustion), the expression for Pt can be rewritten as
*
*	 (1+s )	 *
=	 (1+s) - t ) (2.29)
(b) Leasing
Turning to the first order condition for machines leased (in or out),
differentiation of the objective function with respect to I yields:
8v	 8vr	 +i	 ______* L	 ILK) _E[
	
t+il
El a	 1 = ('+X)(i_T)Gi(I, t t	 t	 L j	 (2.30)L	 t+i	 8Kt+1
This indicates that the leasing decision depends upon the difference
between the expected shadow value of productive capital and the sum of
the marginal adjustment costs resulting from an increase in leased
assets and the (negative) shadow value of the stock of leased capital.
Differentiating (2.18) with respect to K1 and solving forward the
resulting difference equation gives
8vt+11	 .1	 •
E[ ÔK
L j =	 11 
PkJE ['+xD )(1-t	 )p RL (1 _15) iJ 	 (2.31)
k=t+1	 t+J	 t+J t+j t+jt+1	 J=1
Thus E[8V+i/8K^i] represents the expected present value of the
reduction in net dividends due to the stream of rental payments on a
machine leased at time t. The rental payments start in period t+1 and
are net of the tax savings they generate.
If the firm is a lessee, so that G 1=&j (on the assumption that there is
no difference in the adjustment costs between purchasing and leasing an
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additional asset), then at the optimum, for convenience setting X0 for
all s, equations (2.21), (2.30) and (2.31) imply:
=
	 I
ii Pj E I(1-t	 )p RL (i_) i]	 (2.32)
k=t+1	 tL	 t+j t+j t+j
J = 1
ie. the "effective" price of a machine is therefore equal to the present
value of rental rate payments. In the case of 100% free depreciation and
*	 L
constant t , rates of interest, R and R , and rate of increase In the
price of capital goods, g, the equilibrium condition can be given a
slightly different simple interpretation. After some manipulation,
(2.32) yIelds
RL	
(1-rn)
=	 R+-g+g	 (2.33)(1-z)
The left-hand side is the rental rate on a machine leased during period
t, which in equilibrium equals the effective cost of using a machine for
one period, buying it at t and reselling it at t+1 (the right-hand
side). For this is simply the Jorgensen cost of capital:
R(1-m)/(1-z) is the required post-personal tax rate of return on
capital, is the depreciation rate and g is the capital gain on holding
the asset for one period. Equation (2.33) is equivalent to the one that
can be obtained from Edwards and Mayer (1987) by equating their
equations (2.22) and (2.24) and by assuming that dividends paid are
strictly positive.
More generally, however, (2.32) indicates that the equilibrium rental
rate depends on the tax position of the company. It is not the case that
a tax exhausted company can substitute purchases of assets by leased
assets at the "full tax" cost. This suggests that the effects of tax
exhaustion cannot simply be nullified by use of leasing11.
110f course, a full analysis of equilibrium in the leasing market
requires consideration of the tax position of the lessor and lessee. See
Edwards and Mayer (1987) for such an analysis.
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(c) Q investment model
The estimation of a Q investment equation from (2.21) requires the
relationship between the marginal value of capital, E Lay /8K ] andt	 t+1	 t+t
its average value to be specified. Following the approach of Hayashi
(1982), by assuming that 11, G and A are all linear homogeneous, it can
be shown that
	
av	 av	 av
V =
	
+ -._ KT+ __LKL+
	
8K	 8KT t ÔKL
	
t	 t	 t
	
av	 av	 av
+ --L +
8U
	
t	 t	 t
(2.34)
(2.34) simply states that the market value of the firm equals the sum of
the shadow value of each state variable multiplied by its quantity.
Taking expectation of period t+1 help in period t and solving for
E [8V /8K 1 yieldst	 t+1	 t+1
ii	 av	 av
E _____ -	 E (V	 )_KT E r t+1]KL E
tLeK I K	 t t+i	 t+1	 T	 t+i tLaK L j
t+1	 t+4
	
rôV	 r8V	 räV
-E I	 t1B	 I -E I	 t+lL	 I -E I
	
tL3B	 t+1J	 tL0L	 t+1J	 tL 8U
t+1	 t+1	 t+1
(2.35)
Thus, the possibility of tax exhaustion and leasing introduces a wedge
between the marginal and average value of capital due to the presence of
three additional state variables, losses carried forward and unrelieved
ACT due to tax exhaustion and the stock of leased capital. In order to
estimate a Q investment equation like (2.21), there remains the problem
of providing empirical analogues for the unobservable terms in (2.35).
This issue is discussed in the empirical section 2.5 below.
We are now in a position to define the empirical model to be estimated.
Re-arranging the first-order condition on investment (2.21) yields
av
E [_t 8Kt+1
	
ILK)	
*	 -	 *
	Gi(I, t t	 (l-t)	 (l-t)
(2.36)
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(2.36) requires the
Here we follow the
for example, Summers
The interpretation of (2.36) should perhaps be noted. Since it is simply
a rearrangement of the first order condition for investment, it can be
still be Interpreted as simply showing that at the optimum, marginal
' 12
costs (marginal adjustment costs, G T ( 1t ) , plus the effective price of
*13	 t
capital goods, Pt ) are equal to marginal benefits (the shadow value of
an additional unit of capital, 8V1/8K1). Writing the expression in
the form given in (2.36) implicitly suggests that Investment decisions
are taken with a view to optlmising adjustment costs for a given
"tax-adjusted Q". It is clear that no such implication is derived from
the theoretical model - indeed it is just as possible to argue that
investment decisions are taken with a view to optimising the shadow
value of capital for a given total marginal cost. While neither view is
particularly enlightening, this does serve as a reminder that stochastic
shocks to the investment process are unlikely to be independent of Q.
To form an empirical investment model from
specification of the adjustment cost function
literature in using a quadratic function (see,
(1981) )i4:
11L	 2b( ___ c-elK
	
G(II1,K )=-	 -
It	 tJt	2 	 K
(2. 37)
This formulation yields the following investment equation
1itt + -Q + c
t	 b
(2.38)
12Adjustment costs are assumed to be deductible from tax.
of these terms are alued in terms of net dividends and are
therefore multiplied by (7+A ) to measure the marginal cost In terms of
shareholders'	 wealth.
14Assuining that I>O.
(UVI
\'}
where
avI	 t+il
El 8K
	
I/'+X')L	 t+i
(1-t t
*
Pt
-	 (l-t)
(2.39)
*	 *
and r , p and 8V /8K	 are defined in (2.22), (2.25) and (2.35)
t	 t	 t+1	 t+1
respectively. The constant c can be interpreted as the "normal" rate of
investment at which adjustment costs are zero. The only stochastic term
is the unobservable factor c in the adjustment cost function. This may
contain firm specific effects and time effects common to all firms, in
addition to an idiosyncratic time-varying shock. Moreover, the latter
may be serially correlated, giving rise to a dynamic specification of
the investment equation characterised by common factor restrictions.
This is discussed further in the empirical section below.
The construction of empirical measures are discussed in the section 2.5
below. However, it is perhaps worth noting here that, because of the
unavailability of reasonable data on leasing, all of the leasing terms
in the investment equation (2.38) have been excluded from the empirical
work. This may lead to an overestimate or an underestimate of total
investment as a proportion of the capital stock (the left hand side of
(2.38)), depending on the relative size of leasing and new purchases in
period t relative to earlier periods. It will cause an underestimate of
marginal Q, since the market value of the company is depressed by the
present value of future expected payments on the current stock of leased
capital. This present value should therefore be added to the numerator
of Q, and its absence will reduce the estimated value of Q.
2.4: Optimal Financial Policy
*
In this section we make further use of s , the effective rate oft
credit, defined in (2.27). It is also useful to define the "effective"
tax discrimination variable as	 , where	 is
7=(1+s)(1-m)/(l-z)	 (2.40)
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Using these terms, we can now examine the marginal condition for new
equity issues, which can be written as:
*
*	 V	 NV +xD._?-=1+_x	 (2.41)
t	 tV	 t	 t
where	 is the multiplier associated with the non-negativity condition
for Vt, xD is the multiplier associated with the non-negativity
condition for D and w is the lemons premium on new share issues.
t	 t
Ignoring tax exhaustion and the lemons premium, (2.41) is simply the
standard marginal condition for new equity issues, (derived by, for
example, Poterba and Summers (1983)), V+A1-X. This familiar result
implies that firms will not simultaneously issue new shares (implying
and pay dividends (implying AD=O) unless =1. Most studies do not
allow this possibility (and Poterba and Summers rely on V*l to examine
the marginal source of finance for the firm). However, as discussed
below, it is, in principle, possible to allow shareholders for whom 1
to select companies which simultaneously issue new shares and pay
dividends.
Here we investigate the role played by the imputation system, which has
two important effects. The first is that, for certain configurations of
personal tax parameters the standard dividend puzzle - why do firms both
issue new shares and pay dividends despite the tax disadvantages of
doing so? - is turned on its head. This is because there Is a tax
advantage to implementing this strategy. From (2.18) it is clear that
this would be the case if V>l. Recalling that 3r=(1-m)/(1-c)(1-z) this
can occur in at least two common cases. The first is a basic rate
personal income tax payer, for whom m=c, who additionally has a positive
marginal tax rate for capital gains. The second is a shareholder exempt
from income tax and capital gains tax (so that m=z0) but can claim the
benefit of the tax credit associated with the dividend payment.
Institutions, such as pension funds are in this position.
In the absence of tax exhaustion, with >i, firms should continually
issue new shares and pay out the proceeds as dividends, since on every
unit of the transaction shareholders gain i-i• Some models explicitly
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prevent this by imposing a constraint that dividends cannot exceed some
legal limit (Edwards and Keen (1985) explore this constraint in some
detail; basically, firms cannot pay dividends which exceed current and
past profits). However, it is clearly not the case in the UK that this
upper constraint on dividends is frequently met. Evidence is presented
in Chapter 4 that the average dividend payout ratio is around 25% - far
below a level prohibited by law.
However, the second effect of the imputation system captured in (2.41)
is that tax exhaustion introduces a further reason why firms may be
observed simultaneously issuing new shares and paying dividends. In the
DN	 *
absence of the lemons premium, from (2.41)	 implies	 An
intuitive explanation of this position is as follows. Assume that ' > 1
and that the firm is initially certain to be a regular taxpayer. From
(2.12c) net dividends can be increased by the same amount of the share
issue. The cost of the share issue is one, but the post-tax value of the
net dividend to the shareholder is > 1, so that issuing equity
increases shareholders' wealth. As the firm continues to sell new
equities and to pay dividends however, the possibility emerges that it
will become ACT exhausted, in which case (2.12b) implies that it could
only finance a dividend of 1-c=1/(1+s), worth only (1-c)(1-m)/(1-z) to
shareholders. These two extremes of the value of the dual transaction to
*
shareholders is captured precisely by 	 . If a full tax-paying position
*	 *	
t	 *
is certain, s =s and so	 ='. If ACT exhaustion is certain, S =0 and
(l-m)/(l-z).	 If m > z, tthere will come a point where	 1 and the
marginal issue will leave wealth unchanged. Therefore, if, for the
marginal shareholder,	 >1, the firm should exploit the arbitrage
possibility of issuing new shares and paying dividends up to the point
*
at which the probability of ACT exhaustion is such that =1.
This discussion implies that if 7>1 the company will be driven to a
position in which it both issues new shares and pays dividends. This
need not hold, however, in the presence of a lemons premium on new share
issues. In this case, the arbitrage opportunity only arises if 7>l+wt.
If this is true, the same argument applies and the company will end up
at the point at which 7=1+w. If 7<l+w, it is not worth issuing a new
share in order to fund a dividend payment.
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The first order condition for debt can be written:
*
3v*	 DVt	 I	 t+il 
_AB
' +A —=-E
	 B	 t+iL	 + it	 tl	 t a (2.42)
Using (2.32) and (2.33) together, the first order conditions for debt
and new equity imply
avI	 t+il	 N	 B
E	 = -(1+W ) + A - At 8B	 t.	 t	 t+iL	 t+i
(2.43)
In the case in which there is no lemons premium and the firm issues debt
and new equity, so that AB1=A=O, this is a Miller (1977) type of
result: at the optimum, the sum of the value of the firm's equity and
debt is independent of the financial structure (ie. the level of debt),
despite the presence of personal taxes.
To explore (2.42) further, we need to find an expression for
E [8V 18B	 ]. Differentiating (2.18) with respect to B givest	 t+1	 t+1	 t
	
av	 (	 *	
K )) 1 	 (2.44)
	
t	 I (1+AD	 *	 * D (1+s)(1-r )i. 
-(i' +A )	 t
.	 .	 .	 .	
(l+AB(B	
.
	
t	 I	 (1+s)
Taking the expectation in period t of (2.44) for period t+1 and
substituting into (2.42) gives
*
*	 I	 *
+'_-! = E p
	
_(+AD )(1
	 )it t ,	 t t+1 I 	 t+1	 t+1 t+1
*
*
+D ) 't(1+ (B	 ,K	 ))
}] -
	 (2.45)
t +1
and using (2.41) and rearranging, it can be shown that:
AD 	E(AN )
	
1
(j_t+1 )] = c +	 t+1 -	 t	 + — E (AD
tL t+i	 i	 t.t+1 t+1	 t+1
1
+	 E [(B	 ,K	 )( l _AN ) 1 	 (2.46)3i	 t	 t+1 t+1	 t+1 jt+1
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In the absence of agency costs and the ,emons premium, internal optima
for all new equity and retentions in period t and period t+1 imply that
E(t1)=c. As noted by Keen and Schiantarelll. (1987) (their Proposition
1), this implies permanent and certain tax exhaustion. The presence of
agency costs in (2.36) implies that, even with internal optima for all
sources of finance, E(r) is strictly greater than c. Thus, in this
sense, then, the role played by agency costs in this model Is to justify
why an internal solution on all three margins is consistent with the
observation that corporate tax revenues are not zero.
Financial Regimes
We are now in a position to investigate different financial regimes in
which the firm may operate. This exercise has already been undertaken by
a number of authors (for example, Auerbach (1984), Hayashi (1985), Mayer
(1986), and King (1987)). Of these, Mayer has already examined the role
of tax exhaustion, but principally only in the special case of a
classical system.
Below we distinguish four possible regimes which a firm may face. In
each case we assume, for simplicity, that dividends are paid in period
t+1 and henceThe first distinction to make is whether ' is greater or
less than one. We begin with the case in which '<1. In this case, as is
well known, firms should not issue new equity and pay dividends
simultaneously. Rather, they should use retentions in preference to new
equity until dividends are zero and hence retentions exhausted. This
situation is unaffected by the possibility of ACT exhaustion. This is
because, as outlined above, ACT exhaustion can only reduce the amount
which the firm can pay as dividends. It can therefore only increase the
advantage of retention finance over new equity finance. In an extreme
*
case, with ACT exhaustion being permanent and certain, ' falls to
(1-m)/(1-z) - the value of ' under a classical system.
Since retentions are preferred to new equity, we first consider the case
in which new equity is not issued in period t or period t+1. From
N	 *(2.41), for DD xB 0, A =1-	 and E (AN)=l_E (' ). Substituting
t t	 t t+it	 t . 1	 t1
into (2.46) and rearranging yields
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*	 *
p 1 (l-E (t	 )fl. +E (
t+1 L 	 t+i	 t+i t t+l B t+l Kt+l ) ] 
= ' -p E (	 ) (2.47)t t+1 t t+1
(2.47) is therefore the equilibrium condition for internal optima on
debt and retentions, when new equity issues are zero in both period t
and period t+1. The left hand side of (2.47) represents the marginal
cost of issuing a unit of debt in period t, consisting of an interest
charge relieved at the expected effective tax rate (multiplied by v
since it is measured in terms of the value of net dividends foregone by
the shareholder) plus marginal agency costs of debt (multiplied by the
expected value of ), both discounted by the discount factor p1
since they do not arise until period t+1. The right hand side represents
the marginal cost of retaining an additional unit of retentions. This is
*
an immediate cost to the shareholder of 	 since net dividends are
reduced, matched by a discounted increase in dividends worth E('1) in
period t+1.
If the left hand side of (2.47) were less than the right hand side, debt
would be preferred to retentions. In this case, however, the firm would
continually issue debt and pay dividends. Three factors would eventually
end this arbitrage possibility. The first is that marginal agency costs
are assumed to increase with debt (B>O) and so force up the cost of
issuing debt. The second is that as expected interest payments increase
in period t+1, then the expected value of the effective tax rate in
period t+i, E(r), falls since taxable profits become lower and hence
full tax exhaustion becomes more probable. This also increases the
expected cost of issuing debt since the tax relief on interest payments
is lower. It should be noted, though, that there is an offsetting factor
here, namely that as expected taxable profits fall, so the probability
of ACT exhaustion in period t+1 rises and hence E(1+1) falls. This
reduces the impact of agency costs (lowering the marginal cost of debt)
and also reduces the benefit of higher dividends in period t+1 (raising
the marginal cost of retentions). However, the third factor is that this
effect is also present in period t. Thus as dividends increase, so does
the probability of gross dividends exceeding taxable profit and hence
the probability of ACT exhaustion in period t. Thus ' falls, lowering
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the cost of reducing dividends in period t.
These effects will therefore limit the arbitrage possibility of
continually issuing debt and paying dividends, so that an equilibrium
will be reached when (2.47) holds, in which the company is indifferent
between debt and retention finance. Denote this regime 1. This regime
can exist with or without the presence of agency costs of debt since, as
noted above, tax exhaustion also limits the arbitrage possibilities. In
this regime, new investment may be financed partly by retentions and
partly by debt or may be financed solely by debt. To see this, consider
the two cases in which a firm uses only debt or only retentions.
If only debt is used to purchase new fixed assets, there are two groups
of effects. First, as before, an increase in debt causes marginal agency
costs to increase. Offsetting this, however, the increase in the
capital stock, assuming ABK<O, is that marginal agency costs tend to
fall. Under most reasonable formulations of the agency cost function,
though, AEB > so that the impact of the increase in debt dominates
(at least If the new investment Is wholly financed by debt)15.
Intuitively, this is because an investment wholly financed by debt must
increase in gearing of the company, on which agency costs are likely to
depend.
Second, an increase in debt will increase interest payments which will
tend to reduce taxable profit and hence E(t), increasing the
marginal cost of debt. However, now there is also an offsetting effect
here, namely that taxable profits will tend to rise as a result of the
return earned on the new investment, increasing E(t1) and reducing
the cost of debt (this effect is absent if the new debt raised is used
simply to pay dividends). The relative size of these effects depends on
the definition of taxable profit: if the tax system Is neutral, a
marginal investment project financed wholly by debt would leave taxable
profit unchanged. More generally, however, E(x1) could either rise or
15For example, If A=--(B/K)2K, then AEB=b'
Thus,	 for B<K.
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fall, depending on the tax system. Note that E('1) will move in the
same direction since the probability of ACT exhaustion falls with higher
*
taxable profit. An increase in E Cr ) will reduce the marginal cost of
debt (although the corresponding increase in E('1) will increase the
impact of agency costs) and vice versa. It is possible that the
reduction in the marginal cost of debt due to the increase in E(x1)
will outweigh the increase in the marginal cost of debt due to agency
costs. An increase in E(1) will reduce the marginal cost of
retentions, and vice versa.
These effects give rise to three possibilities. The first is that the
marginal cost of retentions falls by more than the marginal cost of
debt' 6, which would imply that the company would also use retention
finance in order to maintain the equilibrium condition (2.47).
Alternatively, it is possible that E(r) and E(71) are unchanged,
in which case the only effect would be an increase in the marginal cost
of debt. In this case as well, the company would also use retentions.
The second is that the the marginal costs of debt and retentions are
reduced by the same amount, in which case the firm would not need to use
retention finance (although this is extremely unlikely since marginal
agency costs must exactly match the difference in marginal tax costs
between retentions and debt). The third is that the marginal cost of
debt falls by more than the marginal cost of retentions. In this case,
the company has further arbitrage possibilities of the kind already
discussed, and would issue even more debt and pay the proceeds out as
dividends. This third possibility must also be counted as unlikely.
An investment wholly financed by retentions will reduce the probability
of ACT exhaustion since dividends are lower. This will increase v and
hence the marginal cost of retentions (intuitively, the lower the
probability of ACT exhaustion, the more shareholders give up for each
pound in the firm that might otherwise be distributed). However, if the
*
investment yields a taxable return, then E (r ) will increase. As
t t+1
160r, alternatively, the marginal cost of retentions may increase less
than the marginal cost of debt or fall while the marginal cost of debt
rises.
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discussed above, this will reduce the marginal cost of debt and also
tend to reduce the marginal cost of retentions. In addition, the
increase in the capital stock will reduce the marginal agency costs of
debt. Unless the increase in E(') outweighs the increase in to
the extent that the overall effect on the marginal cost of retentions Is
to lower it by as much as the reduction in the marginal cost of debt,
then the company will also issue debt.
This rather detailed discussion therefore suggests that It is probable
that both debt and retentions will be used in regime 1 (although there
are possible configurations in which this might not be the case). It is
not the case, however, (as in some other models) that the marginal cost
of finance is constant in this regime. Clearly it will depend on the
probability of tax exhaustion and the size of agency costs, both of
which will depend on the size of investment, debt and retentions.
Also, the proportions in which debt and retentions are used need not be
constant.
If there were no tax exhaustion, and agency costs were a function of the
ratio of the stock of debt to the replacement value of the capital
stock, then in regime 1 debt would constitute a constant proportion of
new finance (Hayashi (1985) makes these assumptions, although several
papers investigating Q based investment equations assume this to be the
case - see, for example, Summers (1981) and Poterba and Summers (1983)).
This can easily be seen by considering (2.48), which Is derived from
(2.47) under the conditions of no tax exhaustion and agency costs depend
on the debt to capital stock ratio:
pt+1Eu-' +A (B /K )1t+i	 B t+i t+i J = (2.48)
If the tax parameters (t, ', m and z) are constant over time, and the
interest rate in period t+1 is unaffected by the behaviour of the
company, then the only element in (2.48) which depends on the company
are marginal agency costs. If agency costs depend only on the ratio of
B to K, then in order to maintain the equality in (2.48) this
ratio must remain constant, so that AB is constant.
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It is worth noting that a regime similar to this can be derived for a
classical corporation tax. Both De Angelo and Masulis (1980) and Mayer
(1986) introduce the possibility that E(t1) falls as interest
payments increase. However, both papers consider only a classical
system, for which s=s 50. Ignoring agency costs, (2.47) becomes
*	 (i-m)
1-E (t	 )=	 (2.49)
t. t+i	 (1-z)
which is, for example, equation (2.2) of Mayer (1986). In this case, as
described above, it is probable that both retentions and debt are used,
even though the marginal cost of retentions is fixed. This is because an
increase in taxable profit due to investment financed by retentions will
*	 *
increase E (t ). To maintain E (t ) constant requires an increase in
t t+1	 t t+1
interest payments. However, the increase in interest payments must
exactly match the increase in taxable profit due to the return from the
investment. In the case of a marginal investment, and a neutral tax
system, this implies that the marginal source of finance must be
entirely debt. It is also possible that an investment earns a taxable
return higher than the interest rate, this implies that debt must be
issued in excess of that needed to finance the investment. Note that an
identical result is obtained under an imputation system if there is no
possibility of ACT exhaustion, and hence s=s =s ^0. This is perhaps
not surprising: the additional effect of ACT exhaustion mentioned above
was that the value of additional funds to pay dividends are reduced by
the possibility of ACT exhaustion. If there is no such possibility, then
the role played by tax exhaustion here is simply that of additional
interest payments reducing taxable profit while additional returns
increase taxable profit.
King (1987) argues that a regime similar to that described can exist
even if there are no agency costs on debt and no tax exhaustion. In this
case, (2.47) reduces to (1-t)=(i-m)/(1-z), which is the knife-edge
condition familiar from King's earlier work (1974 and 1977). King claims
that this condition can be met since the condition essentially defines
the marginal shareholder, who is indifferent between debt and retention
finance. Other investors invest their wealth wholly in debt or wholly in
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equity, depending on their tax preference.
Note that under King's assumptions, the firm is indifferent to its debt
to retention finance ratio, which can therefore be described as a Miller
(1977) equilibrium. However, this is not generally true of the condition
(2.47), since if the equilibrium depends on agency costs or tax
exhaustion, the firm has a determinate ratio for the two sources of
finance. The Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem therefore only holds under
assumptions regarding the marginal investor. One problem with King's
result is simply that t, m and z are statutory tax rates and therefore
have discrete values (although z is sometimes taken to be an
accruals-equivalent tax rate). In this case, there is no reason to
suppose that there is any investor for whom the knife-edge condition
holds. It does not hold for common groups of investors such as tax free
institutions (m=z=O), basic rate tax payers with annual capital gains
less than around £5000 (m=25%, z=0 in 1990 in the UK), or higher rate
taxpayers with large capital gains (mz40% in 1989); in all cases
r=35%. It is, however, possible that these tax rates may be held to be
uncertain, which would introduce the possibility that the knife-edge
condition may hold.
Returning to the general case in regime 1 above, it is also useful to
describe the equilibrium value of marginal q. This is the shadow value
of an additional unit of the capital stock to the firm when it is in a
steady-state. The steady state is usually defined to mean when
adjustment costs, G(I,IL,Kt ), are zero. From (2.21), the first order
condition for Investment, assuming also that the derivative of
G(I,IL,Kt ) with respect to 1 is also zero, the equilibrium value of
marginal q Is
1	 ,	 (+XD)p
e	 rq=—EI
tiaK
Pt	
t+1 -
	 Pt
(2.50)
In (2.50) p is simply the price of the additional unit of capital and
is the "effective" price, after allowing for the various allowances
in the tax system. Intuitively, q answers the question "what is the
value to the shareholder of the firm in steady state being given one
additional unit of capital?". Using the expression for p in (2.29), q
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can also be written
*
V	 *1q = (V+A)[--_- 1)] (2.51)
D	 e *
In regime 1, A=O, and so =VP /P . The reason for this value is clear:
if the firm is given a gift of one additional unit of capital it will
respond by purchasing one less unit (since, by assumption, it already
has the optimal stock of capital). The gain to the shareholder of
purchasing one less unit of capital is the effective price of capital,
*
p , multiplied by any relevant personal tax parameters. In regime 1, net
t	 *
dividends will be increased by p and so the shareholder will gain by
*	
t
VP.
As long as the firm remains paying dividends (or at least until it
reaches some minimum level), it will remain in regime 1. As investment
increases, dividends must eventually reach their minimum level, at which
point debt will become the sole marginal source of finance, with
dividends and new equity set at zero. This is regime 2. Since there is
no equality condition between any two sources of finance in the regime,
it is impossible to derive an expression similar to that in (2.47).
Similarly, although the value of qe can be specified in terms of
E(t )as
t t+1
*
et V	 I	 *
E p Vi	 [1_E (t	 11^A.(B	 K1)J}	 (2.52)t+1L
Pt V
this does not give a unique value of q, because from (2.46) E(t+1)
depends on xD , AD	AN and	 , all of which may be non-zero and
t	 t+1	 t	 t+1
unknown. The equilibrium value of q in regime 2 therefore depends on the
level of the capital stock, and hence investment, through its effect on
E(t1) and agency costs of debt. This mirrors the results of Hayashi
(1985). Edwards and Keen (1985) do give an expression for equilibrium q
in this regime, but their expression depends on the discounted costs of
eventually winding up the firm..
Regime 3 occurs when the costs of issuing debt have risen to the level
of issuing new equity. Following the arguments set out above, it should
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be noted that it is possible that the marginal cost of issuing debt does
not rise in regime 2 - indeed It is possible that it should fall. Regime
3 would not be reached unless it rose. Assuming that it is reached, at
N
this point the firm begins to issue new shares so that 	 becomes zero.
The characterisation of regime 3 depends on E(A1). If E(A1)*O. but
continuing to assume that E (A )0, thent t+1
*
p	 I'(l-E	 (t *	 ) ) i	 +E (*
t+l L 	 t	 t +1	 t + 1 t t+iBt+i'	
) 1 
= 1+w -p E	 (2.53)t+1 j
	
t t+1 t
This condition is very similar to that in (2.47) for regime 1. The only
difference is that the cost of financing the marginal investment through
retentions, ', is replaced by the cost of financing the marginal
investment through new equity, namely l+c i . Following the intuition
given for (2.47), then, the left hand side of (2.53) represents the
marginal cost of debt finance, and the right hand side the marginal cost
of new equity finance.
The second term on the right hand side of (2.53) is the value of the
return to the shareholder given that the return will be paid in the form
*
of dividends. If it is further assumed that E (
	
)=1+w , so that thet t+1	 t+1
firm expects to be indifferent between retentions and new equity In
period t+1, and hence that E(AN)=O, then this substitution can be
made in (2.53). If the lemons premium on new shares issues is ignored,
so that w=w=O, (2.53) can be simplified to
*	 (1-rn)
'(1-E (r	 ))i	 + AB(B	 ,K	 = ( l_z)it+l	 (2.54)t t+1	 t+1	 t+1 t+1
Both debt and new equity are issued in this regime. If the capital stock
rose, financed solely from new equity, marginal agency costs of debt
*
would fall on the assumption that A. <0, and E (t ) would rise,
JK	 t t+i
reducing the net interest cost of issuing debt. This would make debt the
cheaper source of finance again. Partly substituting debt for equity
would both reduce E(rt ) (given that the taxable return is
unchanged)and increase marginal agency costs, both of which would
increase the marginal costs of debt. To maintain equilibrium between
debt and new equity, they must therefore both be used. In particular the
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amount used must be such as to maintain a constant marginal cost of debt
(which, as in regime 1, cannot necessarily be achieved without new
issues of debt exceeding new investment). As in regime 1, debt would
only be a constant proportion of new finance used if the effective tax
rate were unaffected by further changes in the level of debt and if
agency costs depended only on the ratio of the stock of debt to the
replacement value of the capital stock.
Substituting (2.42) into (2.50) and (2.51), with A0, yields the
following expression for q in regime 3
*
e Pt (1+w
—i
Pt	 't
E	
l	
*	
1 ( 1l.(i)-	
* nt I	 t (2.55)
If there is no ACT exhaustion and w=O, then which is the
value commonly assigned to it when new equity is the marginal source of
finance. The possibility of ACT exhaustion raises the possibility that
An intuition for this possibility is as follows. As in regime
1, the effective gain to shareholders of increasing dividends as a
result of purchasing one less unit of capital is However, in this
case the marginal source of finance is new equity. But from (2.32) the
value in terms of a potential reduction of new share issues derived from
*
cutting dividends by one is ' . The overall effect of these two
* *t
transactions is therefore 'p /' , which is identical to the expression
in (2.43) (divided by p) 17 . n q>p/P. the question arises as to
whether investors would be better off investing through an identical
unincorporated business. However, this would only be the case if the
*
effective price of capital for the unincorporated business were also p
(or at least no greater than
This summarises the three financial regimes when 3r<l. This, of course,
17	 e	 *	 *
The reason why	 is not simply equal to Pt 
is that Pt measures the
effective price of capital goods in terms of net dividends foregone.
This includes the effect on the probability of ACT exhaustion of
reducing dividends. If dividends are not reduce, this effect must be
corrected for. This correction is measured by
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is the standard case examined in the literature. However, in the UK, and
in many other European countries, many shareholders face a situation in
which r>1.
The possibility of ACT exhaustion provides one reason why firms do not
engage in more-or-less unlimited arbitrage when >i. As explained above,
if there is a possibility of ACT exhaustion, a unit of new equity cannot
necessarily be transformed Into a unit of net dividends, worth to the
shareholder. This because part of it may be needed to pay the ACT charge
arising on the payment of the dividend. In this situation, the effective
*
rate of credit falls from s to s (defined in (2.27)) and the value oft	 *
the transaction to the shareholder falls to ' . (2.42) confirms that an
equilibrium is reached when
If - were less than 1, the opposite arbitrage possibility would arise,
since the shareholder would gain by reducing dividends and reducing new
equity issues. This will not therefore occur as long as >l, and
dividends and new equity issues are both positive. However, it Is
possible that and V=O. This might arise if the firm has carried
forward a large stock of unrelieved ACT into the current period. In this
case the shareholder cannot benefit by reducing dividends and new
equity. If '<i, the three regimes already described are again the
relevant cases.
However, the possibility that >i and '=i introduces a fourth regime.
In regime 4, the marginal cost of retained earnings is equal to that of
new equity. From (2.42) we can write
*	 *
' =i+w or (1-m)(1+s )=(i-z)(i+w )
	
(2.56)
t	 t	 t	 t
This characterises the values of the personal tax parameters in this
regime. In equilibrium, however, the marginal cost of debt will be equal
to the marginal cost of the other two sources of finance. This implies
that the condition specified in (2.53) (from regime 3) must also hold.
In this regime, an extra unit of capital will probably be financed by
debt and new equity. To see this, consider an additional unit of
investment financed by new equity. The marginal cost of new equity
64
finance is unaffected by the size of the investment or of the share
18	 *issue . To maintain	 =1+0, however, requires that dividends are
unchanged from the equilibrium level (since taxable profits will only
change in period t+1). This does not imply that the firm does not use
retention finance, but merely that the marginal source of finance does
not include retentions. However, as the capital stock increases, agency
*
costs of debt will fall and E (t ) will rise, both of which reduce the
t t+1
marginal cost of debt. This suggests that more debt must be issued in
order to raise the marginal cost back up to its equilibrium level
(although as discussed above, it is strictly possible that increasing
the level of debt does not increase its marginal cost).
The value of qe in regime 4 is straightforward. As in regime 1,
and so The difference between regimes 1 and 4 is that in the
former 7<1 and in the latter 7>1. This raises the possibility that q>1.
However, it is straightforward to show that this requires that the
lemons premium be greater than the present value of tax allowances on
the new investment (ie. w>m), which requires a very large premium.
This can be seen by using the alternative expression for 
qe in (2.51)
e	 *	 *	 e
which shows that q =1+o -i . Since both ' and i are positive, q <1 fort	 t	 t	 t	 t
Note that regime 4 is clearly not a Miller equilibrium. Although the
marginal cost of all three three sources of finance must be the same,
the firm is not indifferent to which it uses: there is an optimal debt
equity ratio, dependent on agency costs and tax exhaustion. However, it
should be noted that a regime of this type may occur even in the absence
of tax exhaustion and the lemons premium, in which case 7=1 and (2.53)
holds with t replacing E(t1).Thus, it could be argued that 1
defines the marginal investor. Note that =1 implies that
18The marginal cost of new equity issues would depend on the size of the
issue if there were transactions costs: there are relatively high fixed
costs to making a new equity issue, so that the overall cost of any
single issue is inversely related to the size of the issue.
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rn-c
z=
	
	
(2.57)
1-c
This possibility is, in fact, rather more likely than the knife-edge
condition (l-r)=(l-m)/(l-z) used by King (1987) and discussed above.
This is because most individuals pay income tax at the basic rate, but
pay no capital gains tax (ie. their gains are less than £5000 per year
in the UK in 1990). Thus, for them, m=c and z=0, and so (2.57) holds.
Indeed, this is far from surprising: this condition is what the
imputation system was designed to achieve. Given (2.57), the firm will
also use debt finance if
AB(B ,Kt+1 t+11-t+	 = 1-c	 (2.58)
t+1
which is simply the condition in (2.54) in the absence of tax
exhaustIon. (2.57) and (2.58) are therefore a version of regime 4 in the
absence of tax exhaustion. Notice that in this case, dividend policy is
irrelevant, since the marginal shareholder Is indifferent between the
three sources of finance. The firm is also unconcerned about the
marginal tax rates of Its investors - this is consistent with the survey
results of Edwards and Mayer (1986). These points are also claimed by
King (1987) for his regime 1 (equivalent to the regime 1 here in the
absence of tax exhaustion). This regime differs from King's regime 1 in
a number of ways, however. First, new equity may be used. Second, there
is a unique debt equity ratio, determined by the scale of agency costs
of debt. Because of this, debt must always constitute some proportion of
new finance raised.
A final point to note is the implication for the cost of increasing the
capital stock by purchasing another firm, rather than purchasing the
asset directly. The regime 1 here mirrors King's regime 1, in that the
19	 *
cost of purchasing one unit of another firm ('p ) is less than the cost
t	
*
of the direct purchase of one unit of the asset (p ) since <1. In
regIme 4, the cost of purchasing another firm is also 	 but here >1,
19
If the target firm is in regime 1.
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and so it would be cheaper to purchase the asset directly.
This description of possible financial regimes indicates that
consideration of tax exhaustion, especially in combination with the
imputation system (which has been in effect in the UK since 1973 and is
also common elsewhere in Europe), adds substantially to the richness of
the relevant analysis. It also suggests a fourth regime which is ignored
in the literature, but which may prove to be common in the UK and in
other European countries.
2.5. Issues in the empirical construction of tax parameters and Q
In this section we discuss the derivation of the terms needed to
estimate the Q investment equation given in (2.38). Three items in
particular need to be identified: t, p. and the version in this model
of the commonly used empirical analogue to the shadow value of capital
ÔV/8K, defined in (2.35). Although the usual use will be made of
the equity market value of the firm, V. from (2.35), all three of these
variables include terms which depend on tax exhaustion. In particular,
all three expressions include expected values of stocks of taxable
losses or unrelieved ACT, E [aV /8L ] and E [aV /8U ] le. the
t	 t+1	 t+1	 t	 t+1	 t+1
shadow values of the two additional state variables introduced by tax
exhaust ion.
Two issues are important here. The first is simply how to find empirical
measures of av /8L	 and 3V /8U	 even if periods of tax
t+1	 t+1	 t+1	 t+1
exhaustion were known by the firm with certainty. The second concerns
how expectations are formed. These issues are discussed in turn.
In general, the effect of either form of tax exhaustion is simply to
delay any tax payment or rebate. This can be seen by differentiating the
maximand in (2. 18) with respect to Ut and L. Beginning with	 we have
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r av
E I	 t+i 1 =
auI-
(2.61)
I	 t+i
+EI	 cx<b
8v	 I	
'H(b )}
	
(2.59)
aut (+AD) [1-H(b)]	 au	 tt	 1..	 L	 +j
(2.59) says that with probability 1-H(b) the firm will not be ACT
exhausted or fully tax exhausted at the end of period. In this case,
unrelieved ACT brought forward into period t will be worth (,+AD)
(discounted back to the beginning of the period to find the value of
8V/8U). This Is because If the firm resumes a tax-paying position, any
unrelieved ACT can be converted directly into an increase in net
dividend payments, worth (+x') to the shareholder. With probability
H(b), the firm will remain in a position of having unrelieved ACT at
the end of period t, which then has expected value E (OV /8U ).
t	 t+1	 t+1
Taking (2.59) one period forward and solving forward yields
	
av	 (
E	 =E p J(A' )[1-H(b	 )]
	
t aU	 t t+1 I 	 t+1	 t+1
t+1
+	
[	
llPH(b1)](+AD)[1_H(b)]}]	 (2.60)
s=t+2
Ignoring expectations, this defines ÔV /ÔU	 as p (l+AD ) with
D
probability 1-H(b1) plus future values of (+X ) weighted by the
discount rate and the probability of resuming a full tax-paying
position. In the simple case in which it is known with certainty that
the firm will be ACT exhausted for n periods from period t, then
H(b ) =H(b )=. . . H(b	 )=1 and H(b ) =0. Treating the discount rate
	
t+1	 t+2	 t+n-1	 t+n
as constant over time,
	 (2.60) becomes
which clearly states that av iau	 is simply an increment to nett+1	 t+1
dividends in period t+n discounted over the period of tax exhaustion.
The definition of E [8V /aL I can be analysed in the same way,t	 t+1	 t+1
although it is slightly more complex. Differentiating (2.18) with
respect to L yields
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av
= (AD)
{
8L	 tt
av
c(1+t-c)	 I	 t+iI
+ { (t-c)(1-c)+	 D	 EtL	 a <a <b i {H(b)-H(at)}t+i t_ t_ tJJ
t+1E	
a b	 H(a
}
D t[8L
(2.62)
Just as in the expression for t, there are three parts to this
expression, corresponding to the three tax regimes in which the firm can
be in period t - tax-paying with probability 1-H(b). ACT exhausted
with probability H(b)_H(a). and full tax exhaustion with probability
H(a). Using the last term, (2.62) can again be solved forward to
produce an expression for E [8V /3L ]:t	 t+1	 t+1
I av
El	 EJ	 pH(a	 )1l(+AD)T[1H(b )]HÔL ] = j	 i_i]1	 s	 SJ=t+1L
c(1+t-c) 3V
______	 t+iJ a b fl[H(b )-H(a )]l	 (2.63)
(+XD ) [ 8U	 S S Sj)	 S	 Jjt+1S
where, for convenience of notation, H(a) =1. While the firm remains
fully tax exhausted, H(a) =1, so that the two parts of the expression in
(2.63) are only relevant when the firm regains either a full tax paying
position or an ACT exhausted position. For example, in the simple case
in which it is known with certainty that the firm will be fully tax
exhausted for m periods and ACT exhausted for a further n periods - so
that H(a ) =1 for s<t+m and H(b ) =1 for s<t+m+n - then using the
S	 S
expression for E [V /ÔU ] in (2.61) and treating the discount rate
t	 t+1	 t+1
as constant over time, we can write
m+n
E Lay ia	 ]=Pm(+A) )(t-c)(1-c) + p 	 ('+AD	 )c(1+t-c)	 (2.64)
t	 t+1	 t+1	 t+m	 t+m+n
If it is known with certainty that the firm will resume a full tax
paying position in period t+m, but will not then be ACT exhausted, so
that n=O, (2.64) simplifies to
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E [8V /8L ]=p
t.	 t+1	 t+1	
m(+AD)T (2.65)
and, of course, if m=0, then E (ÔV /ÔL ]=(+X)t.
t	 t+1	 t+1
Expressions (2.61), (2.64) and (2.65) give values of E(8V1/8U1] and
E[aV/8L1] if periods of tax exhaustion are known with certainty at
period t, which can be used to construct empirical measures of these
*	 *
terms and hence of t and p
t	 t
Having defined E [ÔV /8L I and E [8V ,8U I in the case oft	 t+1	 t+1	 t	 t+1	 t+1
certainty it is now necessary to find some empirical measures. The
approach taken here follow the approach of Hansen (1982) in replacing
20
the expected values with actual values and instrumenting . Thus, it is
assumed	 that	 E [8V /8L ] =8V /ÔL +v	 and
t	 t+1	 t+1	 t+1	 t+1 t+1
E [8V /8U ] =E [8V iaU ]+w , where v 	 and w	 are assumed to
t	 t+1	 t+1	 t	 t+1	 t+1	 t+1	 t+1	 t+1
be orthogonal to information available in period t. Altshuler and
Auerbach (1987) provide the only other attempt to form values of such
terms. They assume that the forecast can be proxied by some distributed
lag. However, it is not clear why this approach should be preferred to
the one used here.
*	 *
We are now in a position to define the values of r and p used below.
For each, three cases can be distinguished:
20Three issues should be noted regarding concerning the use of actual
values. First, 'actual' values are based on the model of the UK
corporation tax system described in Appendix B, and are therefore
subject to some measurement error. Second, perfect foresight assumptions
are clearly not available for periods beyond which data Is available
(1986). In this case, the accounting data has been predicted using
simple autoregressive models, and the tax model applied to the resulting
forecasts. Third, using the 'actual' tax system for future periods,
given that UK tax reforms are generally unanticipated (an exception
being the tansition period in the 1984 reforms), may not minimise the
forecast error, compared with the assumption of static expectations for
the tax system and perfect foresight for accounting data. In practice,
there was no significant difference in the Q model under these two
approaches. The results below assume static expectations for the tax
system.
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•1
m
r =c+(t-c)(1-c)p + c(1+t-c,p
n
1t-c(T-c) + c(t-c)p
case (a)
(2.66)case(b)
case(c)
(a) fully tax paying in period t: H(b)=H(a)=O
(b) Fully tax exhausted for m periods and ACT exhausted for m+n periods:
H(b ) =1 if s<m and H(b )=O; RCa ) =1 if s<m+n and RCa )0)
s	 t+m	 S	 t+n
(c) ACT exhausted for n periods: H(b )=1; H(a )0 if s<n and H(a )1t	 S	 t+n
*
Beginning with t , we can write:
It should be noted that in these definitions, and below, it is assumed
that is constant over time. Clearly the simplest assumption to
achieve this is that dividends are always paid, so that xD=o for all s.
The definition of p is complicated by the term E(8V1/8K+1] in
(2.25). However, K 1 is simply the tax-written down value of the asset
at the end of period t - le. the value of the asset after receiving
depreciation allowances in period t. Suppose there is a constant
exponential depreciation rate for tax purposes for the asset, at rate
T	 T	 TT
so that (abstracting from new investment) K = (1-5 )K . FurtherS	 51
define the depreciation allowance claimable in period s in the absence
of tax exhaustion as z TKT . In the presence of tax exhaustion, the
s-i	 *
value of Z falls to Z . In this case, , is Just the discounted present
S	 *	 S	 *
value of the Z for sat. i and hence p are calculated In exactly this
S	 t	 *t
way, where, for any future period s, Z is
(TZ	 case (a)
Z=(t_c)(1_c)pmZ + c(1+t_c)pnZ 	
case(b)
	
(2.67)
(1-c)(t-c)Z +	 case(c)
21
A fourth case can be distinguished In which the firm is fully tax
exhausted, but not ACT exhausted, which can occur because of the
carry-back provisions in the imputation system. This creates the same
expressiQns as undej a classical corporation tax with tax exhaustion,
namely t =pmr and z =pmz (see below for the definition of z). This case
has been allowed for in the empirical work.
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It only remains to define the various terms used as a proxy for
E[av1/aK11. or Q, from (2.35). is simply the market value of
the firm at the beginning of period t+1. The second term,
T	 TK E [av /3K ], the present value of capital allowances for tax
t+1 t	 t+1	 t+1	 *
purposes on past investment, is calculated in exactly the same way as Z
in (2.55). The third term is the shadow value of the stock of leased
assets, for which, as noted above, insufficient data exists for this
term to be included in the empirical work. It Is therefore ignored. The
fourth term, -B E [3V /0B 1, can be estimated using the expression
t+1 t	 t+1	 t+1
in (2.43). If the firm issues debt and new equity, then this term is
equal to minus the stock of debt held at the beginning of period t+1.
This would be the case, for example, in regimes 3 and 4 discussed above.
However, we further make use of the assumption that positive dividends
are paid, which restricts us to regime 4. It is therefore assumed that
the firm is in regime 422 The last two terms are the shadow values of the
stock of losses and unrelieved ACT brought forward into period t+1.
Given estimates of these stocks from the tax model in Appendix B, and
the discussion above, these terms are straightforward to calculate.
Finally it should be noted that the investment equation, (2.34),
includes a term (+A). Since it is assumed elsewhere that AO, this
implies that marginal Q should be divided by . The distinction between
the case of dividing or not dividing by was the distinction drawn by
Poterba and Summers (1983) between what are termed here regimes 1 and 3
(since in their model ,^AD=l in regime 3). Here, since we are assuming
that the firm is in regime 4, it is possible that 1. This includes
two common possibilities - institutional investors, for whom m=z=O and
'=1/(1-c)>1, and basic rate tax payers for whom mc, z0 and so 1.
Empirically, there is little to choose between these two possibilities,
and so the results presented below are for the case in which 1.
221n principle, this has the disadvantage that this implies that new
equity is always issued. However, restricting the empirical work to only
those observations for which new equity is issued would greatly reduce
the size of the sample and introduce sample selection problems.
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2.6. Data
The data are described in Chapter 1 and Appendix A, and only a brief
description of the relevant variables is given here, before some
discussion of the values of Q and the tax parameters. As noted
elsewhere, the main data sources are company accounting data from
Datastream and their stock market values from the London Share Price
Database. In addition, estimates of the tax position of these companies
from the model described in Appendix B is used. An unbalanced panel of
729 UK manufacturing companies with at least four years of continuous
data is used.
Inflation-adjusted estimates of the net capital stock have been
constructed from the historic cost data available in company accounts
using the perpetual inventory method, with depreciation rates of 8. 19%
for plant and machinery and 2.5% for buildings (taken from King and
Fullerton (1984)). Gross investment includes both new fixed assets
purchased and fixed assets acquired through takeovers. This is because
data on each form of investment separately is not available; firms
involved in major acquisitions have been excluded from the sample. The
book value of debt reported in the accounts is taken as a proxy for its
market value. The market value of equity, V, is measured as the average
of three stock market valuations representing the midpoint of each month
prior to the start of the firm's accounting year.
Descriptive statistics concerning the main accounting variables, such as
the investment rate, are given In Appendix A. Here we discuss values of
*	 *
p and Q. In particular, we wish to examine the impact on the
effective tax rate, the effective price of capital goods and Q of tax
exhaustion. One method of doing so is to construct the tax parameters
and Q under various alternative models of the tax system, and to compare
the results. We therefore consider four different methods of accounting
for taxation:
1. Ignoring tax exhaustion (full tax).
2. Accounting for full tax exhaustion, but ignoring the imputation
system altogether, using the model described in Appendix B for estimates
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of periods of tax exhaustion23.
3. Accounting for full tax exhaustion and ACT exhaustion, again using
the model in Appendix B.
4. Accounting for full tax exhaustion and ACT exhaustion, but using
estimates of tax exhaustion directly from tax data in company accounts.
The reason for including the fourth method is as a partial check on the
corporation tax model described in Appendix B. If the results using
methods 3 and 4 were very different, this may be due to one of the
sources of estimates of tax exhaustion estimates being poor. Below means
*	 *
and standard deviations of each of t , p and Q are presented using each
of these four methods. In addition, the same information on Q ignoring
tax altogether is presented. Finally, correlation coefficients are
presented: if these variables vary across firms because of tax
exhaustion (as the theory predicts), correlation coefficients will be
low.
*
Beginning with r , Table 2.1(a) presents estimates of the unweighted
*
mean value of r across all the companies available in each year. Table
2.1(b) presents the standard deviations on the same basis. These tables
reveal that tax exhaustion can have a significant effect on the average
effective tax rate, and that variation in the effective tax rate across
companies in the same year was considerable in the 1970s and early
1980s. Considering first the preferred measure in the third column of
each table - allowing for full tax exhaustion and ACT exhaustion using
the model in Appendix B - the average tax rate was around 3 and 4
percentage points lower than the full statutory rate (column 1) for much
of the 1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, the standard deviation ranged
between 5 and 7 percentage points (compared with zero in the full tax
case, since the statutory tax rate was constant over much of this
period; positive values for the standard deviation for column 1,
ignoring tax exhaustion, arise only because of changes in the statutory
*
tax rate). Clearly the effective tax rate, r cannot exceed the
23Th1s is essentially the approach taken, in a somewhat ad hoc form, in
Blundell et al (1989).
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*Table 2.1(a) Estimated average effective tax rate, t
year no of	 no tax	 full tax	 full tax and	 full tax and
cos	 exhaustion exhaustion only ACT exhaustion ACT exhaustion
(accounts) 7.
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
190
297
374
409
431
655
673
685
693
690
673
660
639
602
565
492
40. 0
40. 0
44. 7
51.9
52. 0
52. 0
52. 0
52. 0
52. 0
52. 0
52. 0
52. 0
51. 2
48. 1
43. 2
38.2
40. 0
39. 9
44. 2
47.8
48. 5
48. 1
48. 0
47. 9
47. 0
46. 1
46.2
47.1
47.3
45. 0
40.7
37. 0
40. 0
39. 9
43. 7
48.2
49.1
49. 1
49. 1
48. 9
48.2
47.8
48. 1
48.6
48.5
45.6
41.2
37.3
39.8
39.9
44.3
50.9
50. 8
50. 2
50. 1
50. 0
49.3
48. 7
48. 6
48.7
48. 6
45.0
41.2
37. 6
Notes
1. Accounting years are attributed to the calendar year in which the
year end occurs.
2. The estimates presented are an unweighted average of the effective
tax rates facing all of the companies available in each year.
*
Table 2.1(b) Estimated standard deviation of effective tax rate, t
year no of	 no tax	 full tax	 full tax and	 full tax and
cos	 exhaustion exhaustion only ACT exhaustion ACT exhaustion
(accounts)
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
190
297
374
409
431
655
673
685
693
690
673
660
639
602
565
492
0. 1
0. 0
3. 8
0. 4
0. 0
0. 0
0. 0
0. 0
0.0
0. 0
0. 0
0. 0
0. 6
1.6
1.7
1.6
0.3
0. 8
5. 0
9.6
8.9
10. 5
10. 1
10. 4
11.6
12. 9
12. 9
12. 3
11.4
9. 9
8. 6
5. 9
0. 3
0. 8
3. 9
5.7
4. 9
5. 3
5. 4
5. 5
6. 9
7.5
7. 3
7.3
6.4
6. 4
5. 7
4.6
1.4
1.0
4.3
4. 5
4.5
5.4
3.9
3.7
5.2
5.7
6.2
5.9
4. 8
5.8
3. 8
2.0
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*statutory tax rate, t, and so the high standard deviation of of t
*
(greater than the difference between t and t) mostly reflects values
below the average value. This gives a strong indication that there are a
large number of companies facing a very low effective tax rate.
These estimates are reasonably close to those in the last column, based
on tax data directly from company accounts. The last column does not
*
exhibit such a low average value of t , nor such a high standard
deviation, which reflects that this method does not suggest quite such a
high prevalence of tax exhaustion. However, this may simply reflect that
estimates based on tax data in company accounts may underestimate tax
exhaustion due to a desire on the part of companies (or their
accountants) to show a reasonably high figure for tax paid.
*
The second column presents estimates of t ignoring ACT exhaustion. The
figures here appear to be be even more striking in the size of the
standard deviation and the difference of the average value from r. At
first sight this may appear counterintuitive since less tax exhaustion
is being allowed for in these estimates. However, the reason is that ACT
to some extent has an offsetting effect to full tax exhaustion. Consider
*
the value of r in case (b) in (2.66), for example, in which the firm is
fully tax exhausted and ACT exhausted in period t. Ignoring ACT, tax due
in period t on an additional pound of earnings is zero; tax is deferred
until the firm resumes a tax-paying position. However, allowing for ACT,
an ACT charge of c is due immediately if the additional pound of
*
earnings is paid out as a dividend (which is what t measures). At some
point in the future the firm will increase this to t (Ignoring
discounting) by paying a corporation tax charge of t and claiming ACT
*
relief of c. The effect of this is that in the latter case r cannot
fall below c, whereas in the former case it can fall to zero.
*
Table 2.2(a) and Table 2.2(b) present similar statistics for p /p , a
measure of the effective reduction in the price of capital goods due to
tax reliefs and allowances. The full tax case in column 1 is not, in
this case, simply a statutory tax rate. In fact it is simply l-ip where
is the present value of depreciation allowances, averaged over
assets. Assets are split into three categories for this purpose: plant
and machinery, industrial buildings and commercial buildings. Weights
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used are the investment in each asset in each period, and so variation
*
across companies occurs in p /p because of variation in the asset
*
structure of their investments. The minimum value that p /p could take
would be 48'!. - this would be the case for an investment (in plant and
machinery) which received immediate expensing at a tax rate of 52%. The
relative generosity of the allowance for plant and machinery and
industrial buildings is reflected in the low numbers in column 1 of
Table 2.2(a) in the 1970s and up to the 1984 reforms to corporation tax.
Commercial buildings have never received an allowance.
Tax exhaustion has two effects as can easily be seen from the definition
*	 *	 *	 * *	 *
of p
	 in (2.29): p =(1+s )/(1+s)-ii =	 . If ACT exhaustion is
present in period t then '<', which reduces the effective price of the
asset in terms of dividends foregone by the shareholder, since the firm
does not need to reduce net dividends by the full amount of the price of
the asset (since in the absence of imputation reducing net dividends by
1-c it saves ACT of c). However, tax exhaustion need not occur in period
t for it to affect the effective price of capital goods (unless there is
immediate expensing). A subsequent period of tax exhaustion would still
reduce the present value of allowances, i, and so increase p f
allowances to be claimed in that period are delayed.
*
It is generally the case that the second effect, through 	 , outweighs
the first effect, through s, so that tax exhaustion significantly
increases the effective price (although in the mid-1980s the reverse
becomes true). As would be expected, ignoring ACT exhaustion (as in
column 2) leads to an overestimate of the effective price since the
first effect is ignored. Compared with ignoring tax exhaustion
altogether, the standard deviation across companies is also much greater
when tax exhaustion is accounted for. Once again, the standard deviation
is higher if ACT exhaustion is ignored. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.2 are
once more quite similar, although this partly reflects the fact that
forecasts of tax exhaustion beyond the end of the period for which data
are available are the same in both cases.
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*Table 2.2(a) Estimated average effective price of capital goods, p /p
(%).
year no of	 no tax	 full tax	 full tax and	 full tax and
cos	 exhaustion exhaustion only ACT exhaustion ACT exhaustion
(accounts) 7,
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
190
297
374
409
431
655
673
685
693
690
673
660
639
602
565
492
71. 1
68.0
63.6
58. 1
56.3
54. 8
54.4
55.3
55. 1
55. 9
55.5
53. 5
53. 8
58. 6
67.3
74.7
71.7
68.4
64.3
61.6
59. 4
58. 3
58. 0
58.9
59.4
61.0
60.4
57. 9
57. 4
61.2
69. 1
75.5
71. 1
68.4
63. 5
59.2
57. 5
56.2
56. 1
56.7
57.2
58.3
57.8
55. 9
55.7
60. 0
67. 5
74. 1
71.8
68.4
65.0
60. 7
58. 9
57. 1
55.7
56.4
56.4
57. 1
57.2
55.7
55.4
60. 2
67. 2
73.8
Notes
1. Figures are shown as a percentage of the pre-tax price, p.
*
Table 2.2(b) Estimated standard deviation of effective price, p /p.
year no of	 no tax	 full tax	 full tax and	 full tax and
cos	 exhaustion exhaustion only ACT exhaustion ACT exhaustion
(accounts)
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
190
297
374
409
431
655
673
685
693
690
673
660
639
602
565
492
4.5
5.3
6.7
7.1
6. 7
6. 2
6.2
6. 9
6.4
7.1
6. 9
5. 5
5. 5
5. 9
5. 5
5. 3
4. 8
5.6
7. 3
10.2
9.8
10.8
10. 6
11.1
11.7
12. 6
12. 5
12. 1
11.6
10. 1
8.3
6. 4
4. 8
5.6
6.7
7.0
6. 8
6.6
6.7
7.1
7. 6
8. 1
8. 0
7. 8
7. 2
7. 4
6. 5
6. 2
4.7
5.6
7.4
9.2
8.5
8.4
6.8
7. 2
7. 1
7. 1
7.6
7. 1
6.2
7.1
5. 9
5. 8
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Tables 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) present similar descriptive statistics for Q.
In this case there are five versions of Q: the four corresponding to the
four cases above together with an estimate of Q without any correction
for taxation. Several points may be noted regarding the estimates in
Table 2.3(a). To understand them it is helpful to repeat the definition
of Q:
av
E • ________
4 3K j,,<+xD )	 ID;t+1
	
* V
	
* y
	(1-t )p
	
(1-t )p
	
t t	 t t
(2. 39)
In long run equilibrium, Q=0, implying zero adjustment costs. Note then,
that for most of the period considered - from 1975 onwards - average Q
is negative for all versions of Q, which implies that it appears to have
been the stock market's view that, on average, firms should have been
reducing their capital stock. According to the figures given in Appendix
A, firms were increasing their capital stocks over the period. However,
these figures are subject to some measurement error, and depend
crucially on the assumed rates of depreciation24 . Sales were static or
falling for much of the period.
Perhaps surprisingly, adding taxes increases the value of Q. However,
the first term in Q, reflecting the shadow value of an additional unit
*	 *
of capital to the firm increases with t for t >0. Note that
E[3V/3K] should reflect taxation, so that this simply means that
Q unadjusted for taxes is too low since taxes are implicitly deducted
from the numerator but not the denominator. This effect outweighs the
additional cost to the firm of taxation measured by the second term,
which becomes greater than 1/ps' unless P;is at its minimum value of
The drop in the value of Q when tax exhaustion is introduced can
*
partly be explained by the fact that T falls as a result of tax
exhaustion. The fact that the value of Q continues to fall, moving along
24Bond and Devereux (1989) examine the impact of measurement error in the
capital stock on the empirical performance of the Q model of investment,
concluding that the results were insensitive to varying the measure
used.
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1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
190
297
374
409
431
655
673
685
693
690
673
660
639
602
565
492
0.81
0.89
1.66
1.15
-0. 43
-0.75
-0. 71
-0. 57
-0. 44
-0.45
-0.53
-0. 58
-0.38
-0. 24
-0. 08
-0. 16
0.81
0.89
1.56
0.92
-0.57
-0.83
-0.74
-0. 58
-0.44
-0.43
-0. 48
-0.53
-0.34
-0.21
-0. 08
-0. 17
0.81
0.89
1.67
1.09
-0. 40
-0.66
-0. 57
-0. 42
-0. 29
-0.30
-0. 37
-0. 41
-0.25
-0. 13
-0. 03
-0. 14
0.81
0.88
1.67
1.18
-0. 35
-0. 63
-0. 54
-0. 39
-0. 25
-0. 25
-0. 33
-0. 40
-0. 22
-0.11
-0. 02
-0. 13
0.28
0.29
0.57
0.12
-0. 65
-0. 82
-0. 79
-0. 69
-0.61
-0. 59
-0. 64
-0.69
-0. 60
-0. 49
-0.38
-0.37
Table 2.3(a) Estimated average tax-adjusted Q.
year no of	 no tax	 no tax	 full tax	 full tax full tax and
cos	 exhaustion exhaustion	 and ACT ACT exhaustion
exhaustion (accounts) 7.
Notes
1. Figures are shown as a percentage of the pre-tax price, p.
Table 2.3(b) Estimated standard deviation of tax-adjusted Q
year no of	 no tax	 no tax	 full tax	 full tax	 full tax and
cos	 exhaustion exhaustion	 and ACT ACT exhaustion
exhaustion (accounts) %
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
190
297
374
409
431
655
673
685
693
690
673
660
639
602
565
492
1.23
1.16
1.17
0.94
0.64
0.51
0.50
0.66
0.59
0.58
0.65
0.62
0.73
0.81
0.91
0.90
2.06
1.96
2.20
1.95
1.34
1.05
1.04
1.37
1.23
1.21
1.39
1.30
1.49
1.57
1.59
1.45
2.06
1.97
2.20
1.89
1.35
1.03
1.00
1.34
1.21
1.18
1.38
1.29
1.51
1.56
1.59
1.45
2.06
1.97
2.18
1.91
1.35
1.06
1.04
1.36
1.23
1.23
1.39
1.31
1.51
1.58
1.61
1.46
2.06
1.97
2.17
1.94
1.33
1.06
1.06
1.39
1.26
1.23
1.40
1.32
1.50
1.56
1.60
1.46
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the columns in Table 2.3(a), also reflects the fact that the effective
price of investment goods rises, as shown in Table 2.2(a).
More surprising results come from Table 2.3(b), indicating the standard
deviation of Q across companies for each year. The standard deviation
shows a large increase moving from the "no-tax" case to the "full-tax"
case, which is mainly due to variation in the asset structure across
*
firms leading to a different average p (since there is virtually no
variation in t across firms, except during a period of tax reform).
However, the standard deviation of Q is virtually constant across all
four versions which allow for taxation in some way. The variation,
*	 *
across the different definitions, of the standard deviation of t and p
noted above disappears when both tax effects are included in the
definition of Q.
Further evidence on this issue is presented in Table 2.4, which gives
*	 *
correlation coefficients between the different definitions of t , p and
Q across all firms and years. Table 2.4(a) gives the correlation
*
t . The correlation between the full tax case and the other cases is
very weak, as would be expected, since the statutory tax rate, t,
changes little. There is a relatively high coefficient on the
correlation between the main tax exhaustion case and the case ignoring
the imputation system, since the same estimates of periods of tax
exhaustion were used and it is likely that both forms of tax exhaustion
might occur together. The correlation with the method of estimating tax
exhaustion directly from accounts is much lower, since different
*
estimates are used. A similar pattern emerges for p /p.
However, Table 2.4(c) shows that all of the definitions of Q are highly
correlated, with no coefficient less than 0.98. There are two possible
reasons for this. The first is that the effects of tax exhaustion tend
to cancel each other out. This can certainly occur (to some extent) In
the second term of Q, but not to a large extent in the first term (the
empirical proxy for E Lay /8K 1, defined in (2.35), contains the
t	 t+1	 t+1
shadow value of future depreciation allowances on past investment, which
varies with the assumption on tax, but this term is very small compared
to the market value of debt and equity). In any case, the average values
of Q continue to differ, as shown in Table 2.3(a).
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The second reason is then that variation in Q is dominated by variation
in factors other than tax, notably the market value of equity, which is
common to all of the definitions discussed. If this is true, it suggests
that the average Q model as set up in this chapter may not be a very
fruitful model in which to investigate the effects of taxation. More
evidence on this is presented in the next section, which gives estimates
the investment model.
*
Table 2.4(a) Correlation of different definitions of t
no tax	 full tax	 full and	 full and
exhn	 exhaustion	 ACT	 ACT exhn
exhaustion (accounts)
no tax exhn	 1.00
full tax exhn	 0.30	 1.00
full and ACT exhn	 0.52	 0.85	 1.00
full and ACT exhn	 0.64	 0.41	 0.53	 1.00
(accounts)
*
Table 2.4(b) Correlation of different definitions of p /p
no tax	 full tax	 full and	 full and
exhn	 exhaustion	 ACT	 ACT exhn
exhaustion (accounts)
no tax exhn	 1.00
full tax exhn	 0.66	 1.00
full and ACT exhn	 0.83	 0.86	 1.00
full and ACT exhn	 0.86	 0.68	 0.77	 1.00
(accounts)
Table 2.4(c) Correlation of different definitions of Q
no tax	 no tax	 full	 full and full and
exhn	 exhn	 ACT exhn ACT exhn
(accounts)
no tax	 1.00
no tax exhn	 0.98	 1.00
full tax exhn	 0.98	 0.99	 1.00
full and ACT exhn	 0.98	 0.99	 0.99	 1.00
full and ACT exhn	 0.98	 0.99	 0.99	 0.99	 1.00
(accounts)
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2.7. Estimation and Results
This section has two aims. The first is to examine the econometric
issues which arise In estimating the investment model specified above.
The second is to examine the role played by taxation, and in particular
to compare models which ignore taxation altogether, which allow for
taxation but ignore tax exhaustion and, finally, which also allow for
tax exhaustion.
The investment model to be estimated for firm 1 can be written
I
£	 (2.68)= c +	
+
for i=1,2,... ,N, t = 1,2,... ,T, and where Q is defined from (2.39). As
mentioned above, the error term,	 may contain firm specific effects,
a and time specific effects, a as well as an idiosyncratic shock,
Thus the following structure is adopted for
c = a +a +v	 (2.69)it	 I	 t	 It
The last term is not restricted by the theory to be an innovation,
although more general dynamic relationships between the investment rate
and Q will not necessarily be consistent with the theory.
The estimation of (2.68) requires assessment of the stochastic
properties of c	 and Q. If Q
	
is strictly exogenous (ie. it is
uncorrelated with a and v for all s and t) and v is uncorrelatedI	 is	 It
over time, then the standard variance-components GLS estimator can be
used. If, however, Q is correlated with the fixed effect, a, but not
with v 1 , then the GLS estimator is inconsistent, but the within groups
estimator may be used.
However, it Is likely both that Is correlated with v 1 , and that v1,
Is correlated over time. It has already been noted above in the context
of the theoretical model that contemporaneous Q is simultaneously
determined with Investment, which suggests that it should be treated as
endogenous, and as has also been noted, there is nothing in the theory
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to prevent adjustment cost shocks being correlated over time. In
addition, we may wish to test the possibility of more general dynamic
structures involving the lagged dependent variable and the possibility
that Q is correlated with the fixed effect a. In any of these cases,
both the GLS and within groups estimators are inconsistent.
The approach taken here is therefore to estimate (2.68) in
first-differences, using a Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM)
estimator (see Hansen (1982)). This is an instrumental variables
estimator in which the instruments are weighted optimally. In first
differences, the error term becomes (a -a ) + (v -v 	 ) since thet t-1	 It It-i
firm specific effect drops out. If	 is endogenous but v1 is serially
uncorrelated, Q	 and further lags are valid instruments. If	 is,
in fact, predetermined (as it may be given the construction of Q
discussed above), Q is also a valid instrument. Clearly, as t
increases over the sample period, more data points are available as
instruments.
Omitting time effects for notational simplicity, the GMM estimator is
= (x'ZANZ'x)1x'ZANZ'y
	 (2.70)
where x is the stacked vector of observations on and y is the
stacked vector of observations on (I/K). The instrument matrix, Z,
allows the number of instruments in each cross section to increase as we
proceed through the panel. In the presence of general heteroskedasticity
across both firms and time, the optimal choice for AN is
N
AN= _Z'VA;'Z'
[ 1
L.	 I	 I	 I	 ii
Ni=i	 J
(2.71)
where the vectors v are consistent estimates of the first-differeflCed
residuals for each firm (White (1982)). They are obtained from a
preliminary consistent estimator of , setting AN=(N1..lZHZj) 1 where
H is a matrix with twos on the leading diagonal, minus ones on the first
off-diagonal and zeros elsewhere. With large N, this first stage
estimation gives similar, though less well determined, coefficient
estimates.
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The validity of the instruments used depends on whether v 1 is serially
correlated. Only if v1 is serially uncorrelated (implying a MACi) error
term in the differenced model) will 	 be a valid instrument (given
the endogeneity of Q). Second order serial correlation is
tested using the one degree of freedom test (m2) proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1989). Robust Sargan tests of the over-identifying
restrictions exploited by the estimator are also reported.
One other important factor influencing the validity of the instrument
set is the possibility of measurement error. For example, if is
measured with error, inducing a negative correlation between it and the
current shock, v, then Q	 is no longer a valid instrument even if Q
is other wise exogenous. Note that measurement error derived from
including Q	 as an instrument would be expected to induce downwards
bias in the estimated value of , while the endogeneity of would
be expected to result in upwards bias. Although differencing may
exacerbate measurement error problems, the first-difference estimates
are robust to permanent measurement error. Although omitting 11 might
allow us to make some inference of the importance of white noise
measurement error (see Griliches and Hausman (1986)), this procedure may
also remove endogeneity in the instrument set. Below, various
experiments are tried to try to separate these two effects, including
the use of future instruments as suggested by Hayashi and Inoue (1989).
We now turn to the results themselves. Following the strategy outlined
above, we first examine the effects of using different instrument sets
to analyse the stochastic elements In the model. To do this we use the
value of Q given in the model above - that is the value which allows for
full tax exhaustion and ACT exhaustion. Below we test whether this
version of Q in fact fits the data better than alternative versions
which do not model the tax system in as much detail (if at all).
Table 2.5 presents estimates of the Q investment model in
first-differences. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are
reported. The sample period is 1975-86, although as noted in Appendix A,
the sample consists of an unbalanced panel. In most columns is
used which implies an additional two periods of data. In addition, in
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Table 2.5 Testing the econometric specification of the Q model
Dependent variable
(a) UNRESTRICTED (1.) 	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 Cv)	 (vi)
	0.0020	 0.0099	 0.0021	 0.0088	 0.0175	 0.0025
(0.0077) (0.0034) (0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0009)
AQ	 -	 -0.0047	 -0.0022	 -0.0079	 -0.0041	 -0.0019
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0028) (0.0012) (0.0007)
A(I/K)	 -	 0.2365	 0.2347	 0.2218	 0.2450	 0.2434
(0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0214) (0.0201) (0.0208)
m2	 -4. 13	 -0. 29	 -0. 44	 -0. 2i	 -0. 26	 -0. 38
z2	 455.4	 400.8	 418.2	 380.0	 347.1	 484.4
Sargan	 71.5(75) 68.7(78) 77.9(72) 69.8(73) 98.6(81) 128.6(75)
Stability	 0.27(1)	 3.13(3)	 5.07(3)	 1.10(3)	 19.7(3)	 17.4(3)
(b) RESTRICTED	 (1)	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)	 (vi)
tQ	 -	 0.0105	 0.0037	 0.0080	 0.0175	 0.0030
-	 (0.0034) (0.0010) (0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0009)
p	 -	 0.2549	 0.2433	 0.2367	 0.2440	 0.2467
-	 (0.0186) (0.0198)	 (0.0203) (0.0190) (0.0208)
Comfac	 -	 4.47	 3.02	 4.66	 0.02	 3.40
Instruments	 Q 2-Q 8 Q 2-Q 7 Q 1 -Q 6 Q_3-Q_8 Q 2 Q 4 	 +Q2
	(I/K)	 (I/K)	 (I/K)	 Q -Q	 (I/K)
	
-2	 -2	 -2	 +1 +3	 -2
Notes:
1. Time dummies are included as regressors and instruments In all
equations.
2. Asymptotic standard errors are reported In parentheses. Standard
errors and test statistics are robust to general time-series and
cross-section heteroskedasticity.
3. m2 is a test for second order serial correlation in the residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial
correlation.
4. zi is a Wald test of the joint signif.cance of the reported
coefficients, asymptotically distributed as x under the null of no
relationship. The number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of
reported coefficients (excluding time dummies).
5. z2 is a Wald test of the joint significance of the time dummies.
There are 12 degrees of freedom for each model in the table.
6. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as x 2 (k) under the null. The number of
degrees of freedom is given In parentheses.
continued
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continued.
7. The stability test is a Wald test of the hypothesis that the reported
coefficients are common across the sub-periods 1975-80 and 1981-86. The
number of degrees of freedom is equal to the number of reported
coefficients.
8. The comfac statistic is a test of the common factor restrictions that
the dynamics are generated by an AR(1) disturbance, asymptotically
distributed as x (1).
order to use lagged instruments data back to 1971 Is used. Of the 729
firms used here, only 125 have data for every year from 1971 to 1986.
The number of observations used here is 6541.
Column Ci) presents the results for a model that allows Q to be
endogenous (so that the latest value of Q used as an instrument is dated
t-2) and correlated with the fixed effect, but assumes that v is notit
serially correlated. Although the estimate of is positive, it is very
small and not significant. Further, the m2 statistic signals that there
is potentially dynamic misspecification. Residual autocorrelation
remained when lags of Q were added to the model and when the lagged
investment rate was added to the instrument set.
In column (ii), a more general specification is therefore presented
which includes lags of both Q and I/K. The estimate of is considerably
higher, while its standard error falls, so that it becomes
significantly different from zero. The lagged dependent variable is
strongly significant. The m2 statistic falls to close to zero under this
specification, indicating absence of second order serial correlation.
However, as noted above, a dynamic model such as that presented in
column (ii) is only consistent with the theoretical model if the
dynamics can be represented by persistence in the stochastic factor in
the adjustment cost function. In the case of the model in column (ii),
this would require that v1 follows an AR(1) process and that the
parameter estimates satisfy the common factor restrictions for such a
process - that is, if v =pv	 +w , where w	 is white noise, thenIt	 i,t-1	 it	 it
the coefficient on 1 must be equal to -13p. The sign and size
suggest that this restriction might be accepted by the data. A formal
test is presented in the lower half of the table. Here the comfac
restriction is imposed on the unrestricted parameter estimates by the
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minimum distance approach25 . The test statistic for these restrictions is
the minimised value of this criteria function, which is asymptotically
distributed as 2 (k) under the null, where k is the number of
restrictions; in this case k=l. The data slightly reject the restriction
at 5% confidence levels.
It could therefore be argued that column (ii) represents a reasonable
specification of the model. As a further test, the table also shows that
the estimates in column (ii) do not reject a Wald test for the stability
of the slope coefficients over the two halves of the sample period,
split in 1981. One remaining problem, however, is the size of the
coefficient on Q. The estimate in column (ii) (and indeed throughout
the results presented here) is roughly in line with results found on
aggregate data (see for example, Summers (1981), Poterba and Summers
(1983), von Furstenburg (1977) and Poret and Torres (1989)), which, as
shown by Summers (1981), implies an extremely long adjustment process
for new investment. These possible shortcomings of the Q model are
discussed further below.
Column (iii) of Table 2.5 begins to test some of the assumptions
underlying the specification in column (ii), in particular the possible
endogeneity of	 and possible measurement error in	 Column (iii)
explores these issues by including	 in the instrument set. This
would be valid in the absence of measurement error and if is
predetermined with respect to v. Contrary to what would be expected if
the endogeneity issue were the most important, the coefficient on
falls when is added to the instrument set. Indeed, it is no
longer significantly different from zero. The other parameter estimates
and the test statistics are largely unchanged: although the fact that
the Sargan rises by a relatively small amount is further evidence that
the endogeneity issue is not dominant. Overall, these results suggest,
then, that measurement error in Q is leading to downwards bias which
more than offsets any upward bias due to the simultaneous determination
ofQ	 andyi,t-1	 i,t-1
25This approach is described, for example, in Blundell et al (1989).
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However, in the presence of measurement error, in principle, 
1 t-2 
also
becomes an invalid instrument although its significance in contributing
to any bias may well be small. This is because measurement error in
t-2 
can only constitute a small part of the whole error term - if
is in the Innovation part of the AR(1) process, and m 	 is the
measurement error in Q, then the error term in column (ii) is
Given the sizes of	 and	 the
last term must be relatively small. Column (iv) therefore explores the
effect of removing ° from the instrument set. The result is a
relatively small drop in the estimate of compared with column (Ii) and
a large rise compared with column (iii). Comparison of columns (Ii) and
(iii) do not therefore support the hypothesis of large biases due to
measurement error resulting from the inclusion of 	 in the
instrument set.
Such a comparison cannot reject the possibility entirely, though, since
it may simply the case that including only lags of t-3 and earlier In
the instrument set reduces the correlation of the instrument set with
the regressors: in other words the instruments are not very powerful.
Some light on this possibility is, however, shed by considering the
standard error of in column (iv). Since it is only very slightly
higher than in column (ii) this suggests that the power of the two
instrument sets are not very different. Note also that, as in column
(Ii) the comfac restriction slightly rejects in column (iv) and that the
stability test also holds.
In column (v) we examine the possibility that conditions hold under
which future instruments may be valid by including	 and
in the instrument set, again in their GMM form	 and
continue to be excluded). This follows the arguments of Hayashi and
Inoue (1989), that if v 1 is serially independent, then under efficient
markets, Q
	
can be shown to be independent of current and past
innovations to the investment process. If this argument Is valid the
efficiency of the GMM estimator will be increased by including future
instruments. It is apparent from column (v) of Table 2.5 that the
standard error on the coefficient of 	 does indeed fall when these
additional future instruments are included. However, it should also be
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noted that the coefficient estimate almost doubles compared with the
estimate in column (ii). Thus, as predicted by the theory, the presence
of serial correlation in v 	 induces upwards bias when futureIt
instruments are Included.
Finally, in column (vi) the effect of assuming strict exogeneity of Q
(as would be required for the consistency of the GLS or within groups
estimators) is tested by including values of Q dated between t-2 and t+3
inclusive in the instrument set. The estimate of under these
conditions falls once more to below that found in columns (11) and (lv),
which suggests that downwards bias due to measurement error is once
again dominating any upwards bias due to simultaneity. The large
differences in the coefficient estimates in this table suggest that
using any estimator which requires strict conditions on the stochastic
properties of the model, such as strict exogeneity of Q or lack of
serial correlation in v 	 Is likely to be biased and inconsistent.It
Clearly, this rules out the use of OLS as well as GLS and within groups.
Of the estimates shown in Table 2.5, the results in column (ii) seem
most reasonable, showing a reasonably precise and relatively large
estimate of	 in a theoretically consistent and stable model.
Having found such a preferred specification, we can now turn to the
issue of taxation, and, in particular, to test the effect of using
different measures of Q in the model. The results of this procedure are
shown in Table 2.6.
The five columns in Table 2.6 represent five measures of Q. They are as
follows:
(1) Ignoring taxation entirely.
(ii) Allowing taxes, but assuming no tax exhaustion.
(iii) Allowing taxable losses, but not unrelieved ACT.
(iv) Allowing both forms of tax exhaustion.
(v) As (iv), but using estimates of tax exhaustion based on an algorithm
for using data on taxation in company accounts, rather than using the
model described in Appendix B.
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Table 2.6 Alternative measures of Q
Dependent variable A(I/K)
(a) UNRESTRI CTED	 (1)
	
(ii)
	
(iii)
	
(iv)
	 (v)
I,t-1
(I/K)
It
m2
z2
Sargan
Stability
0. 0219
(0. 0073)
-0. 0083
(0.0024)
0. 2316
(0.0206)
-0. 52
388. 7
61. 9 (78)
2.91(3)
0. 0103
(0.0034)
-0. 0040
(0.0012)
0. 2206
(0.0205)
-0. 49
388. 8
67.9(78)
2. 45(3)
0. 0100
(0. 0032)
-0. 0039
(0.0012)
0. 2282
(0.0206)
-0.33
389. 9
68.0(78)
3.60(3)
0. 0099
(0.0034)
-0. 0047
(0.0012)
0. 2365
(0. 0205)
-0.29
400. 8
68. 7(78)
3.13(3)
0. 0102
(0.0033)
-0. 0038
(0.0012)
0. 2281
(0.0203)
-0.43
376. 3
71.8(78)
4.15(3)
(b) RESTRICTED	 (i)	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 (v)
	
0.0233	 0.0105	 0.0103	 0.0105	 0.0104
	
(0.0072)	 (0.0033)	 (0.0032)	 (0.0034)	 (0.0033)
p	 0. 2443	 0. 2338	 0. 2395	 0. 2549	 0. 2385
	
(0.0187)	 (0.0187)	 (0.0192)	 (0.0186)	 (0.0189)
Comfac	 2.21	 2.46	 2.34	 4.47	 2.03
Instruments	 Q2-Q7	 Q2-Q7	 Q2-Q7	 Q2-Q7	 Q_2-Q_7
(I/K) 2	(I/K)2	 (I/K)2	 (I/K)2	 (I/K)2
Notes. See notes to Table 2.5
As might have been expected, given the very high correlations between
the different measures of Q presented in Table 2.4, there is very little
variation across the columns in Table 2.6. In particular, the four
columns in which Q is adjusted for taxation in some fashion produce
virtually identical results. In the light of such similarity there is
clearly no point in performing formal specification tests to determine
whether any measure of Q outperforms the other measures. The result
would obviously be that no measure can be preferred by consideration of
the data.
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It is somewhat surprising that the measure of Q unadjusted for taxation
yields a coefficient estimate roughly double that of the measures of Q
adjusted for taxation, contrary to results presented elsewhere (see, for
example, Salinger and Summers (1984)). It should also be noted, however,
that the standard errors on Qand in column (1) are also double
those in the other columns, indicating that the 'no tax' model is less
well determined.
2.8 Conclusions
This chapter has developed a model of firm behaviour which explicitly
allows for the two forms of tax exhaustion found in the UK and elsewhere
in Europe, full tax exhaustion and ACT exhaustion. The model has been
used to analyse the financial behaviour of the firm and the investment
behaviour through the Q model of Investment. In the course of this
analysis, two important tax variables are developed, the effective tax
rate and the effective price of capital goods, both of which depend on
the tax position of the firm, and, in particular, on whether It Is
currently tax exhausted or whether It expects to be in the future.
Four possible financial regimes in which the firm may find itself are
discussed. Which regime the firm is in depends partly on the value of ,
the 'tax discrimination' variable. [f <1 (the case which Is commonly
analysed in the literature) there are three possible regimes. In regime
1, the firm will use debt and retention finance, In regime 2 only debt
finance, and in regime 3 debt and new equity finance. The proportions of
each type of finance used Is, however, difficult to determine since any
activity by the firm tends to alter the probability of tax exhaustion
and therefore affect effective tax rates and the relative cost of each
form of finance. If >1, a fourth regime is possible, in which the firm
uses all three sources of fInance. This regime does not constitute a
'Miller' equilibrium, however, since once again, the proportions of each
source of finance used Is determined by the probability of tax
exhaustion and agency costs on debt.
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The definition of average Q is slightly different from the normal
formulation when tax exhaustion is allowed for. In particular, the
shadow values of the two additional state variables, losses carried
forward and unrelieved ACT must be deducted from the market value of the
firm in order to find an expression for marginal Q. Despite considerable
variation in the effective tax rate and effective price of capital goods
across different measures of taxation (essentially allowing for tax
exhaustion and not allowing for tax exhaustion), the equivalent
variation in Q was minimal.
In estimating the Q model, considerable attention was paid to the
possibility of endogeneity of Q and measurement error in Q, with results
suggesting that measurement error was significant and dominated problems
of endogeneity. In comparing the preferred specification across
alternative measures of taxation, however, there was very little
difference in the empirical results. While this may be accounted for by
the fact that tax exhaustion is simply irrelevant to investment
decisions, such a view is weakened by the fact that the effective tax
rate and effective price of capital goods varied considerably across the
alternative measures of taxation. An alternative view is therefore that
the Q model is a poor model for the study of the effects of taxation on
investment. This view is supported by the very small variation in Q
across the different measures which suggests that the variation in taxes
is dominated by variation in the market value of the firm. The low
coefficient found on Q (in line with other empirical work) together with
the apparently important role played by measurement error, may suggest
that the firm's market value may be too volatile to be used as a
reasonable proxy for marginal Q, and therefore casts doubt on the value
of investment equations based on average Q.
These points mirror the debates between Jorgenson, Eisner and others
beginning in the late 1960s 26 : essentially the question then was whether
26See, for example, Eisner and Nadiri (1968) and (1970) and Hall and
Jorgensen (1969).
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the investment equation should include a term combining output and the
cost of capital or whether the two should be kept separate. The more
restricted model, in which the composite term is used tends to overstate
the impact of the cost of capital on investment (Chirinko and Eisner
(1983)). In the case of the Q model, the reverse may be true. For some
reason, possibly volatility of market values, the coefficient is very
low. This may result in understating the impact of taxation on
investment, since, once again, a composite term is used.
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Chapter 3
INVESTMENT AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter the model developed in chapter 2 is used to develop
measures of the cost of capital under different financial regimes. The
impact of these measures on the level on investment is then tested in an
Euler equation approach, based directly on the first order conditions
for investment and the capital stock. This model differs from the
standard cost of capital procedure of Jorgensen (1963), Jorgensen and
Hall (1967) and many others in a number of ways, primarily due to the
treatment of adjustment costs and expectations in the maximisation
process (for a critical survey of the vast literature on investment and
the cost of capital, see Chirinko (1987 and 1988)).
The traditional empirical approach is to consider a standard
neoclassical model in the absence of adjustment costs 1 , optimisation of
which yields the result that the cost of capital should be equal to the
marginal product of capital. Specifying a functional form for the
production function yields an equation determining the optimal, or
desired, capital stock. The presence of adjustment costs is taken to
mean that the firm does not reach this optimal point in every period,
but rather that it makes some partial adjustment towards this desired
level from the current level. Introducing the possibility of adaptive
expectations and delivery and other lags yields an equation for the
level of investment in a given period, which generally depends on
output, lagged output, lagged investment and the cost of capital.
The precise form of the traditional equation varies with the assumptions
made, and various features of the equation can vary considerably.
1Although theoretical work has incorporated adjustment costs into
explicit optimising models since Eisner and Strotz (1963), Lucas (1967),
Gould (1968) and Treadway (1969).
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However, this type of approach has two common elements. First, following
this procedure clearly results in an ad hoc investment equation. The
reasons for the partial adjustment to the desired level of the capital
stock are generally not explicitly Incorporated Into the optimisatlon
which yields the equality between the cost of capital and the marginal
product of capital.
Second, the eventual model is backward looking, lags representing
adaptive expectations, partial adjustment due to some form of adjustment
costs and lags between the placing of an order for a capital asset and
the beginning of its productive use. As a result of each of these
features this approach has several disadvantages. It suffers from the
Lucas (1976) critique, in that the estimated parameters are some
(unknown) combination of effects derived from expectations, tastes and
technology. However, expectations may well change as a result of
government policy, for example a change in taxation. Consider, for
example, the 1984 reforms to corporation tax in the UK, in which changes
to the tax system were announced for up to two years ahead. Inasmuch as
the actual level of investment responded to the announcement of future
changes to the tax system, the parameters of such backward-looking
models cannot incorporate such effects.
The model described below has neither of these features. It is derived
explicitly from what is essentially the same model as discussed in
Chapter 2. The presence of adjustment costs in that model enable a
forward-looking investment equation to be derived, in which the rate of
investment in the current period depends positively on the rate of
investment, the rate of investment squared and the marginal product of
capital, all In the next period and, negatively on the cost of capital.
Assuming rational expectations permits the expected values of the future
variables to be replaced with their actual outcomes, with instrumental
variables being used for estimation.
In the next section, this basic investment model is derived, and the
definition of the cost of capital in the model is analysed. In
particular, alternative financial regimes are taken into account, and
the effects of the UK imputation system and tax exhaustion are
considered. The cost of capital depends on the financial regime in which
96
the firm operates in both in the current period and in the next period.
Allowing for each source of finance to be the marginal source in each
period yields a 3x3 matrix of possible values of the cost of capital,
which (as argued by Edwards and Keen (1984)) shows that the tax system
creates most distortion when financial regimes change over time.
Section 3.3 then considers the investment model in more detail, paying
particular attention to the role of expectations and the response of
investment to various types of tax reform. In particular, the response
of investment to announcements of tax reforms, temporary tax reforms and
short and long run effects of permanent reforms are all considered.
Section 3.4 presents some evidence on the value of the cost of capital
in the UK over the period considered, and indicates the wide disparity
between the cost of capital for different investment projects. Section
3.5 presents estimates of the Investment model and section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 The cost of capital in alternative financial regimes
One additional feature is added and two minor simpliflcations are made
to the model in Chapter 2, although none of these are necessary to
derive measures of the cost of capital or an investment equation. First,
the possibility of imperfect competition in the product market is
allowed for. This permits a unique steady-state optimal capital stock in
a model with a constant returns to scale. In combination with this, the
model now explicitly deals with labour as a variable factor. To
incorporate these additions the definitions of the variables are
slightly changed. We now define U(,K,L,I,p) as a net revenue
function, where Thus F(.)
is the gross revenue function, which depends on the stochastic shock
as well as the stock of capital at the beginning of the period,
K,labour used during the period, L and the price of output, p. G(.)
is the adjustment cost function, assumed separable from F(.), the
arguments of which are K, p and new investment in period t,	 Thus,
2The stochastic shock is again assumed to be separable from the other
arguments of the revenue function.
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as in Chapter 2, adjustment costs are assumed to be internal and result
in lost output.
Second, in order to simplify the analysis and allow the focus to be on
the effect of taxation in different financial regimes, both leasing and
the lemons premium on new share issues is ignored. Otherwise the
objective function in (2.18) is unchanged.
The first order conditions used to derive the basic investment equation
are those for investment and the beginning of the period capital stock.
The condition for investment is:
av
E 1 aKt+hi = E	 +	 I}	 (3.1)L +J	 4
which is familiar as the basic Q investment equation from chapter 2. The
condition for K ist
	
8v	 *	
I,p") - AK(BKt)]_ 
=E[p{(^X)1(1-r
	
t	 L	 t
8v
}]
+ (1	 E-	 8K It+i
(3.2)
Using the values of (3.1) and (3.2) for t+1, expected in t, writing
as FK(.)_GK(.). and for notational simplicity replacing the full
arguments of F and G by their time period3, they can be rearranged to
give:
(+AD) [1-Eer)]G1(t)
(	 *
ti
I	 (AD )1( 1_t	 )[FK(t+1)_GK(t+1)+(1_)GI(t+1)] -t+1	 t+1
{	
D *	 (1-)E 1p (+AD	
*
-	 tt	 tL t+i	 t+i)Pt+i]J
	
(3.3)
3So that, for example, F(a,K,L,p')=F(t).
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Parameterising the adjustment cost function, G, allows the left hand
side of (3.3) to be written in terms of an observable level (or rate) of
investment in period t. This depends positively on marginal revenue
product of capital expected in period t+1, negatively on the derivative
of the adjustment cost function in period t+l with respect to
positively on the derivative of the same function with respect to
negatively on the derivative of the agency cost function with respect to
K1and negatively on a term involving the effective price of investment
goods, personal tax parameters and the rate of depreciation4.
In most formulations of cost of capital models, adjustment costs are
ignored (some arbitrary movement of the capital stock towards its
desired level being in their place). In this case, (3.3) can be
rewritten to define the cost of capital as equal to the marginal revenue
product of capital, FK. in the absence of adjustment costs (possibly in
a steady-state equilibrium). In order to follow this definition, we can
take the last term in (3.3) into the previous term, and arrive at a
definition of the cost of capital as
t+1
E(c) Et{
	
)p	
1	 (3.4)
=	 *
	P1pY (+AD )(l-t	 )	 Jt+1	 t+1	 t+1
Thus, in the absence of adjustment costs, E [F (t+1)]E Ep ' c ].
t. K	 t. t+it
In estimation below, the same procedure as in Chapter 2 is followed,
replacing expected values with actual outturns, and adding a stochastic
error term which is orthogonal to information in period t. Making
this substitution the investment equation can therefore be written as
40f course no causation is implied by the Euler conditions, and (3.1)
and (3.2) could equally well be solved for G 1 (t+1), for example, and
other interpretations are discussed further below. However, given the
forward-looking nature of investment decisions and the assumed one
period lag in capital becoming productive, the formulation in (3.3) has
a natural interpretation.
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(+AD	 *)(1-t )G (I ,K
t Itt
=P	 (AD ) 1 (lt	 )[TIK(t+1)_GK(t+1)+(1_o)GI(t+1) - p' clt+1	 t+1	 t+1 t+1 t
- AK(t+1)) + Ct	 (3.5)
Using the definition of E(c) from (3.4) and dealing with the
expectational errors through c, we are now in a position to identify
the value of the cost of capital under various financial regimes.
Both A and A 1 enter (3.4). This implies that the source of finance
used by the firm In both periods t and t+1 are relevant to the period t
cost of capital. This is not surprising: the cost of capital is defined
to be forward-looking inasmuch as it includes a term representing the
capital gain on the asset between period t and period t+1 and depends on
the tax rate in the period in which the return on the investment Is
earned. To see this, consider the simplest case in which AA 1 O. Then
(3.4) can be rearranged to yield:
1	 1(1_rn) *	 *	 *
(1-t	 ) y	 (1-z) t t+i	 t+i	
(3.6)
*	 p1	 +óp	 -(p
t+1 - t+1
This is clearly closely related to the usual Jorgensen user cost of
capital5 . Inside the brackets are three terms: the required financial
rate of return (here the rate of interest) adjusted for personal taxes,
the cost of depreciation of the asset (valued at period t+1 prices) and
a capital gains term. All of these are grossed up by a factor depending
on the tax rate in period t+1. It is worth noting that all of the price
terms reflect the "effective" price of the asset. Intuitively, this is
because the cost of capital is a one period cost, measuring the cost to
the firm of accelerating a unit of expenditure from period t+l to period
51n the absence of taxes, this is identical to the definition given in
Nickell (1978, p.258)
100
t. Thus, for example, the capital gain reflects the change in the
effective price of the asset between the two dates. However, the
effective price in period t+1 depends in the source of finance used
then, and hence on t+1
Table 3. 1 examines the value of the cost of capital for alternative
financial regimes. It extends the results of Edwards and Keen (1984) and
(1985) in two principal ways. First, it allows for tax exhaustion.
Second it considers the possibility that the source of finance in either
period may be debt (as well as new equity and retentions). This results
in there being nine possible values of the cost of capital (compared
with the four considered by Edwards and Keen (1984)). These nine
possibilities are defined by the values of	 D	
N N	 xB and
B	 D	
t	 t+i	 t	 t+i	 t+i
A . Thus A =0 implies that retentions are the marginal source of
t+2	 t
finance in period t,	 =0 implies that the marginal source of finance is
new equity, and implies that the marginal source of finance is
debt. Below we consider cases in which the firm is indifferent between
two sources of finance and relate the results here to the financial
regimes discussed in Chapter 2.
Recall from Chapter 2 that the first order condition for new equity
(ignoring the lemons premium) is:
*	 D1t	 N
+- =1-A
t	 tl	 t
(3.7)
A similar expression holds for period t+1. Similarly, the first order
condition for debt can be rearranged to yield
	
*	 *
	
* Dt	 D	 *	 t+i
+A	 E	 (+A	 )(1-t	 )i +(l+(t+l))'_AB	 (3.8)
= -
Combining (3.4), (3.7) and (3.8) enable values for the cost of capital
to be derived for the nine cases shown in Table 3.1. The only elements
of (3.6) which differ in the different financial regimes are the
coefficients of 
Pt. 
The table therefore shows only these coefficients.
All the other terms are as shown in (3.6).
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Table 3.1 Definitions of the cost of capital
o; xD	 0t+1	 t+1	 t+2	 t+2
*
(1-rn)
(1-rn)	 * [i+	
-	
i	
I
ADO	 1 + (1 z)	 1 Z	 t+1	 2t-
*
*	
(1-rn)	 ______________1	 (1-rn)	 _ _
xNo	
__1i+	 1	 ' t+i11+	 	 * 2
	
(1-z) t+iJ	 *	 [	 (1-z) t+iJ
*	 *	 *
0	 't+i-v— (1+A8(t^1))	 —i--- (l+A(t+l))
	
*	 *	 *
	+ —(1-r	 )i	 + -_,(1-t	 )i	 + —(1-t	 )it+1 t+1	 t+1 t+1	 t+1	 t+1
Notes:
*
1. The table gives the values of the coefficient of p in the cost of
capital, ie. (1_T+1)c1_+1, under different financial conditions.
Pt
*	 *
2. =	 (1-t )r + ' (14-A (s)).
S	 $ s	 s	 B
3. The cases in which AB =0 and	 =0 require an additional assumptiont+2	 t+1
regarding the marginal source of finance in period t+2 (and thereafter
is the marginal source in period t+2 is debt). Here it is assumed that
=0.t +2
Expressions commonly found in the literature generally assume
(implicitly or explicitly) that xD=o, and so correspond to the values
in the first column of Table 3.1. Thus, for example, the values given in
the first column correspond exactly to those of Edwards and Keen (1985)
when,	 following their assumptions,
	
3=0,	 p p ,
	 AB(t+l)=O and
E(p1)E(p1),	 ss and E(s) =s.	 In addition,	 ignoring tax
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* *
parameters between period t and period t+1 (in which case 	 ) and
* *	
t t+1
the values in column 1 match those given in the
widely-used methodology of King and Fullerton (1984). There are two
differences from the King and Fullerton formulae, however, which are
discussed below.
Finally, it can also be shown that the formulae in Table 3.1 correspond
to those derived from retention and debt finance by Devereux (1989).
These last results (based on an approach by Edwards (1984)), which also
assume that p =p , were based on a similar model of the investment
t t+1
process which again assumed a one period lag between the acquisition of
the capital good and its contribution to output. Although some of the
definitions of the terms used in Devereux (1989) differ from those used
here, the underlying results are the same.
While it is comforting to realise that the formulae in Table 3. 1 are in
line with the literature, several Issues can now be examined. First,
what role does tax exhaustion play in the way in which dividend taxation
(summarised by ', ' and affects the cost of capital? Second, what
Is the cost of capital if the marginal source of finance in period t or
period t+1 Is debt? Third, how do changes in the position of the firm
with regard to both full tax exhaustion and ACT exhaustion affect the
cost of capital? Fourth, how do the results In the table compare to the
financial regimes outlined in Chapter 2? Fifth, what is the appropriate
measure to use in estimating an investment equation? We examine these
issues in turn.
The table extends the results of Edwards and Keen (1984) regarding the
relevance of the trapped equity model. Thus, If so that
retentions are the marginal source of finance in both period t and
period t+1, then the coefficient of p shown in the table is simply the
shareholder's discount factor, p , and so dividend taxation does not
t+1
affect the cost of capital (this was first shown by Auerbach (1979)).
This result therefore holds whether or not the firm is tax exhausted in
either period. As Edwards and Keen show, in the absence of tax
exhaustion and assuming no change in tax parameters (le. so  that
* *	 N	 N	 * *
v =v ), the same would be true if A =A =0 .However, if i
t t+1	 t+1 t+1	 N
then the result does not hold for the case in which A" =A	 0; that
t+1 t+1
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is, the way in which dividends are taxed will affect the cost of
capital. Thus the conclusion of Edwards and Keen (1984) that "the
dividend tax affects the cost of capital ... only when the marginal
source of finance is about to change" does not extend to the case in
which tax exhaustion is allowed for, because the effective rate of
dividend taxation may in any case change between period t and period
t+1.
If the marginal source of finance changes between period t and period
t+1, then, once again, the taxation of dividends may affect the cost of
capital. The "traditional" view of the effect of dividend taxation is
given by the assumptions that N=o, x^o, This is shown
In the second row of the first column of Table 3.1. In the absence of
taxation, with '<1, this shows that the cost of capital Is increased by
dividend taxation. This would also be true in the presence of tax
exhaustion if <1. However, it is interesting to consider the case In
which >1. As discussed in Chapter 2, >l would imply that the firm
would benefit from the arbitrage of issuing new equity to fund dividend
payments. It was also suggested that this would increase the probability
*
of ACT exhaustion, thus reducing the value of ' . An equilibrium would
be reached when '=1. In this case, the discrimination against new
equity finance would disappear: since D=o, the values given in the
first and second rows of the table would be equal. However, it is
possible that if there were some other constraint which prevented this
arbitrage (some reason for which dividends could not be paid, for
example) then the firm might reach this regime, with 1>1. In this case,
the cost of capital would be reduced by dividend taxation.
It might also be noted that the result here is different from that of
King and Fullerton (1984)6. They only consider the role of dividend
taxation on the required rate of return. Thus, ignoring tax exhaustion,
6The second difference from the King Fullerton methodology, which I
brought out more clearly in Keen (1990) concerns the definitions of p
and p. Here the definitions of these effective prices are independent
of the financial regime. In the King Fullerton methodology, however, the
discount factor applied to future tax allowances varies with the regime
which the firm is in during period t.
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they correctly find that the required rate of return in the absence of
taxation, i, should be multiplied by (1-m)/r(1-z)=1+s. However, they
ignore the fact that this multiplier (1/i) should also be applied to
the capital invested. Essentially the marginal value of the firm is
multiplied by this factor as a result of changing financial regimes
between period t and period t+1. For <1, this implies that there is a
much larger cost of new equity finance (in period t only) than simply
the effect on the company's discount rate. Similarly, if i>1 (or i >i if
tax exhaustion is considered) then there is a very large benefit to
being in this regime.
It is clear from the result in the first row of the second column that
similar arguments can be used when the marginal source of funds in
period t is retentions and in period t+1 is new equity. Here, though,
the multiplier on 1+i+1(1_m)/(l_z) is rather than so that
all of the results are reversed.
It is interesting to note that all of the regimes in the third row of
the table (in all of which debt is the marginal source of finance in
period t) yield the same cost of capital. In the absence of tax
exhaustion (so that i =i =i ) the cost of capital is independent of
dividend taxation, not only if the marginal source of finance in period
t is debt. Once again, tax exhaustion introduces the possibility that
dividend taxation does affect the cost of capital in these regimes. For
example, if '='<' (ACT exhaustion in period t and period t+1 to an
equal extent) then the cost of capital would be raised. (Tax exhaustion
also raises the cost of capital through r, reducing the value of
interest deductibility). Finally, it should also be noted that marginal
agency costs appear in the definition of the cost of capital, as well as
separately in the investment equation.
The final two elements of the table are where the marginal source of
finance in period t+1 is debt, but in period t is either retained
earnings or new equity. It is impossible to define the cost of capital
independently of some multiplier in these cases unless further
assumptions are made. The most convenient is to assume that the marginal
source of finance in period t+2 is retained earnings. The resulting cost
of capital is a combination of those in column 1. For example, defining
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the top left hand corner of the table as c and the bottom left hand
13	 31
corner as c , the cost of capital in the top right hand corner, c
can be expressed as: c 1=cc 1/c 31 . This makes some intuitive sense:
in periods t and t+2 the marginal source of finance is retentions and
period t+1 it Is debt. Thus the cost of capital in period t+1 is cr1.
If retained earnings had been the marginal source of finance in period
t+1, the costs of capital in periods t and t+1 would have been c and
c 1 respectively. The actual cost of capital in period t is therefore a
combination of these terms.
Tax exhaustion is probably most important when companies move into and
out of tax exhaustion, since it is in these cases that the relevant tax
parameters can vary widely between consecutive years. (Thus studies
which do try to take account of tax exhaustion, but assume that a
company is either a permanent tax payer or is permanently tax exhausted
miss these effects).The two principal effects here are as follows.
To abstract from the effects of tax exhaustion via dividend taxation,
consider the impact of full tax exhaustion on the cost of capital in the
"trapped equity" regime in which given In (3.6). Consider
first a company which becomes fully tax exhausted in period t+1 and
remains in that state for a number of years but which was not fully tax
exhausted in period t. Differentiating the expression for c with
respect to r1 gives	
t
*	 *
t+i 1t c	
1y {
	
(1-rn)	 op
[1+	 i	 I	 -(1-6)	 *	 (3.9)* =
(1-t	 ) (1-i	 )	 (1-z) t+i 8t	 )t+1	 t+1	 t+1 t+l
	
t+1
*	 *
	A reduction in t
	 will tend to increase p , since the value oft+1
investment allowances will be reduced. Although this may be offset, to
*	 *
some extent, by the fact that Op lOt <0, it is unlikely that the
	
*	 t	 t+1	 *
effect through 
Pt 
can outweigh the effect through 1t+1 since at least
part of the allowance due on investment in period t will already have
been claimed before period t+1. In the extreme case in which the whole
purchase price can be written off against taxable profit in the year in
which the expense was incurred (as was the case in the UK for plant and
machinery between 1972 and 1984) and the firm was a full tax payer in
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*	 *
period t, then Op /&r =0. These arguments imply that, if c >0, then
*	 t	 t+1	 t
8c /&r >0, so that moving into a period of tax exhaustion in period
t+1 (and hence reducing t1) will reduce the cost of capital in period
t. Intuitively, this is because the return on investment (earned in
period t+1) will be taxed at a lower rate, while the present value of
allowances on the investment made in period t will not be reduced so
substantially.	 In addition, the last term of (3.9) notes that, since
is reduced by full tax exhaustion in period t+1, the capital gain
on the effective price of the asset is also reduced7.
Conversely, a company which moves out of a period of tax exhaustion
faces a higher cost of capital. To see this differentiate c with
respect to r in the same financial regime:
*
Oc	 ___________ /1+ (1-rn)
	
Op
}-i
t
* = (1-t	 ) y	 (1-z) t+it	 t+1 t+1	 t
(3. 10)
*	 *	 *
As before, op lOx <0 and so Oc lOx <0. The reason for this is clear.t	 t	 t	 t
Full tax exhaustion in period t reduces the present value of tax
allowances on investments made in period t. However, if the firm is a
full tax payer in period t+1, the return to each investment is taxed at
the full rate, and, in addition, the effective price of capital in
period t+1 is lower. All of these effects tend to raise the cost of
capital if the firm is fully tax exhausted in period t (only). It should
be noted that this effect has considerably less impact than the former
case. This is because it only arises if a fully tax exhausted firm Is
about to become tax paying. In this case, the reduction of below x
will be small, since tax effects are essentially only discounted one
period. However, a firm becoming fully tax exhausted in period t+1 may
remain so for an unlimited period, so that additional tax liabilities
arising in period t+1 may have a very small present value, with the
reduction In t	 below x being consequently large.
7The "capital gain" here is best interpreted as the gain from bringing
forward the investment by one period. In this case it is clear that the
firm's effective price in periods t and t+1 is relevant; the effective
price in period t+1 should not be interpreted as a market value.
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(3. 13)
These considerations suggest that full tax exhaustion may have a
counter-cyclical effect. To the extent that widespread tax exhaustion
occurs towards the bottom of the business cycle, firms will tend to move
into positions of full tax exhaustion during the downswing of a
recession. This reduces their cost of capital (possibly by a
considerable amount). The opposite effect occurs during the upswing
(although this is not likely to be as important).
Some comments regarding the effects of ACT exhaustion have already been
made regarding the effect through dividend taxation. Thus, apart from
D	 D	 Nthe two cases in which A =0 and either A =0 or A =0, ACT exhaustiont	 *	 t+1	 t+1
in period t reduces the value of ' and, ceteris paribus, raises the
D
cost of capital. Similarly, apart from the two cases in which AO and
either D=o or xN=o , ACT exhaustion in period t+1 reduces the value of
*	 t	 t
and, ceteris paribus, raises the cost of capital.
More generally, however, the impact of ACT exhaustion on the cost of
capital is ambiguous. Consider again the "trapped equity" regime in
DID	 *	 *
which A =A =0. Using a reduction in ' and '	 to reflect thet t+1	 t	 t+1
existence of ACT exhaustion in periods t and t+i, respectively, then
*	 *
8c	 c	 1	 (i-rn)	 3p	 ôp t+1t	 t	 ____
y {[1+	
i	 ] •	 -(1-5)	 *	 (3.11)*	 =	 *	 *	 (1-z) t+i
	(1- rnr	 ) (i-r	 ) pt+1	 t+1	 t+1
and
*
8c	 1
11+ 
(i-rn)
* =
	 *	 y	 (1-z)	 *(1-t
(3. 12)
The problem in finding the sign of these effects is that the signs of
*	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
8p /8' , 8p /8' and 8p /a' >0 are ambiguous. To see this, recall
	
+	 t*	 t+1	 t+1
from (2.29) that 
Pt 
can be written
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Increasing	 (by reducing ACT exhaustion) increases the first term in
(3.13) which is the cost to the shareholder of forgoing one unit of
dividends. But it also increases	 the present value of allowances.
The net effect of these two terms is therefore ambiguous8.
One other important point to note from the formulae in Table 3. 1 does
not depend on tax exhaustion, but concerns the nature of the capital
gain term. As already noted, the capital gain In each of the formulae
reflects the change in the "effective" price of capital goods, not the
change in the nominal price. This means that it depends on, among other
things, the depreciation provisions in the tax system. To consider two
extreme cases, assume that there is no tax exhaustion, and consider the
case of purchases of plant and machinery and commercial buildings under
the pre-1984 UK tax system, for which the relevant depreciation rates
were 100% and zero, respectively. The "effective" price of a unit of
plant and machinery was therefore p(l-t) and that of a unit of
commercial buildings was p. Assuming no change in the statutory tax
system between periods t and t+1, then it is clear that for retention
finance, for example, the statutory tax rate both multiplies and divides
is worth noting that there are at least two other features of the UK
tax system which, because of their asymmetric treatment, give rise to
large effects on the cost of capital. The first Is double taxation
relief, which allows part of the foreign tax paid on foreign source
income to be deducted from the UK liability. However, if foreign tax
paid is greater than the UK liability on the repatriated profit, no UK
tax is paid, but, more importantly, the difference is not eligible to be
carried forward to be set against future liabilities. In this case It is
possible for small changes in taxable profit before deduction of foreign
taxes to make no difference to the final tax liability in this, or any
other, period. This may have very large effects on the cost of capital
in a dynamic context. For example, if there is excess foreign tax in
period t, and depreciation allowance de on a marginal invest,jnent in
period t is lost, with the result that
	
is very low or zero, p and c
t	 *	 t*	 t
are very large and positive. If it occurs in period t+1, t 1 O,	 is
very low and p
	
is very large. As in the discussion above, for ô<1,
t+1*	 *
the effects on r
	 and p
	
have opposite effects on c . One furthert+1	 t+1	 t
asymmetry is in the treatment of net dividend receipts. Where dividends
received by the company are greater than dividends paid, the company
faces no ACT liability. The excess of receipts over payments can either
be carried forward to offset against future ACT liabilities, or used as
an offset against taxable losses, allowing an immediate tax credit.
These situations act in some ways as ACT exhaustion and, again, the
dynamic effects on the cost of capital can be large.
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each term and therefore drops out of the expression for c 9. For
commercial buildings, the financial cost of capital (abstracting from
the economic depreciation charge, ) is larger by a factor of 1/(1-t).
However, if C for plant and machinery is negative because the capital
gain term outweighed the other two terms (as, according to the results
presented below, was sometimes the case), then the cost of capital for
commercial buildings will be negative and larger; in this case, the
depreciation allowance reduces the incentive to invest.
So far we have considered the cost of capital in conventional financial
regimes (that is with retentions, debt or new equity as the marginal
source of finance and no agency costs on debt). However, it is easy to
relate the expressions derived to the discussion of financial regimes in
chapter 2.
In regime 1, the marginal source of finance was retentions and debt.
Since the marginal cost of these two sources must be equal in regime 1,
the expressions given in the first and third rows of Table 3.1 must be
equal. Equating them yields the same condition for equality as given in
(2.47), defining the regime. Note that it was assumed in the discussion
of the financial regimes that corresponding to the first column
of Table 3.1. In regime 2, the marginal source of finance was just debt
in which case there is no similar condition. In regime 3, new equity and
debt were the marginal sources of finance; along the same lines of
argument as for regime 1, the expressions in rows 2 and 3 of Table 3.1
must be equal. Here the conditions (2.53) and (2.54) can be derived10,
corresponding to whether or not AN =0.
t+1
In regime 4, the marginal cost of finance is the same from each of the
three sources. In this case, the cost of capital in each row of Table
3.1 must be equal (again assuming A'=O). Equating the first and second
9This is of course the neutrality result of a flow of funds corporation
tax, advocated by the Meade Committee (1977) and Edwards (1982) among
others.
10Except for the lemons premium which is now ignored.
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* 11
rows yields the condition 	 . Equating the first and third rows,
given i =l yields
*
[1-'i	 (1+A_Jt+1))]
*	 t+1	 ti(1-t )i = (1-c)i	 - _________________
t+1 t+1	 t+1
(3. 14)
where c (without a subscript) is the imputation rate. If it is further
*
assumed that the regime also holds in period t+1, so that 	 =1, and
*	
+1
marginal agency costs are zero then this implies rt=c which, as noted by
Keen and Schiantarelli (1989), implies that the firm must be permanently
tax exhausted with certainty. As noted in Chapter 2, agency costs of
debt were included in the model partly to avoid this implication of the
model.
The equality =l, or (1-m)/(1-z)=1/(1+s) can be used to substitute
into the expression for retention finance in Table 3.1. This yields the
following expression for the cost of capital in regime 4:
*
i p
1	
+1{ 
1
c=	
* t+lt(1-t	 )p	 (1+s
t+1	 t
* - (P +1_P)}+ '5p t+1 (3. 15)
It is this expression for the cost of capital that is used in the
estimation below, for two reasons. First, under the imputation system,
with >1 for a number of investors (including large financial
institutions such as pension funds), it is likely that a firm would aim
to be in this regime. Second, for empirical purposes, it removes the
need to stipulate values of m and z, the income tax and capital gains
tax rates of the marginal investor. This is a significant advantage
given that the identity of the marginal investor is unknown. By
contrast, s is simply the cost of credit under the imputation system,
which applies to all investors. It is true that s depends on future
profitability, but as in Chapter 2, this can be replaced by the actual
outturn within the estimation strategy used. The main alternatives to
this procedure are to arbitrarily choose a marginal investor (eg a
pension fund for which m=z=O), or to approximate marginal personal tax
Equivalent to (2.56) in the absence of the lemons premium.
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rates by estimates of average tax rates (Robson (1988) provides
estimates of average personal tax rates among those who invest in the
UK). While none of these methods avoid problems, heroic assumptions are
kept to a minimum by taking the route of the expression in (3.15) from
regime 4.
Of course using the expression in (3.15) implies that the empirical
section below ignores most of the preceding discussion of financial
policy. However, this discussion should provide a basis for some
empirical examination of the role of taxation and tax exhaustion in
financial decisions. The main difficulty is to assess which financial
regime a firm is likely to be in at any point in time. This is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
3.3 Taxes in a forward-looking investment model
Returning now to the investment equation (3.5), it is necessary to
specify a functional form for the adjustment cost function, and to make
some restrictions on the production function in order to derive an
estimable model. Partly to compare this approach with the Q approach
discussed in Chapter 2, we assume that the adjustment cost function is
of the same form12 . Hence
b	 2
_1_ 
-a' K
21K	
ft (3. 16)
where a is the rate of investment at which adjustment costs are zero. It
is sometimes useful to assume that a=5, so that adjustment costs are
only incurred on net, rather than gross, investment. A similar form is
assumed for the agency cost function:
12
Apart from the stochastic element, which is now neglected.
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z ( B
A(B,K)= -	 I K
2' pK J'.	 tt
(3. 17)
Using the definition in (3.16) it is now necessary to specify the form
of the revenue function. Begin by defining the gross revenue function
(ie.	 gross	 of	 adjustment	 costs)	 to	 be
where L is the amount of labour
used in period t and w is the wage rate in period t. Further, assume
(as in Chapter 2) that labour is paid its real marginal product, so that
F_-w/p. and that the production function, F1(a,K,L), is constant
returns to scale. Further, define pZ(. )=pF 1 (. )-G(.) to be the value of
yl	 ygross output. We do not observe pF , but we do observe pZ(.). Using
the fact that both F(.) and G(. )/p are linear homogeneous, the
marginal revenue product of capital, FK (. )_GK(.) can be substituted out
of the equation (3.5) using Z/K, WL/K and I/K. In particular,
zr	 1 1	 t+i
FK(t+l)_GK(t+l)= p 1 1- - I	 -
I.	 cjKt+1
w L
t+1 t+1
K	 (1-1/c)
t+1 t+1
I	 2	 I
t+1'	 I t+il
-abi	 I
}I	 'K	 I[	 L	 +1J
(3. 18)
where c is the elasticity of demand. Similarly, the derivative of the
adjustment cost function with respect to investment is
bIi1( t
G (t)=PL1_ - fl___ 
_ab} (3. 19)
Finally, it is useful to combine the variables in the equation with the
tax rates by which they are multiplied. Defining, for example,
I,*	 p	 rIr	 .	 * 1
I:-i = — ( 1-t )I _L	 Pt Si
we can then write the investment equation to be estimated as:
(3.20)
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where
1
b
-(1-ô)p	 (1-t	 )Y ]
t t	 t+1	 t+1 t+1
(3.22)
E
b (1-1/c)
1.1 *	 Z	 *	 w	 L	 *	 I	 *r
1+
t+il	 [ t+i t+11	 r	 i
= a +
	 [	
+ 2 
P+iK+1J	
3( i-
Lt+ i iL	 .J
I	 *2I t+i
+
 4[ j +t+1
-1
133=lóa, p4=1;
B	 *2
1
	
+6I	
K
	
I	 t
	
L	 t+i
-1
" b(1-1/c)
(3.21)
The equation derived here is clearly not without problems for
estimation. First, the intercept, a, in principle varies across both
firms and years because it depends on both and (and In
estimation, approximate notice of this issue will be taken by allowing
for firm specific effects and time effects. Second, the inclusion of the
*2	 *2
two squared terms, (I/K)	 and (B/pK), may be problematic if (as is
likely), the replacement cost of the capital stock is measured with
error, since any error will enter the error term squared.
Third, the equation has been written as if the elasticity of demand, c,
is constant across both firms and time. This is rather unlikely,
although an approximation may be to allow it to vary between firms in
different industries. Of course, the model would revert to perfect
competition by setting c to be infinite. Clearly, allowing for a
constant, but not infinite, e is a less restrictive version of the model
(and therefore less restrictive than the Q model estimated in Chapter
2). However, since the size of the sample available falls if
remuneration, wL, is added to the database, most of the estimation makes
use of the larger database by imposing perfect competition. In the case
of perfect competition, p"Z-wL is equal to cash flow, and the first two
explanatory variables can be merged with a single coefficient equal to
1/b.
In principle, there are five parameters of interest in the model: b, a,
, c and E. However, two of these, a and ó only appear in 2' the
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coefficient on (I/K)1. They cannot therefore be separately identified.
However, under the reasonable assumption that adjustment costs on net
investment are zero, then ã=a, and thus an estimate can be found. The
third and fourth parameters, b and c are overidentif led, since they can
be found from 2 and In the case of perfect competition, the
coefficients of cash flow and the cost of capital should be equal and of
opposite sign. More generally, 
2 
and should be equal and opposite.
This, and the fact that 3 1 yields two testable restrictions in the
model. Thus, for example, for c=, as well as being estimated in the
form given in (3.21), the restrictions could be imposed to yield
* I
	
*	 *	 B	 *2
II ti	 I t+il	 I	 II t+il	 1	 I t+il	 I t+il
1 L-] L'	 = a	 -c
	
.+J J
	
ILKt+ij	
t J	3[J	 6[K	 ( +w
	 (3.23)
t+1	 t+1
One feature of the way that the model is presented here is that it is
forward-looking: the expected profitability of new investment is
captured by the next period's marginal product of capital, proxied as
shown in (3.18). The role played by the future investment rate and the
future investment rate squared is due to the nature of the adjustment
cost function. With quadratic adjustment costs, the firm will aim to
even out its investment pattern. For example, if next period's
investment rate is expected to be high, then the firm should increase
this year's investment up to the point at which total adjustment costs
over the two periods are minimised. The convexity of the adjustment cost
function is reflected in the presence of the squared term. Finally,
increasing the capital stock reduces marginal agency costs of debt.
Two issues which can be investigated within the model are the role
played by shocks to the investment process and the effects of different
kinds of tax reform. As is clear from the discussion above, the cost of
capital model as presented predicts that investment will depend on
expectations held in period t of various period t+1 variables. This is
clearly similar to the Q model discussed in Chapter 2. However, the
difference from the Q model is that the latter explicitly uses the
expectation Itself. Thus, V, the market value of the firm, is held to
reflect all expectations of relevant future events conditional on the
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information available at the time the investment decision is taken. It
is clear from this that any subsequent shock cannot affect either
via V. or (I/K). Any such new information is simply irrelevant.
By contrast, the estimation strategy used here replaces the currently
13held expectations of future variables with the actual outturn . The
difference between the expectation and the outturn is the stochastic
shock, w. An innovation which takes place after the investment decision
in period t has been taken (and therefore not included in the relevant
information set) is therefore a form of measurement error in the model.
Predicting the effect of a tax reform known in period t, but using
outturn values from period t+1 is therefore subject to a form of error
not present in the Q model.
It should be noted that this formulation is somewhat different from
other uses of the Euler equation framework. The investment equation
(3.21) could equally well be written with (I/K)1 as the dependent
variable (see Bond and Meghir (1990), for example). In this
interpretation the model would be predicting the investment rate in
period t+1 given information in period t and expectations held in period
t of other variables in period t+1. [n this context the innovation,
labelled w in (3.21), but taking place in period t+1, would represent a
shock to investment in period t+1 unanticipated at period t. In the
context of analysing the impact of tax reform on investment, this
implies that an unanticipated reform taking place in period t+1 would
influence investment in period t+1 in a manner not captured by the
model.
The formulation presented above can, however, be used to analyse the
impact of a number of different forms of tax reform. It can, for
example, be used to compare the effect on the investment rate in the
short and long run of temporary and permanent reforms, and anticipated
and unanticipated reforms.
The long-run properties of a model with a linear homogeneous production
13
And therefore uses instrumental variables in estimation.
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and adjustment cost function and perfect competition in the product
market have been analysed by Lucas (1967), who pointed out that, in the
long run, the capital stock will grow or decline at a constant rate.
Investment and output grow or decline at the same rate. In this case the
model therefore does not yield a constant long-run level of the capital
*
stock, K , although it does yield a constant capital to output ratio,
'14(K/Z)	 . However, there are several ways of avoiding this result. For
example, Nickell (1978) does not impose linear homogeneity of the
adjustment cost function, so that adjustment costs define an optimal
level of the capital stock. Alternatively, if the elasticity of demand
varied with output in a product market with imperfect competition, the
*	 15
optimal level of output and hence K would be fixed
The short-run properties of the model have been analysed by Nickell
(1978), Abel (1978) and (1982) and Summers (1981). While the papers by
Abel and Summers are in the context of a Q model, as has been
emphasised, the two models are essentially the same and so the results
of these papers apply to the formulation presented here. The main
difference in approach is therefore in estimation, using the estimated
parameters from (3.21) rather than from the Q model. However, it should
be noted that the model here assumes a one period lag between investment
and the asset having productive capacity (possibly because of delivery
lags). As noted above, this introduces a number of complications
regarding the impact of the reform on the cost of capital in successive
periods. The impact of a change in t on the cost of capital, c, has
already been discussed in the context of tax exhaustion since the impact
*
of an increase in r will be in the same direction as an increase in tt	 t
ceteris paribus. Thus (3.9) and (3.10) show that 8c/&r<O
	
and
8c/&r>O, for reasons given above.
In order to discuss the impact of tax reform on investment in this
14Sumxners (1981) assumes that adjustment costs apply only to net
investment (so that a=6 in (3.16)). In the long-run steady state,
adjustment costs are minimised at zer by I/K=& However, this still
does not imply a unique solution for K dependent only on prices, since
it also depends on the initial value of K.
15Although this raises insuperable problems for estimation of the
investment equation.
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model, we therefore briefly consider the impact of temporary and
permanent changes to the statutory tax rate. To simplify the analysis,
assume that output is constant and that prior to the reform the firm
had been in its steady state position.
(a) unanticipated temporary increase in
The most obvious effect of a temporary increase in is clearly to
reduce c (since the present value of investment allowances rises,
reducing the net cost of investment). Since the change in r is reversed
in period t+1, there is no offsetting effect from period t+1, nor is the
cost of capital in any other period affected. The reduction in c has a
direct impact on (I/K) with a coefficient of -1/b.
However, this is not the only impact on (I/K). If investment in period
t rises as a result of the reduction in the cost of capital, then the
capital stock used in period t+1 will be higher. Assuming that F<O,
and noting from (3.16) that G>O, then Z=F-G<O. This suggests
that there will be a downward effect on (I/K) via the expected impact
on production and adjustment costs. To see this within the context of
the equation (3.21), holding output constant and abstracting from the
impact of adjustment costs via (I/K)1. it would be expected that
(Z/K)1 would fall since production in period t+1 depends on the
capital stock at the beginning of the period, which depends directly on
It can easily be demonstrated that, with the one period lag in
capital becoming productive, O<8(Z/K) /8c <1, implying that I and
16	
t+i	 t
K	 both rise
t+1
To consider the effects of adjustment costs, consider the return to the
steady state position. Eventually, I/K must return to ô, with K
*
returning to the steady-state capital stock, K . Since the initial
16To confirm this, consider the bounds on 8(Z/K) 1/8c. Is it possible
that 3(Z/K) /8c 1? For example, if a(Z/K) /8c =1, then the two
	
t+1	 t	 t+1	 t
effects via c and (Z/K)
	
must cancel out, leaving I unchanged. But
	
t	 t+1	 t
if I is unchanged then (Z/K)
	
cannot change, and so 0(Z/K) /8c
t	 t+1	 t+1	 t
cannot equal 1. Similar considerations rule out other values outside the
range 0 to 1.
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effect is to increase K 	 the future path of K must be downwards, with
t+1
(I/K) <& for n=1,2,..., until the firm has returned to the steady
t+n
state. Since (I/K)<, this will provide a further moderating
influence on I• Intuitively, the presence of adjustment costs mean that
it is not worthwhile increasing the capital stock to fully take
advantage of the lower cost of capital in period t, because quadratic
adjustment costs will be incurred both when K is raised and when it is
reduced17.
(b) temporary increase in r 1 , announced in period t:
As discussed above, a increase in t	 both reduces c	 and increases
t+1	 t+1
c. To consider the path of the capital stock in this case, it is useful
to examine these effects separately. Begin with the reduction in c1
which is virtually identical to the case just considered. Neglecting,
for the moment, the impact via c the reduction in c	 would lead to
t	 t+1
changes in the path of K similar to that described above. However, there
is an additional effect here, namely that since (I/K)1 will be higher
as a result of the reduction in c , there will also be an upward
t+1
pressure on (I/K) independent of the effect via c.
The impact via c can be analysed in much the same way, and is simply
the opposite of the effect discussed above of a reduction in c. Since
c is increased in this case, however, the initial impact on I will be
downwards. This will offset the announcement effect derived through
C
t+1
The relative effects on c and c
	
depend on the tax system. From (3.9)
t	 t+1
and (3.10), ignoring tax exhaustion and changes in prices, it can be
shown that:
path of investment and the capital stock is similar to that which
can be derived from, for example, Abel (1982) when the firm is initially
at its steady state level. Abel also analyses the case in which there is
a temporary tax rate change when the firm is on the stable path to the
steady state with similar results.
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p	 Op	 OpOc	 8c	 1 t+il	 1 ttt+ 1	 _____
äa	
(1-t)p {[P_1_(1_][
1-r -j + p a—F	 (3.24)
t+1	 t+1 t+1	 t+1)
*
In the case of 100% first year allowances, Op lOt =0 and
*	
t	 t+1
In this case, the right hand side of (3.24) becomes
zero, indicating that the change in c will be equal and opposite to the
change in c1. In this case, (I/K) must fall, as the impact of c must
outweigh the announcement effect through c . However, (I/K) 	 mustt+1	 t+1
rise (above a) because of the upward impact of the reduction in c1.
Since the announcement effect moderates the reduction in I , an effectt
which is absent in period t+1, it is likely that K 	 will be above the
*	
t+2
steady state level, K , so that subsequent investment rates must
gradually decline back to the steady state rate t5.
However, with less than 100% first year allowances, the sign of the
right hand side of (3.24) is ambiguous. In this case, it is possible
that the announcement effects via c 	 may outweigh the direct effects
through c , so that the initial movement in I and hence K	 is
t	 t	 t+1
upwards. However, this would require (3.24) to be strongly negative,
which is unlikely.
(c) permanent increase in t, with effect from period t:
A permanent increase in -r has a different effect on the cost of capital.
Since this is a permanent change there is no difference between the
effect on the cost of capital in different periods, so the Issue above,
concerning the relative size of the change in c and c1 does not arise
here. As noted above, under a neutral corporation tax the long run cost
of capital is independent of the tax rate. In this case, the long run
steady state will not change and there would not even be a temporary
effect.
However, if the tax system were not neutral, then there would be both a
short term and a long term effect of the increase in the tax rate.
Specifically, considering the trapped equity regime shown In (3.6), if
capital allowances were less than 100% in the first year, then
corporation tax would not be neutral and the increase in the tax rate
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would increase the cost of capital.
The effect of an increase in the cost of capital in period t and all
subsequent periods on the level of the capital stock and the rate of
investment has been analysed by Abel (1982). There would be an initial
drop in and hence K1. with the capital stock continuing to fall
until the new steady-state was reached.
Cd) permanent or temporary change in t, with effect from period t+n, but
announced in period t:
Many of the comments made in the previous section remain valid in the
case of the announcement in period t of a permanent or temporary
increase in r to take effect from period t+n. The additional factor
here, of course, is that the rate of investment will begin to change
immediately in order to minimise adjustment costs over the course of the
total adjustment to the new steady-state level of the capital stock
which has to take place.
It should perhaps be noted that, although the forward-looking nature of
this model In principle permits the analysis of various forms of tax
reform, whether permanent, temporary or simply announced, tax simulation
exercises would need to be able to predict the effect of the tax reform
also on the marginal product of capital. This would require separate
estimation of parameters of the production function. (This is, of
course, similar to exercises that have been done in the context of the Q
model - see, for example, Summers (1981)).
We turn now to the empirical implementation of the model, considering In
the next section the value of the cost of capital over time and between
uses, paying particular attention to the role of tax exhaustion. In
section 3.5, the model described above is estimated on the sample of
data described in Appendix A.
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3.4. Empirical measurements of the cost of capital
This section presents empirical estimates of the cost of capital as
defined in the previous section, based on the panel of company
accounting data described in Appendix A. We begin by summarising the
means and standard deviations of the 'average' cost of capital for each
year of data. As noted above, these estimates are based on the
assumption that companies are in financial regime 4. The overall average
cost of capital is constructed by first computing the cost of capital
for each firm in each period for nine different forms of investment:
three assets purchased (plant and machinery, industrial buildings and
commercial buildings) each financed from three sources (retained
earnings, debt and new equity). Second a weighted average cost of
capital for each company in each period is constructed, weighted across
the different types of investment using actual investment in each asset
and finance from each source in that period as the weight. Third,an
unweighted average across all of the companies in the sample in each
year is computed. The standard deviations are constructed in the same
way. After examining this overall average, some estimates of the
variation between the cost of capital for investment in different assets
and financed from different sources are presented.
As in Chapter 2, the cost of capital is constructed under five different
possible ways of taking account of taxation: (a) ignoring tax
altogether; (b) allowing for tax, but ignoring all forms of tax
exhaustion; (c) allowing for tax including full tax exhaustion (given by
the presence of positive losses carried forward) but Ignoring ACT
exhaustion; (d) allowing for tax, including both full tax exhaustion and
ACT exhaustion; and (e) as (d), but using estimates of periods of tax
exhaustion using the data on tax payments from accounts, rather than
from the model described in Appendix B. As in the discussion of Q in
Chapter 2, the correlation between these different definitions (over the
whole sample) are also presented.
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics on the average cost of
capital. As noted In Appendix A, the measure chosen for the required
financial rate of return, I, is simply a long run rate of interest.
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190
297
374
409
431
655
673
685
693
690
673
660
639
602
565
492
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
3.33
-0. 16
-4.20
-5.06
-1.73
-2. 02
2.97
0.80
0.65
5.94
10. 26
11.81
11.80
-0. 18
-5. 23
3.49
3.60
-0. 12
-5. 04
-3. 85
0.15
-0. 10
3.50
1.65
0.83
5.42
9.61
11.62
11.29
3.39
-2. 75
3.13
3.33
-0. 16
-7. 21
-5. 35
-2. 36
-1.99
2.71
0.26
-0.32
5.80
11.30
12.80
13.12
-2. 28
-7. 37
-0. 12
3.56
0.15
-5.00
-6.13
-2. 75
-1.71
2.43
1.06
-0. 02
4.74
9.85
11. 12
10. 92
-6. 03
-10. 68
-0. 80
6.46
2.89
-1.32
1.12
2.73
2.59
6.51
4.08
3.19
8.23
13.27
14.39
13. 68
9.93
7.51
8.60
Table 3.2(a) Estimated average cost of capital (%)
year no of no tax	 no tax	 full tax	 full tax	 full tax and
cos	 exhaustion exhaustion and ACT ACT exhaustion
exhaustion	 (accounts)
Notes: The average is constructed as described in the text.
Table 3.2(b) Estimated standard deviation of cost of capital
year no of no tax	 no tax	 full tax	 full tax	 full tax and
cos	 exhaustion exhaustion and ACT ACT exhaustion
exhaust ion	 (accounts)
1971	 190	 1.41	 1.57	 1.69	 1.69	 2.61
1972	 297	 2.81	 3.02	 3.49	 3.49	 4.14
1973	 374	 1.80	 2.84	 6.15	 5.69	 7.21
1974	 409	 1.85	 2.79	 5.72	 3.93	 5.34
1975	 431	 2.03	 2.66	 7.48	 4.30	 6.76
1976	 655	 1.71	 2.40	 6.90	 4.47	 8.13
1977	 673	 3.33	 3.15	 6.48	 4.89	 6.42
1978	 685	 2.46	 2.43	 8.04	 5.14	 7.19
1979	 693	 1.57	 1.94	 8.90	 4.90	 6.61
1980	 690	 3.55	 3.42	 11.96	 7•37	 7.98
1981	 673	 2.80	 1.54	 9.60	 5.54	 9.20
1982	 660	 2.50	 1.85	 12.26	 7.97	 9.44
1983	 639	 2.06	 1.34	 13.92	 6.60	 7.84
1984	 602	 2.36	 15.62	 13.44	 10.03	 8.99
1985	 565	 1.83	 10.33	 6.16	 5.77	 5.12
1986	 492	 1.80	 5.03	 4.14	 5.72	 4.55
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No attempt has been made to distinguish required rates of return on
equity as opposed to debt. The economic depreciation rates are taken
from King and Fullerton (1984) and are 8. 19% for plant and machinery and
2.5% for buildings, both on an exponential basis. The investment goods
price series and the general price series are constructed from deflators
available in the Blue Book (various years). The latter is industry
specific.
Table 3.2(a) presents the mean of the average cost of capital ie. the
cost of capital averaged across different types of investment and across
all firms in the sample. As noted above, the figures given correspond to
the cost of capital in the financial regime 4 defined above. Even in the
'no tax' case, it is clear that there has been substantial variation
over the period considered (1971 to 1986). Throughout much of the 1970s
the real interest rate was negative, and the cost of capital is only
positive because of the cost of depreciation. By the recession in the
early 1980s, however, real interest rates were very high, and this is
reflected in very high figures for the cost of capital in this period.
Introducing taxation in all cases reduces the cost of capital,
indicating that throughout this period the tax system acted, on
average, as an incentive to invest. This, of course, reflects the
generosity of the tax system during this period - the existence of 100%
allowances for plant and machinery, and allowances climbing to 75% in
the first year for industrial buildings, in combination with an
imputation system for taxation of dividends and full interest
deductibility.
However, the most striking example of this is during the transition
period after the 1984 reforms. This occurred because for t=1984 and
t1985, r<x, and implying that p1>p. As already noted,
8c/&r>0 and it is also the case (as can be seen from (3.6)) that
8c/ôp<O. Both the reduction in the tax rate and the increase in the
effective price of capital goods in period t+1 therefore reduce the cost
of capital in period t. This is exactly what happened during the
transition period between 1984 and 1986, with the result that the cost
of capital, ignoring tax exhaustion, was of the order of 15 percentage
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points below the 'no tax' cost of capital in 1984 and 1985. Intuitively,
an investment made in 1984, say, received a capital allowance in 1984 at
a relatively high rate; in 1985 the return on that investment was taxed
at a relatively low rate, and the rise in the effective price of capital
goods also created a high capital gain. The change in the effective
price effectively captures the advantage of bringing forward investment
from 1985 to 1984, and similarly from 1986 to 1985. Since the
transitional period did not end until April 1986, some of this
transitional effect is also present in 1986.
In fact, the second column In Table 3.2(a), ignoring tax exhaustion,
exaggerates the effect of the transitional rules. As can be seen in the
other columns, the effect of tax exhaustion was to reduce the impact of
*	 *
the provisions on t	 and p
	
compared with r	 and p . Otherwise,
t+1	 t+1	 t+1	 t+1
however, the average values of the cost of capital when tax exhaustion
is allowed for are not very different from the case in which tax
exhaustion is not allowed for.
It is clear from Table 3.2(b), however, that this measure hides large
variation in the cost of capital between companies when tax exhaustion
is allowed for. The standard deviation shown for the 'full tax' case is
around 1 to 2 percentage points (up to 1984). Since all firms face the
same statutory tax regime, this variation is due almost exclusively to
differences in the weights used between firms to create an average cost
of capital for each firm. Further, since these figures are for regime 4,
the variation is due solely to differences in the composition of the
capital stock rather than due to differences in the use of different
forms of finance. By contrast, the standard deviation in the third
column (allowing for full tax exhaustion but not ACT exhaustion), ranges
from around 6 to around 12 percentage points, and that for the fourth
column (including ACT exhaustion as well) ranges from around 4 to around
8 percentage points. As would be expected from the discussion above and
in Chapter 2, these are clearly an order of magnitude greater than those
in column 2. The standard deviations in column 5, using the alternative
estimates of tax exhaustion are generally between those in columns 3 and
4.
Table 3.2(c) presents simple correlation coefficients between the
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various measures of the average cost of capital across both firms and
time periods. Recall that a similar table showing correlations between
the various definitions of Q, in Chapter 2, revealed that any variation
due to tax exhaustion was dwarfed by variation in the market value of
firms. One possible advantage of using an investment model based on the
cost of capital is that such an effect is clearly not present in Table
3.2(c). The correlation coefficients between the 'full tax' cost of
capital and the two 'tax exhaustion' measures based on the model in
Appendix B are 0.61 and 0.62. The correlation with the other estimates
based on tax exhaustion are even lower. This suggests that the effects
of tax exhaustion on investment might be more easily investigated using
such cost of capital measures than in the Q model used in Chapter 2.
Table 3.2(c) Correlation of different definitions of cost of capital
no tax	 no tax	 full	 full and	 full and
exhn	 exhn	 ACT exhn	 ACT exhn
(accounts)
no tax	 1.00
no tax exhn	 0.57	 1.00
full tax exhn	 0.50	 0.61	 1.00
full and ACT exhn	 0.64	 0.62	 0.84	 1.00
full and ACT exhn	 0.56	 0.50	 0.48	 0.58	 1.00
(accounts)
Before turning to the estimation of the investment model, we briefly
discuss differences in the cost of capital due to alternative forms of
finance being used, and alternative types of asset purchased. Table 3.3
presents estimates based on the definitions in the first column of Table
3.1 ie. it is assumed that so that the firm pays dividends in
period t+1. The first three columns of Table 3.3 present the cases in
which X=0, xN=o and which correspond to the marginal source of
finance being retentions, new equity and debt respectively. Column 4
presents the cost of capital under the regime in which the firms uses
all three forms of finance, described above as regime 4 (and which is
used elsewhere in the empirical work in this chapter). The figures
presented correspond to those in column 4 of Table 3.2(a) ie. they allow
for both full tax exhaustion and ACT exhaustion. For the purposes of
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presentation it is assumed that the marginal rate of personal income tax
is equal to the basic rate and that the marginal rate of capital gains
tax is zero.
Table 3.3 Average cost of capital by source of finance ('/,)
year no of	 retained	 new	 debt	 regime
cos	 earnings	 equity	 4
1971	 190	 3.36	 80.04	 3.41	 3.33
1972	 297	 -0.67	 69.10	 -0.63	 -0.16
1973	 374	 -3.07	 25.18	 -6.17	 -4.19
1974	 409	 -5.79	 10.19	 -14.31	 -5.06
1975	 431	 -2.58	 12.71	 -11.91	 -1.73
1976	 655	 -3.54	 10.83	 -8.22	 -2.02
1977	 673	 3.76	 19.91	 -1.19	 2.97
1978	 685	 0.34	 17.02	 -5.81	 0.80
1979	 693	 0.03	 12.86	 -5.90	 0.65
1980	 690	 6.26	 18.61	 -0.66	 5.94
1981	 673	 9.66	 19.73	 1.90	 9.61
1982	 660	 11.39	 19.30	 4.08	 11.62
1983	 639	 11.49	 16.42	 6.17	 11.29
1984	 602	 0.12	 3.38	 -5.60	 3.39
1985	 565	 -6.84	 -3.44	 -14.62	 -2.75
1986	 492	 3.20	 4.77	 0.86	 3.13
There is a clear ordering of the relative sizes of the cost of capital.
Debt Is clearly the cheapest form of finance - because it is fully
deductible from corporation tax. By contrast, the cost of capital for
new equity is substantially higher than either of the other two sources.
The size of this effect depends crucially on the assumption made
regarding the marginal rate of personal income tax. Under the
assumptions used, of a shareholder facing the basic rate of income tax
and a zero rate of capital gains tax, then, in the absence of tax
exhaustion, '=1. From Table 3.1, this implies that the firm should be
indifferent between retention and new equity finance. In the presence of
ACT exhaustion, however, it is possible that s<s, so that '<1. In this
case, the cost of capital for new equity finance is raised. In an
extreme case in which s falls to zero (as under a classical corporation
tax) the cost of capital for new equity would be much higher than shown
in the table. Note that if, instead, it were assumed that the marginal
rate of income tax was zero (as for a pension fund, for example), then
*
>1, and it is probable that ' 1, which would make the cost of capital
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for new equity lower than that for retained earnings. The difficulty of
empirically choosing between these two cases is one of the principle
reasons for choosing the 'regime 4' estimates (defined In (3.15) in
empirical work. Using regime 4 does not require marginal rates of income
tax and capital gains tax rates to be specified. It can be seen that, in
practice, the average cost of capital under regime 4 Is very close to
that for retained earnings. Within the context of the model used here,
the difference between the regime 4 cost of capital and the cost of
capital under debt finance may be attributed to marginal agency cost of
debt.
Table 3.4 turns to the cost of capital on each of the three types of
asset considered, under the regime 4 form of finance. The three assets
are plant and machinery, industrial buildings and commercial buildings
(buildings are split in this way because they are treated differently by
the corporation tax system; in particular, commercial buildings receive
no allowance). The relative treatment of the different assets depends
mainly on the rate of capital allowance, but also on the rate of
Table 3.4 Tax wedge by type of asset (%)
year no of
	 plant and	 industrial	 commercial
cos	 machinery	 buildings	 buildings
1971	 190	 -2.89	 -3.73	 -3.43
1972	 297	 -2.24	 -2.49	 -4.62
1973	 374	 -0.36	 -1.37	 -5.27
1974	 409	 -2.39	 -4.67	 -9.37
1975	 431	 -3.16	 -4.74	 -8.94
1976	 655	 -6.11	 -3.31	 -2.55
1977	 673	 -2.46	 -3.08	 -4.32
1978	 685	 -2.16	 -2.85	 -5.86
1979	 693	 -2.53	 -2.42	 -5.47
1980	 690	 -0.37	 -2.55	 -4.63
1981	 673	 -2.79	 -3.00	 -1.14
1982	 660	 -2.82	 -3.07	 -0.74
1983	 639	 -1.92	 -2.34	 -1.10
1984	 602	 -9.94	 -12.36	 -2.51
1985	 565	 -13.67	 -16.95	 -3.14
1986	 492	 -4.35	 -8.35	 0.56
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economic depreciation assumed, which as noted above, is 8.19% for plant
and machinery and 2.5% for buildings. Because of variation in the cost
of capital due differences in the economic depreciation rate between
plant and machinery and buildings, Table 3.4 presents estimates of the
marginal tax wedge. This is simply the difference between the cost of
capital in the absence of taxation and the cost of capital in the
presence of taxation for each asset. This is therefore a comparable
measure of the direct effect of taxation on the cost of capital for each
asset.
3.5 Estimation of the investment model
The basic model to be estimated for firm i is
I *	 H	 *	 I	
1*	
I	 *2I itl	 [ i,t+il	 i,t+i	
+	
i,t+il	 *
I i-I	 K	 +2[ K	 K	 j	
+ c +w	 (3.25)
4 it	 it
L	 1 J	 i,t+i	 i,t+1	 i,t+1
for l=1,2,...,N, t=i,2,,. ..,T, where 	 ie cash flow, and
where:
I	 *	
*	
I
r
= —(i-t )[
L IS] 	 Pt	
is [ H
I
and
(3.26)
1	 1
33=i	 34=,
b
aa[= (1-r )p-(1-i3)p	 (i-t	 ) 1]	 ( 3.27)*	 *It t
	
t+1	 it+1
Data on remuneration is not available for all the observations of the
sample, so the estimation strategy effectively imposes perfect
competition 18 . This implies replacing the output and wages terms by cash
18The imperfect competition model was estimated using a smaller data set
which included data on wages. However, this did not lend support to the
more general model. The wages term was positive and significant when the
129
flow. In addition, the significance of the debt term from the original
equation is investigated below. The presence of time and firm variation
in the constant, a, can be approximated by the inclusion of firm fixed
effects and time dummies. Thus the estimation procedure needs to allow
for fixed effects even if they are not present in the error term, w1.
We therefore assume that
a+w =	 + q +c	 (3.28)
itit	 I	 t
The same estimation procedure as in Chapter 2 is followed. The presence
of endogenous terms in (3.25) makes the standard variance-components GLS
estimator inconsistent, and the inclusion of (I/K) 	 in the equation
I, t.+1
would introduce bias if within groups estimation were used. As in
Chapter 2, the estimation is therefore in first-differences, using a GMM
estimator. Estimating the equation in first differences implies that the
fixed effect, q,, drops out of the equation. The GMM procedure weights
the instruments optimally. However, first-differencing the equation
introduces w	 into the equation. Since w 	 must be correlated
I,t-1	 I,t-1
with (I/K)	 , then the latter cannot be used as an instrument. Whilei ,t-1
in principle (I/K)1..2 is uncorrelated with w1,_1 it is necessary to
test for more general dynamic structures particularly due to the
expanded error structure defined in (3.28). As in Chapter 2, the
appropriateness of the instrument set is tested using the Sargan test of
over-identifying restrictions and a test for second order serial
correlation (Arellano and Bond (1989)).
Table 3.5 examines the econometric specification of the investment model
(3.25). Column (1) begins by estimating the unrestricted form of the
model, using each of the right hand side variables as instruments, dated
period t-2 or earlier. Each of these instruments is in its GMM form 19 . In
addition to these instruments, the 'full tax' cost of capital is used as
an instrument, on the grounds that it is unlikely to be correlated with
model predicted that it should be negative. Probably as a result, the
output term (replacing cash flow) was small and insignificant. The other
variables were broadly similar to those presented in Table 3.5.
19The number of periods used for each instrument is restricted mainly by
the need to restrict the overall number of instruments to 90 in order to
compute the estimates using the econometric software GAUSS
1.49.
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the error term since it does not depend on the behaviour of the
20	 *
company . This table uses the measure of the cost of capital and
developed in the model, and therefore takes account of full tax
exhaustion and ACT exhaustion.
The Sargan statistic in column (i) indicates that this set of
instruments is not valid, and is therefore probably introducing bias
into the estimated coefficients. Column (ii) therefore takes all the GMM
Instruments back to period t-3 (and earlier). The Sargan statistic is
now (marginally) acceptable at normal confidence levels. The results in
column (ii) are mixed. Three of the four coefficients have the correct
sign and reasonable values. Thus the coefficient on (I/K)1+1 Is
0.4385, which assuming the a=ô, gives a value of .5, the average economic
depreciation rate of around 28%. While this may be considered rather
high, it is not unreasonably so.
The coefficients on (Z/K)
	
and c are predicted to be equal and
t,t+1	 it
opposite, and this Is confirmed in that the difference between the two
coefficients is within one standard error. Furthermore, this coefficient
measures precisely the same parameter as the Q coefficient in the Q
model, that is, it is 1/b, where b Is given in the adjustment cost
function (3.16). However, the estimate of 1/b Is between ten and fifteen
times larger than that found in the Q model (see Table 2.5, and many
other estimates in the literature). Given that one of the weaknesses of
the Q model is that empirical estimates of 1/b are always very small,
this is an encouraging feature of the results In column (II). It
suggests that the value of b is between 6 and 10, rather than 100.
The only feature of the results in column (ii) not to be in line with
the predictions of the model in (3.25) is therefore the coefficient on
(I/K)+1. The intuition underlying the model Is that this coefficient
should be positive. This reflects the fact that adjustment costs are
quadratic; If the company expects investment in period t+1 to be high,
it should increase investment in period t by an amount which minimises
adjustment costs (ceteris paribus). One point to note about this result
20The DPD programme developed by Arellano and Bond (1988) was used for
estimation.
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0.4233
(0.0517)
-0. 1712
(0. 0201)
Table 3.5 Testing the econometric specification of the model
(i)	 (ii)	 (iii)	 (iv)	 Cv)
*	 *	 *	 *	 *
Dep variable	 MI/K)	 MI/K)	 MI/K)	 A[(I/K) -	 MI/K)it	 it	 it	 *t	 it
(I/K) I , t+ 1
MI/K)	 0.6054	 0.4385	 0.4043	 -2.2668I ,t+1
(0.0627)	 (0.0743)	 (0.0682)	 (0.0597)
MI/K)	 -0.1968	 -0.1814	 -0.1694	 -i,t+1
(0.0248)	 (0.0260)	 (0.0239)
A(H/K)	 0.0090	 0.1068	 0.1216	 0.7048	 0.0487I ,t+1
(0.0308)	 (0.0651)	 (0.0594)	 (0.1129)	 (0.0548)
*
Ac	 -0. 0332	 -0. 1539	 -0. 1279	 -0. 1702	 -0. 0960it
(0.0449)	 (0.0469)	 (0.0462)	 (0.0520)	 (0.0412)
*2
A(B/pK)	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0. 0223I, t+1
(0.0217)
m2	 -0.39	 -1.21	 -1.25	 0.45	 -1.78
z	 227.0 (11) 232.4 (11) 228.4 (11) 235.5 (11) 209.2 (11)
Sargan	 120.5 (74) 95.3 (71) 95.9 (71) 101.8 (72) 	 92.2 (70)
Instri.uents	 G(I/K)	 G(I/K)	 G(I/K)	 G(I/K)3	 G(I/K)3
G(I/K) 2	G(I/K)2	 G(I/K)2	 G(I/K)23	 G(I/K)23
G(H/K)	 G(H/K)3 G(H/K) 3 G(H/K) 3	G(H/K)3
G(H/K)	 G(H/K)	 G(H/K)	 G(H/K)4	 G(H/K)4
	Gc . . Gc Gc . . Gc Gc . . Gc Gc . . Gc	 Gc . . Gc
-4	 5	 3	 -5	 3	 ,. -5	 -
c,Ac	 c,Ac	 c,Ac	 c,Ac	 c,Act	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t
G(B/pK)3
G(B/pK)4
Notes:
1. Time dummies are included as regressors and instruments in all
equations.
2. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard
errors and test statistics are robust to general time-series and
cross-section heteroskedasticity.
3. m2 is a test for second order serial correlation in the residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial
correlation.
4. z2 is a Wald test of the joint significance of the time dummies.
There are 12 degrees of freedom for each model in the table.
continued
continued
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5. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-Identifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as 2 (k) under the null. The number of
degrees of freedom is given in parentheses.
6. Instruments preceded by G are In their GMM form. c refers to the cost
of capital allowing for taxation but ignoring tax exhaustion (and
therefore unaffected by actions of individual companies).
is, however, the possibility of measurement error, especially in the
estimates of the capital stock. Any measurement error (which could well
be important given the lack of data on the replacement cost values of
the capital stock) is exacerbated by the squared term, and this may be
reflected in a biased coefficient.
Column (iii) is a slight variation on column (ii). Here the
definitions of each variable are slightly different from those
given in (3.26), since the discount factor is removed. The purpose
here is simply to allow the discount factor to be estimated by
forcing it to become part of the coefficient, and hence fixed
across companies and over time. As can be seen, the coefficients
are slightly lower than in column (ii), as would be expected, since the
right hand side variables are now slightly larger. Imposing
constant discount factors therefore does little harm to the model.
Column (iv) returns to the problem of the coefficient on (I/K)21, by
imposing the restriction that it is equal to one, and forming a new
dependent variable. It is clear from the results that this does not
improve the fit of the model. Indeed, the performance of all the other
terms is now worse than in the unrestricted case. It should perhaps be
noted here that, if at least part of the problem is due to measurement
error, this would not be solved by imposing the restriction.
Finally, column (v) adds the square of the ratio of the stock of debt to
the replacement cost of the capital stock to the specification. As
indicated in the model, if agency costs are present and are a function
of this ratio, this term should enter with a positive sign. As can be
seen, the coefficient on this term is positive but it is insignificantly
different from zero. This suggests that agency costs dependent on the
level of debt do not play a major role in investment decisions by the
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firm21 . The role played by cash flow in period t+1 is weakened somewhat
by the inclusion of the debt term, due possibly to collinearity between
these two terms.
Table 3.6 turns to the issue of whether the results are affected by
using different measures of the cost of capital. The five columns of the
table make different assumptions regarding the role of the tax system.
The assumptions are the same as those investigated earlier in
considering values of the cost of capital. They are
(i) ignoring tax altogether
(ii) allowing for tax, but ignoring all forms of tax exhaustion
(iii) allowing for tax including full tax exhaustion (given by the
presence of positive losses carried forward) but ignoring ACT exhaustion
(iv) allowing for tax, including both full tax exhaustion and ACT
exhaust ion
(v) as (iv), but using estimates of periods of tax exhaustion using the
data on tax payments from accounts, rather than from the model described
in Appendix B
Table 3.6 reproduces the model in column (ii) of Table 3.5 for each of
these measures of the cost of capital (note also that and hence
the regressors, are also affected by the assumption). It can be seen
that only column (iv), reproduced from Table 3.5 since it allows for
both full tax exhaustion and ACT exhaustion, fits the predictions of the
model at all well. Although the coefficients on the cost of capital do
not vary greatly between the different columns (and for columns (ii),
(iii) and (iv) they are very close), the overall results, and hence
predictions of the model, do vary. In particular, the coefficient on
is lower in all of the other columns (compared with (iv)),
which, interpreted in the light of the underlying model, suggests very
high depreciation rates. The fact that these coefficients are low
contributes to the presence of serial correlation, as given by the M2
statistic.
conclusion is supported by the evidence in the next chapter.
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(H/K) I ,t+1
it
Table 3.6 Testing alternative measures of the cost of capital
Dependent variable
(a)
*
A(I/K) I , t+ 1
'2(I/K) I ,t+1
	(1)	 (ii)	 (lii)	 (iv)	 (v)
0.1233	 0.1288	 0.0104	 0.4385	 0.2416
(0.0705)	 (0.0722)	 (0.0725)	 (0.0743)	 (0.0039)
	
-0.1692	 -0.1363	 -0.1198	 -0.1814	 -0.0643
(0.0265)	 (0.0270)	 (0.0262)	 (0.0260)	 (0.0292)
0.3461	 0.2799	 0.2115	 0.1068	 0.3913
(0.0653)	 (0.0651)	 (0.0666)	 (0.0651)	 (0.0844)
-0.3466	 -0.1552	 -0.1557	 -0.1539	 -0.2553
(0.0753)	 (0.0342)	 (0.0415)	 (0.0469)	 (0.0436)
m2	 -2.47	 -2.42	 -2.41	 -1.21	 -3.20
z	 153.8 (11) 234.0 (11) 236.0(11) 232.4 (11) 151.1 (11)
Sargan	 96.9 (71)
	
95.7 (71) 97.5(71) 95.3 (71) 97.1 (71)
Instruments	 G(I/K)	 G(I/K)	 G(I/K)	 G(I/K)3	 G(I/K)3
G(I/K) 2	G(I/K)23	 G(I/K)23	 G(I/K)23	 G(I/K)23
G(H/K) 3 G(H/K) 3 G(H/K) 3 G(H/K) 3 G(H/K)3
G(H/K) 4 G(H/K)	 G(H/K)4 G(H/K) 4 G(H/K)4
Gc . . Gc Gc . . Gc Gc . . Gc Gc . . Gc Gc . . Gc
	
.	 -5	 -3 - -5 	3 - -5 	 -,3	 .' -5	 -	 -5
c,c	 c,c	 c,c	 c,Ac	 c,tct	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t
A further experiment was to include more than one of the definitions of
the cost of capital in the equation simultaneously. This was tried using
the definitions from columns (ii) and (iv). However, the collinearity
between the two definitions meant that sensible estimates could not be
derived (the coefficients were almost exactly equal and opposite, and
very large). An alternative experiment was to include the cost of
capital from column (ii) (the 'full tax' case) and the difference
between the two definitions in columns (ii) and (iv) (a measure of the
additional information due to tax exhaustion). The results of this were
as follows:
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*	 *	 *2	 *
(I/K) = 0.1237 (I/K)	 - 0.1080 (I/K)	 + 0.2466 (Z/K)it	 (oo3o3)	 i)t+1	 (0.0764)	 It+1(0.0786)
*	 *	 *
-0.0712 c ft + 0.4556 (c x-c ft)
(0.0474)	 (0.1001)	 t	 (3.29)
M2= -2.37; z=229.7 (11); Sargan=82.9 (70)
*	 *
where c ft is the cost of capital under the 'full tax' case, and c x is
the cost of capital allowing for tax exhaustion. This has the somewhat
surprising result that an increase in the cost of capital due to tax
exhaustion tends to increase the rate of investment.
There are two possible interpretations of these results. The first is
that all models which do not take account of tax exhaustion are
misspecified, since it is only in the case in which tax exhaustion is
properly allowed for that the results can be interpreted to be in line
with the predictions of the model. However, the fact that small changes
to the specification can lead to dramatic changes in the estimated
coefficients and to the fit of the model also suggest that the
formulation of the model in (3.25) is not robust.
3.6. Conclusions
This chapter has constructed a model of investment based directly on an
explicit maximisation process in which investment in the short term
depends on adjustment costs. The model is essentially the same as that
in Chapter 2 and thus allows for both forms of tax exhaustion. This
chapter analysed the effects of tax exhaustion on the cost of capital in
various financial regimes, and considered the dynamic effects of moving
into and out of tax exhaustion.
The investment model generated by the optimisation is well suited to the
simulation of tax changes to investigate the likely response of
investment. In particular, the prediction of the model for various forms
of tax reform, whether temporary or permanent, or pre-announced or
unannounced, was discussed. The model fitted the data reasonably well.
In particular, the coefficient on the cost of capital, which according
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to the model has the same interpretation of that on Q in Q investment
models ie. the parameter of the adjustment cost function, was relatively
high, at around (minus) 0.15, compared to only around 0.01 in the Q
model shown in Chapter 2. This suggests that this model may be a more
fruitful tool for the examination of the impact of taxation on
investment than the Q model.
However, the model does not appear to be very robust to small changes in
its specification. This suggests further exploration of some of the
assumptions used in the model might identify its weaknesses. There are
several possibilities for such further examination. First, the model
could be allowed to have rather more general timing: for example, the
assumption of a one year lag in capital becoming productive may not be
reasonable . More general timings should also be considered. Second, the
non-quadratic forms for the adjustment cost function might be
incorporated into the model. The quadratic form used here was to provide
a direct comparison with the Q model, and it is a simple form to use.
However, other forms may prove to be more robust. Third, more work needs
to be done to compare the perfect competition and imperfect competition
models. Finally, as much of the earlier part of the chapter indicated,
the cost of capital should depend on personal tax parameters. Problems
involved in defining those parameters were largely defined away in the
empirical work, but other assumptions could be incorporated into further
empirical work.
Finally, some comment should be made on the performance of tax variables
adjusted for tax exhaustion. Tax exhaustion has been tested into two
separate (although related) models of investment, with a view to
discovering whether it has an independent effect on investment decisions
as theory would predict. However, it has proved difficult to test this
hypothesis in a theoretically consistent model of investment because
there are, in any case, underlying problems with both models. Having
said this, there is one other possible factor which would reduce the
impact of tax exhaustion, namely the possibility available to firms to
lease, rather than to purchase, assets, and thereby probably capture at
least part of the tax allowance. Unfortunately, owing to the lack of
data on leasing,	 it has proved impossible to test this
possibility.
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CHAPTER 4
INVESTMENT, FINANCIAL FACTORS AND CASH FLOW
4.1. Introduction
Most empirical models of company investment rely on the assumption of
perfect capital markets. In a world without taxes, one implication of
this assumption is that firms are indifferent to funding their
investment programmes from internal or external funds. However, there is
a rapidly growing body of literature examining the possible existence of
imperfections in capital markets and their effects on firms' financial
and real decisions. This chapter provides some econometric evidence on
the impact of financial factors like cash flow, debt and stock measures
of liquidity on the investment decisions of firms in the sample used in
this thesis. It also investigates whether the effect of financial
factors varies across different types of firm.
One of the basic models of company financial policy, described briefly
in Chapter 1 is an attempt to distinguish firms according to three
specific regimes. In regime 1, the firm uses only retention finance (the
cheapest source of finance). In regime 2, retention finance is exhausted
- or, equivalently, dividend payments have reached zero - and the firm
uses debt finance. The cost of debt finance increases with the amount
borrowed, so that eventually, debt becomes as expensive as new equity
finance. At this point, the latter becomes the marginal source of
finance for the firm. As Hayashl (1985) argued, changes in the firm's
cash flow will increase the availability of retention finance, and will
therefore reduce the marginal cost of finance if the firm is in regime 2
(regimes 1 and 3 will be unaffected). It follows from this that
investment should be positively related to cash flow if the firm is in
regime 2.
This model therefore predicts that there will be cross sectional
variation in the way that companies respond to a change in their cash
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flow, and that it is not the case that all companies would increase
their investment in response to an increase in cash flow. Before
discussing papers which have attempted to test the predictions of this
model of financial policy, the outline of the approach here will be
given.
As will be noted from the detailed discussion of financial regimes in
Chapter 2, the simple three regime model is unconvincing. Perhaps its
most unfavourable feature is that it predicts that companies would never
simultaneously issue new shares and pay dividends - and indeed that they
would never simultaneously issue new debt and pay dividends. As
indicated below, this is completely at variance with the data, at least
in the UK. In this chapter a simple extension of the model of the firm
from Chapter 2 is therefore presented. The earlier model is simplified
by ignoring tax exhaustion, but allows for agency costs of debt, for
reasons given at length in Chapter 1, relating to problems of asymmetric
information and principal-agent issues. In this model, agency costs are
assumed to depend on the company's cash flow, as well as the stock of
debt, the size of the capital stock and the level of internal funds.The
prediction of such a model is that it is possible that all companies may
face a positive relationship between cash flow and investment, and not
Just those in a specific financial regime.
Part of the aim of the chapter is therefore to examine whether it is
indeed the case that the data is consistent with the view that all
companies may face a positive relationship between cash flow and
investment. Such a positive relationship will be referred to, somewhat
loosely, as a credit constrant. A second aim is to consider whether it
is likely that some companies are more likely to face credit constraints
than others, and again to test any such predictions against the data.
This chapter investigates in particular the possibility that small
companies (and young companies) face a more severe disadvantage in
raising external finance, and therefore have a more severe 'credit
constraint' problem. There are several reasons why this may be true.
First, smaller companies are likely to face greater problems of
asymmetric information. A lot of information is provided by financial
analysts on the state and prospects of quoted companies, but this is
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undoubtedly greater for larger companies. As a result, lemons arguments
might apply more significantly to small companies - external investors
cannot distinguish between small companies with good and bad prospects,
and will therefore charge a premium to cover the risk. This raises the
cost of external finance for such companies.
Second, smaller companies often tend to be less diversified, to display
greater earnings volatility, and to be more prone to bankruptcy (Titman
and Wessels, 1988). The higher degree of risk creates a greater
distinction between the shareholder and debtholders of the company, in
that the returns to the latter in a successful outcome will be limited,
while in an unsuccessful outcome may be zero. As a result, debtholders
are likely to impose a higher charge. This issue may be worsened for
small companies by asymmetric information: the lemons premium is likely
to be higher because small firms as a group ten to be more risky.
However, there are also reasons why it might be the case that incentive
problems are more severe for firms in which insiders own a smaller
proportion of the firm and outside ownership is more dispersed. This is
because of principal agent problems, where shareholders need to control
the actions of the managers. Since size may proxy for ownership
structure, there is some ambiguity in assessing the effect of size on
the cost of external finance.
Most of the arguments regarding the impact of the size of the firm on
the cost of external finance apply equally well to the distinction
between older firms which are more established, and younger firms. It is
therefore also interesting to compare the impact of cash flow on
investment decisions for these two categories of companies.
The cross-sectional variation of the impact on investment of flow and
stock measures of liquidity has been analysed also by Fazzari et al
(1988) and by Gertler and Hubbard (1988) for US firms and by Hoshi et al
(1988) for Japanese firms. The former studies distinguish between firms
according to their dividend payment behaviour, while the latter classify
firms according to the strength of their institutional relationships
with banks. However, neither of these approaches is suitable for the UK.
The latter is not suitable because the close relationship between some
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firms and their bankers is not observed in the UK to the same extent as
it is in Japan. In any case, no data exist for the UK to analyse this
kind of issue.
It might be considered that the former approach is suitable for use on
the UK data used in this thesis. Fazzari et al are essentially trying to
test the simple model described above. To distinguish firms in regime 2,
they use the dividend payout ratio: they split their sample of firms
into three groups, corresponding to a high, medium and low payout. The
idea is presumably that firms with low dividend payout ratios are closer
to having exhausted their retention finance, and therefore it is more
likely that a relationship between cash flow and investment will be
observed for such firms. However, this argument is fallacious. The
empirical approach implicitly requires that there must be some reason
why firms continue to pay any dividends - indeed there is a large
literature on why firms pay dividends despite the apparent tax
disadvantages of doing so - for example, firms may need to send a signal
to investors (see for instance John and Williams (1985), Axnbarish et al.
(1987) and Edwards (1987) for a critical discussion) or investors may
want firms to be subject to scrutiny from the market (see Easterbrook
(1984) and Rozeff (1982)). However, without explicitly modelling why
dividends are paid, it is not clear which firms are constrained in
raising finance by their earnings and which are not. It may well be the
case, for example, that firms which have a higher dividend payout ratio
face a constraint that demands a higher payment, and so are forced to
use external finance more quickly.
This ambiguity is reflected in the empirical results of Fazzarl et al:
cash flow proved to a significant determinant of investment for all
three groups of firms; although the coefficient on cash flow proved to
be highest for firms with low dividend payout ratios and lowest for
those firms with high payout ratios, it is not clear from this simple
model what the implications of this result are. Certainly one possible
interpretation consistent with the simple model is simply that the
elasticity of the cost of debt finance with respect to the level of debt
is lowest for firms with high dividend payout ratios and highest for
firms with low payout ratios (although this In itself is one reason for
supposing the latter group to be more constrained).
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The existing literature thus leaves open a number of questions. First,
does cash flow have an empirical significance in Q investment equations
on UK panel data? Second, if so, does this empirical significance really
represent some form of financial constraint on firms' activities- or at
least, an increasing cost of external funds - as opposed to merely
proxying better than Q, investment opportunities open to the firm.
Third, if financial factors are really important, it is not clear why
they should necessarily be best proxied by cash flow: for example,
internal funds may be better proxied by the stock of cash or liquid
assets held within the firm; are these variables Important empirically?
Fourth, if financial factors do play a role, do they appear to do so for
all companies? Fifth, do financial factors appear to play a more
important role for small, or young, companies? Sixth, the empirical work
of Fazzari et al is open to objection on the grounds that their sample
selection is based on an endogenous variable (dividend payout) and so
their results may be biased and inconsistent; can significant
differences in the role played by financial factors across groups of
firms selected exogenously be identified?
This chapter addresses itself to these questions. Financial factors are
introduced into the model of the firm from the previous two chapters
(although tax exhaustion is Ignored in the exposition of the model in
order to focus on the issues raised by financial factors). In
particular, financial factors are introduced via an agency costs of debt
finance; agency costs depend on the level of liquid assets in the firm
and cash flow in the current period. While this is obviously an ad hoc
means of introducing financial factors, potential lenders, such as bank
managers, appear to take such items into account in deciding whether to
lend to a firm, and if so, at what rate. In addition to agency costs on
debt, a lemons premium is added to the cost of new equity, following the
arguments of Myers and Majluf (1984). As noted above, they argued that
if managers acted in the interests of the existing shareholders, and had
information regarding a profitable investment opportunity that outsiders
did not have, then it would be impossible for the managers to issue
shares to finance that investment st a price which reflected the true
value of the project.
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The position of the agency cost function is allowed to vary across firms
of different size, age and sector reflecting the arguments discussed
above. Observations are therefore grouped here according to firm size
and age (and controlling for the type of industry). The empirical
importance of this breakdown is a natural subject of Investigation and
the problems of endogenous selection are minimised.
In Section 4.2, the simple extension of the investment model is
outlined, illustrating how cash flow can be introduced in Q models. The
determinants of the size of the cash flow effect are discussed, and it
is explained why caution must be exercised in attributing inter-firm
differences only to differences in the Importance of agency or financial
distress costs. Section 4.3 describes the behaviour and performance of
the sample of firms, split by size and age, and section 4.4 presents
some econometric results which indicate that financial factors,
principally in the form of lagged cash flow, do have an independent
effect on investment. Section 4.5 briefly concludes.
4.2. Financial factors in an investment model
This section presents an extension of the model used In the previous two
chapters to investigate the role of financial factors in the investment
decision. To concentrate on financial factors other than taxation, tax
is here modelled only by using the corporate tax rate, t. For clarity of
exposition, depreciation rates are ignored, although they are included
in the empirical work below. The model includes agency or financial
distress costs A(.), which are a function of the stock of debt at the
end of the period, B, the repalcement value of the capital stock at
the end of the period, pK ,the stock of liquid assets at the end of
the period L, and cash flow during the period, X 1 . Debt and liquid
assets are chosen endogenously, together with investment and new share
Issues. On the basis of the arguments of the previous section and in
chapter 1, agency costs are assumed to be an increasing function of debt
1Note that stocks held at the beginning of the period are dated t and at
the end of the period are dated t^1; flows during the period are dated
t.
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=D +p I +(1+(1-t)i)B +Lt tt	 t t+1 (4.1)
and a decreasing function of cash flow, the capital stock and of liquid
assets. As explained above, the agency cost function is allowed to vary
for firms in different age and size classes and in different industries.
In addition, the lemons premium introduced by Mayers and MaJluf (1984)
is again included.
This way of summarising informational asymmetries and the risk of
bankruptcy is obviously ad hoc. It is adopted here to provide some
unifying principle to the discussion and to the empirical testing and to
make clear the implicit assumptions underlying the type of equations
that have been used so far to test for the importance of financial
factors in equations containing average Q. In particular, the aim is to
specify a model that is consistent with the fact that cash flow may
matter (albeit differently) for all firms, and not only for those that
have used up all retentions and are not issuing any new shares.
As in chapter 2, we begin in (4.1) by specifying the sources and uses
of funds:
(1-t)prf(K. I )-A CX ,B 1,L1,p K	 )+Vt+B +L (l+(lt)i')t t+1	 t t+1 tt	 t t
where is the price of output and 
Pt 
the price of investment goods,
both during period t, IT real revenues net of variable costs, K the
capital stock at the beginning of the period (there is a one period lag
in capital becoming productive), I investment during the period, B debt
at the beginning of the period, new equity issued during period t, L
liquid assets at the beginning of the period, D dividends paid during
the period, i the rate of interest on debt and iL the rate of interest
on liquid assets, both, for simplicity, assumed to be constant over
time. X is cash flow generated by operations, after interest payments
but before dividend payments and new investment:
(4.2)X =(1-r)U -(1+(1-t)i)Bt	 t	 t	 t
The capital accumulation equation is
144
K = (l-r)K +1t+i	 t t	 (4.3)
The firm is assumed to maximise the market value of the firm, which is
given by
V =E ' p1{7D _VNu+w )}
t. tL	 t t.	 t
J =0
(4.4)
where is the lemons premium associated with issuing new shares and p
and ' are, respectively, the discount factor (assumed constant over time
for expositional purposes) and the tax discrimination parameter between
dividends and retentions, defined as in chapters 2 and 3 as
(1-rn)	 (1-m)
p= 1+	 r	 and	 =(1-z)	 (1-z)(1-c)
where m is the marginal rate of personal income tax, z the marginal rate
of capital gains tax and c the imputation rate. Finally, it is assumed
that T1(K,I) is linear homogeneous and separable, and can therefore be
written as F(K)-G(I,K), where F is the production function and G is
the adjustment cost function. Further, G is assumed to have the
following functional form, familiar from the Q literature (see Summers
(1981)):
b	 I	 2I	 t	
1K	 (4.5)G(I t ,K)= --I
L	 tj t
where c is the rate of investment at which adjustment costs are zero and
is a stochastic error term. Introducing non-negativity equations on
new equity issues and dividend payments, VO and 	 with associated
multipliers	 and	 and denoting the multiplier associated with (4.3)
as xK, the first order condition for investment can be written as:
I	 1	 AK/(+X)_
Ptt - ____ _________
K	 b(1_A)	 (1-t)p	 }
(4.6)
where	 denotes the partial derivative of the agency cost function with
145
respect to cash f low2 . If it is further assumed that the agency cost
function is linear homogeneous, it is possible to show that the
following relationship holds (this is equivalent to the usual equality
between average and marginal Q first derived by Hayashi
(1982))
	
XKK (1-a) + ABB + ALL = V	 (4.7)
tt	 tt	 tt	 t
where AB and A are the shadow values of debt and liquid assets
respectively. If the firm is on its optimal path, it is possible to show
that A=- (r+ii ) and A = (f+g.L). If positive dividends are paid, as is
almost always the case in our sample, then g.t=O. Using this result in
(4.7) and taking a first order approximation of (4.6) around sample
averages or steady state values we can write:
I	 X	 B	 L
t
41 p K )
	
(4.8)
K 01t2(P K )	 3(pK ) +tt	 tt	 I.t
where
Pt
___________ - ______
	 (4.9)
t	 (1-a)K(1-t)p	 (1-t)p
The coefficients, denoting sample averages or steady state values by
bars, are:
	
hr	 in;
1	 JAx,x,K	 X,L/K
	b(1-A )
	
-	 -	 4	 -	 ( 4.10)
	
x	
1-A	 1-A	 1-A
	
x	 x	 x
where subscripts again denote partial derivatives.
This suggests that the coefficient of average Q, le.	
, 
reflects both
the adjustment cost parameter b and the derivative of the agency cost
is important here that cash flow is defined net of adjustment costs.
If cash flow is defined gross of adjustment costs, then agency coswts of
debt do not depend on I, and the investment equation is identical to the
basic Q model, with A=0.
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function with respect to cash flow. The coefficient of cash flow, ie.
Is positive if A as is reasonable to assume (ie. increasing
cash flow reduces agency costs at a decreasing rate). The coefficient
increases with the average investment rate. It also depends upon average
ratios of cash flow, debt and liquid assets to the capital stock.
Similar comments apply to the coefficients of B/K and L/K ie. and I3
respectively, the signs of which depend on the cross partial derivatives
of A. If the agency cost function is additively separable in the pairs
(X, K), (B, K) and CL, K), the last two regressors can be omitted and
the coefficient of X/K depends only upon the average cash flow to
beginning of period capital stock ratio (in addition to the investment
rate). Unless more specific assumptions are made about the functional
form of A little can be said a priori regarding its effect on the size
of the coefficient and this is a source of ambiguity in forecasting the
expected strength of the effect of cash flow, debt and liquid assets on
investment for different types of firms.
Aside from this ambiguity, the agency cost function may be displaced
upward or downward by a multiplicative cnstant which is specific for
each group of firms and therefore varies according to size, age and
sector. An increase in the constant unambiguously increases the
coefficient of cash flow, debt and liquid assets.
It has so far been assumed that positive dividends are being paid,
because the data show that this occurs most of the time. In this case
the first order condition on new shares issues implies that
If	 is independent of	 as in Fazzari et al. (1988), then, within the
context of this model it is necessary to assume that i+w, otherwise
it would pay to finance continuous new dividend distributions by issuing
new shares. Of course, the possibility that this condition might not
hold was discussed extensively in Chapter 2 and will not be repeated
here, except to note that the possibility of ACT exhaustion rules out
such an arbitrage.
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4.3 Intra-Firm Differences in Financing, Investment and Profitability in
the UK
The discussion above Implied that there are several reasons why one
might expect the location of the agency cost function to differ across
firms. Given its location, the expectation of the relative effect of
financial factors on investment would also depend on their relative
investment rates, and their cash flow, debt and other liquid assets
relative to their capital stock. This section presents some evidence on
the relative sizes of these ratios and more generally on firms'
characteristics according to size, age and whether they operate in a
growing or declining sector.
Table 4. 1 presents some summary statistics when each observation on each
firm is classified into one of three size categories according to the
real value of the capital stock (1980 prices) at the beginning of the
preceding period (p'K, where p' is the 1980 price). The observation
is classified as small if p'K	 is less than £6 million, medium if
p'K is between £6 million and £50 million, and large if p'K2 Is
above £50 million. Note that as a firm grows, it may move from one group
to another. As explained in the next section, the sample is split
according to the size of p'K in order to minimise problems of
endogenous selection in estimation3. The table indicates that investment
and cash flow, each as a percentage of the end of period capital stock,
decrease with size. This Is particularly true of cash flow, with small
firms generating a return of 18% compared to only 11% for large firms.
Ceteris paribus, the existence of higher cash flows for small firms
makes it less likely that they will face financial constraints. The
dividend payout ratio is higher for larger firms, although this appears
to be mainly due to the fact that depreciation (the difference between
cash flow and profit) represents a higher proportion of cash flow for
large firms; the average dividend to cash flow ratio is remarkably
constant across the three size categories. The frequency with which
dividends are paid increases with size, but even for small firms
31n order to allow for any distortion to these results arising from
measurement error in K, a similar split was performed using the real
value of sales two periods earlier as a measure of size. The results
were very similar.
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however, the average dividend payout ratio is approximately 34% and
dividends are paid 89% of the time.
Table 4.1 Description of the sample split by size
Case 1 pK < £6mt-2
Case 2 £6m < pK < £50mt-2
Case 3 pK > £50mt-2
No of observations
Investment/Capital Stock
Sales/Capital stock
Cash flow/Capital stock
Profit/Capital stock
Dividends/Cash flow
Dividends/Profit
Investment/Total funds1
Retentions/Total funds
New Equity/Total funds
Change in long term debt/Total funds
Change in short term debt/Total funds
Change in bank debt/Total finds
Long term debt/Market value
Interest paid/i Interest+cash flow)
Current asets /Capital stock
Average Q
Std deviation of real sales growth
Frequency of dividend payments
Frequency of new equity issues
Case 1
2681
13. 4
318. 8
17.8
12. 4
23. 3
33. 5
66. 4
67.9
13. 2
5. 7
13. 2
12. 1
7.6
16. 6
24. 5
-0. 13
16. 1
89. 2
13. 6
Case 2
3966
11. 1
232. 9
13.6
8. 8
23. 8
36.6
70. 0
65. 5
14.8
7. 8
11.9
10.8
12. 5
18. 1
20. 6
-0. 19
15. 4
94. 5
27. 5
percent
Case 3
2059
10. 2
170. 8
11.4
6. 6
22.4
38.7
78.3
68. 0
12.3
13.3
6.5
5.2
23.3
20.3
23. 2
0.11
12.7
97.5
49.8
Notes:
1. Total funds are the sum of retentions, new equity and the change in
long term and short term debt.
2. "Market value" is taken as the market value of equity plus the book
value of debt.
3. Current assets comprise inventories and work in progress, financial
investments, the stock of cash and trade debtors less trade creditors
and other short term liabilities (excluding short term debt).
4. Q is defined in equation (4). Vt is measured at the beginning of the
period.
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Prima fade evidence that internal sources of finance are preferred to
external sources is represented by the fact that investment is financed
mainly through retentions, which constitutes about 67'/. of the total
sources of funds. Perhaps surprisingly, the proportion of funds raised
from retentions by large firms is almost identical to that raised by
small firms. New equity varies between 12 and 15% of total new funds4.
The frequency of new share issues increases with size. The lower
frequency of new equity issues for small firms is consistent with the
observation that flotation and underwriting costs are an decreasing
function of the value of the issue.
Long term debt represents a small percentage of investment finance
especially for smaller firms. This suggests that It Is expensive for
small firms to rely on market debt. Note, however, that the percentage
of new finance derived from short term debt (with maturity of less than
one year) is greater for smaller firms. The vast majority of their short
term debt is provided by banks. This indicates that the difficulty of
borrowing In the open market may be partly relieved by the ability to
orrow from Institutions that can more easily monitor the borrower
through a continuing relationship. It is not clear, however, that the
duration of bank debt matches the requirements imposed by investment
projects that will provide a return over a long period of time.
A final piece of interesting evidence from Table 4.1 is that the
standard deviation of real sales growth falls with size although this
effect is not very large. The slightly higher figure for small firms may
be reflected in the relatively high ratio of current assets to the
capital stock, in that such firms may find it useful to maintain a
sizable reserve of liquid assets in order to buffer the volatility of
sales revenues and to avoid being forced to borrow on unfavourable
terms. Moreover, this ratio is one of the indices commonly used by
lenders to judge the credit worthiness of potential borrowers. Another
indicator of the ability to meet financial obligations is the ratio of
interest payments to cash flow, which is smaller for smaller firms. By
Siayer (1988) claims that the proportion of funds raised from new share
issues is somewhat lower, although our figures appear to be reasonably
in line with official statistics (DTI Business Monitor, MA3).
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presenting a healthy liquid asset position firms may be able to reduce
the cost of borrowing.
Table 4.2 presents some independent evidence on the degree to which
financial factors are perceived to influence the investment decision of
different sizes of firms. The figures are taken from the quarterly
survey of UK manufacturing industry conducted by the Confederation of
British Industry. It indicates that over the period 1981 to 1986
virtually a third of the respondents cited some financial factor as
constraining their investment (although it is hard to distinguish the
Table 4.2 Evidence from CBI Industrial Trends Survey of UK Manufacturing
companies
Average response to the question: "What factors are likely to limit
(wholly or partly) your capital expenditure authorisations over the next
12 months?" over the period 1981 to 1986 (24 quarterly surveys)
Percent
Size by number of employees
Whole 0-199 200-499 500_4999 >5000
Sample_______ _______ _______ _____
Inadequate net return
on proposed investment	 39. 5	 26. 3
	 38. 5
	
41.7
	
46. 5
Shortage of internal finance	 21. 2
	
15. 4
	
15. 5
	
8. 5
	
29. 2
Inability to raise external
finance	 2. 6
	
3. 0
	
2. 3
	
2. 1
	
2. 9
Cost of finance	 8. 5
	
10. 6
	
8. 5
	
8. 0
	
8. 4
Uncertainty about demand 	 46. 3
	
56.7
	
52.8
	
48.2
	
36.9
Shortage of labour1
	
3. 1
	
3. 7
	
3. 5
	
2.4
	
3. 1
Other	 2. 3
	
2. 0
	
2. 8
	
2. 4
	
2. 4
N/A	 12.2	 14. 2
	
9. 6
	
10.3
	
13. 4
Notes:
1. Including manual and technical staff
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Case 1
773
14.4
282. 5
18.0
12. 3
23.6
34.5
72. 3
69.0
15. 3
5. 9
9.8
9.3
10.1
17. 4
13.2
0.82
17. 1
95. 5
24. 1
three questions related to financial factors). The most striking feature
of the table is, however, the proportion of the largest firms which
cited "shortage of internal finance" as a significant constraint on
5
their investment. While the sample of firms in this category is low
this does suggest that very large firms may face financial constraints.
The table suggests, however, that slightly less large firms (in the
third category) face somewhat lower financial constraints.
Table 4.3 Description of the sample split by size and age
Case 1 pK2 < £50m; less than 12 years since first quotation
Case 2 PK2 < £50m; more than 12 years since first quotation
No of observations
Investment/Capital Stock
Sales/Capital stock
Cash flow/Capital stock
Profit/Capital stock
Dividends/Cash flow
Dividends/Profit	
1Investment/Total funds
Retentions/Total funds
New Equity/Total funds
Change in long term debt/Total funds
Change in short term debt/Total fund
Change in bank debt/Total fnds
Long term debt/Market value
Interest paid/Interest+cash flow)
Current assets /Capital stock
Average Q4
Std deviation of real sales growth
Frequency of dividend payments
Frequency of new equity issues
percent
Case 2
5874
11.0
238. 0
13.6
8. 9
23. 7
36.4
69. 2
65. 5
14.5
7.7
12. 3
11.1
12.2
18. 0
21.8
-0.30
15.6
92. 0
21.6
Notes: See notes to Table 4. 1
5Between 25 and 60 out of a sample of around 1250.
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Within this age category, new companies have a higher investment rate
and cash flow. The payout ratio is fairly stable across the two
categories. Younger firms make greater use of retentions, and also
derive a slightly larger fraction of new funds from new share issues.
The higher profitablility and investment of new companies is reflected
in a higher value of Q. There Is little variation in the standard
deviation of sales growth, thus suggesting that sales volatility does
not depend to any great extent on firm age.
Another dimension that has a potential bearing on investment and
financing decisions, especially in the presence of asymmetric
Information, is the firm's age. Although accounting data do not include
information on each firm's age, it is known when firms went public.
Table 4.3 distinguishes between observations on companies that have been
quoted for at least 12 years and observations on companies that have
been quoted for less than 12 years. This table examines only small and
medium sized firms (ie. p K	 less than £50 million). Since larger
-	 t-2 t-1
firms are almost exclusively more than 12 years since their first
quotation, they would all fall into the "old" category. By concentrating
on the remainder, we consider firms which, apart from age, are more
nearly alike.
4.4 .Exnpirical Results
We turn now to estimating equation (4.8) for the entire sample. Many of
the econometric issues involved in estimating this equation have been
discussed at length in chapter 2 and only a cursory discussion Is given
here. We wish to allow for the possibility of time specific and firm
specific effects. Introducing the subscript i to distinguish companies,
we therefore wish to estimate
[J =	 + Q +It	 0	 1 It	 2 [)	 +	 +	 +	 +a +v	 (4. 11)4IpKI	 i t itit	 It	 'it
The stochastic term, v, arises from disturbances to the adjustment
cost function, as In the standard Q model. There Is nothing in the
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theory which restricts this term to be an innovation error, and indeed,
as discussed in chapter 2, in the standard Q model vit appears to follow
an AR(1) process. To allow for the possibility that this is true also of
the extended model shown in (4.11), lagged values of the dependent
variable and of each regressor are included in the equation (the model
is again estimated without Imposing the common factor restriction). The
lagged values may, of course, also reflect the ambiguities involved in
choosing the timing of the various variables.
The model is again estimated in first differences to allow for firm
specific, time invariant effects and an instrumental variable procedure
is used to allow for the endogeneity of the regressors. This endogeneity
arises because current cash flow, debt, current assets, Q and investment
may all be simultaneously determined (although Q, unlike the other
variables, is constructed by dating it at the beginning of the period).
In addition, care must be taken to allow for the possibility of
measurement error, particularly in Q. For reasons discussed in chapter
2, a GMM estimator is used, and the instrument set used is denoted in
the form eg. Q(n,m), where n indicates that the latest lag used is dated
t-n, and m indicates the number of lags used.
Column 1 of Table 4.4 presents the estimated coefficients for the
equation containing, in addition to Q and lagged Investment, both flow
and stock measures of liquidity and the stock of debt 6. Time dummies are
included as regressors and instruments in all equations. The results
suggest that contemporaneous Q remains a significant determinant of
investment despite the inclusion of the other terms, although the size
of its coefficient remains small. Cash flow, especially dated t-1, plays
an important role with a large coefficient. The coefficient on
contemporaneous debt is negative and significant, as one would expect if
an increase in cash flow decreases the marginal agency cost of debt,so
that AXBIX<O (see (4.10)). The stock of liquid assets does not play a
significant role in this equation. Dropping liquid assets from the model
In column 1 has very little effect on the other terms in the equation.
6Experiments have also been undertaken to assess the effect of
alternative empirical measures of '. The results do not appear to be
sensitive to alternative measures. The tables report the results for
=1.
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These results are generally robust to variations in the instrument set.
The equation does not exhibit second order serial correlation (see the
M2 statistic) which would invalidate the instrument set. Moreover, the
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the
instruments are not correlated with the error term. As in chapter 2, If
Q is Included in the Instrument set (the most recent value of Q used
in the Instrument set In column 1 is dated t-2), the coefficient on
contemporaneous Q falls, which Is consistent with the possibility that
downwards bias due to measurement error in Q outweighs any upward bias
7due to the possible endogeneity of Q . This result Is also found when
the same comparison is made for the other equations presented below, and
so	 is generally excluded from the instrument set.
The positive effect of the lagged investment rate and the negative
coefficient on the lagged Q term are consistent with an AR(1) error term
In the underlying equation. However, the positive coefficients on both
the cash flow terms is inconsistent with this explanation of the dynamic
structure. (Replacing (X/pK) with (X/pK)2 provides a result
consistent with the AR(1) process although this would imply that lagged
cash flow, not current cash flow, should be in the specification In
equation (4.8)). This suggests that the timing of the impact of cash
flow In investment is more complex than suggested by the model in
section 4.2. Intuitively, the significance of lagged cash flow may be
explained if external investors may observe only cash flow in the
previous period, or, more generally, may judge the firm's credit
worthiness using a weighted average of past cash flows.
Column 2 of Table 4.4 explores what happens when debt Is excluded from
the model (debt is rarely significant in the subsamples of the data
examined below, which may be mainly due to the fact that less data Is
available). The positive effect of contemporaneous cash flow disappears
in the absence of the negative effect of contemporaneous debt, while
7As suggested in chapter 2, including Q
	
in the instrument set may
also introduce bias since it also appears as a regressor in the
dlfferenced equation, although in later tables the first differenced
is omitted since it is not significant for subsamples of the data.
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Table 4.4 The Full Sample
Dependent Variable A(I/K)1
	
Period 1972-1986
A (I /K)
AQ
AQ1
A (X/K)
A (X/K) t-1
A (B/pK)
A(B/pK)1
A (L/PK)
A(L/pK)1
1
0. 1896
(0.0306)
0. 0180
(0. 0051)
-0. 0044
(0.0019)
0.1168
(0.0788)
0. 1584
(0.0582)
-0. 0772
(0.0300)
0. 0581
(0.0418)
-0. 0149
(0.0130)
0.0153
(0.0138)
2
0. 1896
(0. 0286)
0. 0166
(0.0079)
-0. 0039
(0.0025)
-0.0086
(0. 1494)
0. 2309
(0.0894)
3
0. 1907
CO. 0284 )
0. 0158
(0.0074)
-0. 0036
(0.0023)
0. 0481
(0. 1180)
0. 2179
(0.0798)
A(Y/pK)	 -	 -	 -0.0059tl	 (0. 0043)
A(Y/pK)	 -	 -	 0. 0023t	 (0. 0033)
m2	 -1.26	 -1.17
WT	 52.1 (15)
	
49.5 (15)
	
96.5 (15)
Sargan	 59.0 (72)
	
97.7 (72)
	
51.1 (72)
Instruments	 Q(2,2),X/pK(2,1)	 I/K(2,1),Q(2,2)	 I/K(2,1)Q(2,2)
	
B/pk(2,1),	 X/pK(2,1)	 X/pK(2,1)
	
t-2'11Kt-3	
Y/pK(2,1)	 Y/pK(2,1)
L/K , L/Kt-2	 t-3
Notes.
1. Time dummies are included in all equations.
2. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard
errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to
heteroscedasticity across companies.
3. m2 is a test for second_order serial correlation in the residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial
correlation. See Arellano and Bond (1988).
4. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over_identifying restrictions,
asymptotically distributed as x (k).
5. W is a Wald test of the 4oint significance of the time dummies,
asymptotically distributed as x (k), under the null of no significance.
6. The instrument sets are explained in the text.
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lagged cash flow becomes more important. The coefficient on current Q
falls slightly.
In Column 3 lagged and twice lagged output as a proportion of the
replacement value of the capital stock is added to this specification
(contemporaneous output is not significant). Their coefficients are
neither individually nor jointly significant. However, note that the
negative coefficient on current output is consistent with the presence
of imperfect competition, which introduces an additional wedge between
marginal and average Q, which depends on the present value of current
and future output 8. The wedge captures the loss of monopoly profits due
to the decrease in price associated with the additional output produced
by new investment. Adding output to the equation to some extent proxies
for the wedge, and therefore we would expect a negative coefficient9.
This issue is explored further below for different subsamples of the
data.
The presence of output in the equation has little effect on the
coefficient of lagged cash flow. Its remaining significance suggests
that even if cash flow is to some extent proxying for demand, this is
not the main reason for its importance. The principal model investigated
below is a parsimonious version of column 2 of Table 4, dropping lagged
Q and current cash flow (which are individually and jointly
insignificant). The size and significance of the other variables is
virtually unchanged when these two terms are omitted.
One reason for the significance of cash flow is that it may be a better
8More precisely, omitting debt, liquid assets and taxes, it can be shown
that
I
	
v -:	
(l+R)ip
t+t t+i
	
1=1	 t+i
t (1-6) K
t
where c	 is the elasticity of demand.
t+ I
9However, if the equation were estimated in a quasi-differenced form, as
suggested by Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1988), the contemporaneous
investment rate, given 'scaled' past investment should be positively
related to (V/K). When this variable is added to the specification in
column 2 on its own, it is rarely significant (depending on the
instrument set used).
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proxy for market fundamentals than the market value of the firm and
entrepreneurs may respond only to fundamentals (Blanchard et al., 1988).
In this case one would expect that during periods of potential
speculative bubbles or fads in the stock market, the coefficient for Q
and cash flow should be different, compared with other periods. In
particular one may expect that Q matters less relative to cash flow In
such periods. It is obviously difficult to Identify unambiguously when
bubbles or fads caused share prices to be a poor reflection of
fundamentals. During the period available in the data, the years between
1981 and 1986 are possible candidates; average price-earnings ratios
have been consistently higher from 1981 onwards then over the previous
10 years. While this may, of course, simply reflect more optimistic
expectations, this may also reflect the existence of a bubble.
The specification used below, for example in Table 5, has therefore been
re-estimated allowing all of the slope coefficients to differ between
the two subperiods. However, there is not strong evidence of a
structural break. The Wald test statistic for the joint significance of
the three additional terms (each variable interacted with a dummy equal
to 1 for the period 1981 to 1986 and 0 otherwise) is 6.83 (compared with
a critical value of 7.81 at the 5% significance level). In addition, the
coefficient on lagged cash flow for the whole period was 0.2951 (with
standard error 0.0462), while that for the additional variable lagged
cash flow from 1981 to 1986 only was -0.0982 (with standard error of
0.0607). If Q is included in the instrument set, the three additional
terms become jointly significant (with a Wald statistic of 15.3). The
same pattern arises for the cash flow terms, and additionally in this
case, the coefficient on Q from 1981 to 1986 only is positive and
significant. Any support for a structural break which might be found in
these results would therefore be in the opposite direction to what would
be expected if cash flow were merely proxying for market fundamentals.
Rather, it seems that in the relative boom years of the 1980s firms were
simply less financially constrained and hence cash flow was less
Important. The asymmetric effect of cash flow on investment during booms
and recessions is emphasised by Gertler and Hubbard (1988). Of course,
it may be that cash flow proxies both for market fundamentals and
financial constraints, but that the change in the latter dominate in the
1980s. This is an issue that deserves further investigation. However
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these initial results suggest that fads and bubbles are not the key
explanation as to why cash flow Is significantly related to investment.
The arguments in the previous section suggest that cash flow and other
financial variables may have a differential impact across different
types of firms. In Table 4.5 we present the results on the effect on
cash flow for firms of three different sizes ("small", "medium" and
"large"). We also consider "very large" firms (which are a subset of the
Table 4.5 Split by Size
Dependent Variable
Case 1 p'K	 < £6mt-1
Case 2 £6m < p'K	 < £50mt-1
Case 3 p'K	 > £50mt-1
Case 4 p'K	 > £lOOmt-1
Case 1	 Case 2
	
Case 3	 Case 4
Number of firms 	 311	 403
	
164	 112
Number of observations	 1709	 3111
	
1726	 1140
A(I/K) i,t-1
AQ1
A (X/K) i,t-1
m2
WT
Sargan
Instruments
0. 1723
(0.0485)
0.0011
(0.0052)
0. 2275
(0. 0413)
-2. 14
67.3 (15)
82.1 (72)
0. 1550
(0. 0355)
0. 0144
(0. 0082)
0. 2263
(0. 0385)
-0. 52
67.1 (15)
89.4 (72)
0. 1056
(0. 0493)
0. 0188
(0. 0101)
0. 3163
(0.0667)
-0. 18
38.0 (15)
85.0 (72)
0. 1032
(0.0480)
0. 0085
(0.0058)
0. 4050
(0.1113)
0.03
59.7 (15)
73.8 (72)
I/K(2,1), Q(2,2), X/pK(2,1), Y/pK(2,1)
Notes. See notes to Table 4.4.
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group of "large" firms). Note that observations are classified according
to the real value (1980 prices) of the capital stock at the end of time
t-2, p'K (where p' is the price of capital goods in 1980). Under the
assumption that the error term in the levels equation is not serially
correlated, p'K 1 is predetermined with respect to the error term in
the differenced equation. Current assets were not significant when added
to the various equations. In addition, current cash flow and further
lags of cash flow and Q were generally insignificant when added to the
equations presented.
Consider, first, cases 1, 2 and 3. The coefficient on cash flow Is
significant for all classes of firms. Perhaps surprisingly, it is
greater for large firms, although there is not a statistically
significant difference between the coefficients for large and small
firms at normal significance levels (the t-statlstic for the
10
significance of the difference between the two coefficients is 1.13)
The coefficient and the significance of current Q increases across the
size categories; for small firms Q appears to have no impact on
investment, while for large firms, the coefficient on Q is much
greater 11 . Given the increasing coefficient on cash flow as size
increases, it is also worth considering whether the impact of cash flow
for large firms Is dominated by very large firms. The results shown in
case 4 show that this may be the case; although the coefficient on cash
flow for very large firms is less precisely determined (as would be
expected since there are fewer observations), the point estimate Is
considerably higher even than that for 'large' firms and the
significance of the difference between it and that for small firms is
slightly higher (with a t-statistic of 1.50).
These qualitative results are invariant to alternative instrument sets.
100n the assumption that the error terms are independent across the two
categories, the appropriate standard error is simply the square root of
the sum of the squares of the two standard errors on the two
coefficients. This allows a simple t-test to be performed on the
difference between the coefficients.
11 This also suggests that cash flow is not significant merely because it
is a better proxy for expectations of future prospects than Q: Q has a
more significant impact for large firms, yet the coefficient on cash
flow is also higher for these firms.
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However, the significance of both the Q and cash flow does vary with the
instrument set. In particular, if is included in the instrument
set, current Q is statistically significant for medium, large and very
large firms although the estimated coefficients are slightly lower. In
addition, the differences between the cash flow coefficients are more
significant (with t_statistics of 1.68 for the difference between small
and large firms and 1.88 for the difference between small and very large
firms).
With one main exception, adding other regressors has little impact on
the coefficients and standard errors presented in Table 5. The exception
occurs when current output is added to the model for large firms. The
coefficient on current output for large firms is -0.0106 with standard
error 0.0026. Its negative sign is again consistent with the possibility
that output is reflecting the existence of imperfect competition since
large firms are more likely to be in a position to exploit the benefits
of monopolistic competition. The coefficient on current cash flow for
large firms increases substantially when current output Is included,
although it is less precisely estimated. Current debt also has a
negative sign but is not significant when added to the models in Table
4.5. Adding debt tends to increase the difference in the coefficients on
cash flow between case 1 and case 3 firms, although their standard
errors also increase.
In the context of the model described in the section 4.2, the size of
the coefficient on cash flow for large firms cannot be accounted for by
a higher investment rate of large firms (see (4.10)), because it Is, in
fact, lower. It could be explained by the lower cash flow/capital ratio
that characterises larger firms, if the coefficient of cash flow
decreases with this ratio. It is easy to find parameterisations of the
agency cost function that yield this result 12. This factor may be
dominant since differences in the investment rate are not very large and
12This would be the case, for example, if, ignoring liquid assets
A__{_a(X/K)X+b(B/K)}K, where 0<<1, or if
A={(X/'K)a(B/K)}, where a<0.
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neither Is the difference in the riskiness as measured by the variance
of sales. It is also possible that the differential according to size
may capture Industry effects. Finally, it is possible that, ceteris
parlbus, agency costs may be more severe when insiders effectively
controlling the firm hold a lower fraction of the equity and/or outside
equity holdings are more dispersed. Size may proxy for the effect of
these factors on the severity of the incentive problems.
Two criticisms might be made with regard to splitting firms according to
the replacement cost value of the capital stock two periods ago. One Is
that there may remain some endogeneity introduced by serial correlation
In the error term (although the results do not suggest such a
correlation). The second is that whatever effects size is proxylng for,
an alternative would be to split by the size of a firm relative to the
size of other firms in the industry in which that firm operates. Thus a
"small" firm overall may seem larger relative to other firms in its own
industry. To meet these possible criticisms, two other sample splits
have been considered. Firstly, firms are split simply according to their
initial size (that is, their size, in 1980 prices, when they first
entered the database). Of course, this takes no account of the rate of
growth of a firm since it entered the database, and possibly as a
result, there is much less variation in the value of the cash flow
coefficient between different size classes of firms measured by initial
size.
Secondly, however, in Table 4.6, we present the results of splitting
firms according to their initial size relative to that of other firms in
their industry which are also in the database; again, the comparison Is
made in 1980 prices. Thus, case 1 firms are among the smallest 75% of
firms In their industry measured by initial size and case 2 firms are
among the largest 25%. It is clear from the table that the results
concerning cash flow are similar to those in Table 5 (indeed the size
and significance of the difference across the two categories is greater
in Table 4.6; the t-statistic on the difference between the two cash
flow coefficients is 1.84). By contrast, however, Q appears more
Important for the smaller firms. This latter result may be partly due to
grouping together all "non-large" firms in the first column.
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Table 4.6 SplIt by Initial Size relative to Distribution of Industry
Initial Size
Dependent Variable A(I/K)
Case 1 p'K0 within smallest 75% of firms in the same industry
Case 2 p'K0 within largest 25% of firms in the same industry
Case 1
	
Case 2
Number of firms
Number of observations
A(I/K) i,t-1
AQI,t
A (X/K) 1,t-1
m2
WT
Sargan
Instruments
4530
541
0. 1741
(0.0325)
0. 0130
(0.0082)
0. 2303
(0. 0293)
-1.67
96.9 (15)
102.0 (72)
2016
179
0. 1782
(0. 0546)
0. 0060
(0.0032)
0.3613
(0.0648)
-0.33
38.5 (15)
85.1 (72)
I/K(2,1), Q(2,2), X/pK(2,1), Y/pK(2,1)
Notes. See notes to Table 4.4
Table 4.7 takes the issue of examining the effects of size while
controlling for industry one stage further by exploring the distinction
between growing and declining sectors. The reason for this is that it is
intuitively more probable that companies in declining sectors may face
financial distress. The second hand market for capital goods is likely
to be less active, the liquidation value of assets to be smaller and,
therefore, the cost of financial problems greater. Here the two size
categories are used, p'K <(lOm and p'K1>10m. Within each category,
companies are divided according to whether they are in a growing or
declining sector. Due to the small number of observations in some of the
categories, parameters are estimated with less precision than in other
tables. As can be seen from Table 4.7, It remains the case that larger
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companies have higher coefficients on the cash flow term. This is true
both for companies in growing sectors and companies in declining
sectors. However, the impact of size appears to be reduced when the
sector is taken into account.
Table 4.7 Split by Size and Sector
Dependent Variable A(I/K)
Case 1 p'K1 < LiOm; growing sectors
Case 2 p'K1 < LiOm; declining sectors
Case 3 P'K1 > LiOm; growing sectors
Case 4 p'K	 > LiOm; declining sectors
Case 1
	
Case 2	 Case 3	 Case 4
Number of firms
Number of observations
MI/K) i,t-1
AQ1
A (X/K)
m2
WT
Sargan
Instruments
157
859
0. 2222
(0. 0674)
0. 0086
(0.0080)
0.2719
(0.0648)
-3. 05
39.8 (15)
67.1 (72)
298
1775
0. 1246
(0. 0454)
0. 0142
(0. 0056)
0. 1786
(0. 0400)
-1.24
55.8 (15)
85.8 (72)
132
1356
0.0614
(0. 0613)
0. 0299
(0.0145)
0. 3234
(0. 0683)
-0.66
30.9 (15)
82.2 (72)
279
2556
0. 1149
(0.0413)
0. 0061
(0.0030)
0. 2055
(0. 0433)
0.02
48.5 (15)
89.3 (72)
I/K(2,1), Q(2,2), X/pK(2,1), Y/pK(2,1)
Notes.
1.See notes to Table 4.4
2. Growing sectors are: chemicals and man-made fibres, electrical and
instrument engineering and food, drink and tobacco. Declining sectors
are: metals and metal goods, other minerals and mineral products,
mechanical engineering, motor vehicles and parts and other transport
equipment, textiles, clothing, leather and footwear and other
industries.
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The perhaps surprising result from Table 4.7 is that the coefficient on
cash flow is greater for firms operating in growing sectors. This is
true even if the long run impact of cash flow is considered. This
result is not sensitive to the instrument set used. One explanation for
this effect may be that the lower investment rate of firms in declining
sectors dominates empirically their lower cash flow and their higher
agency costs which, ceteris paribus, would be expected to arise. The
table indicates that the impact of Q is mixed: among small firms it is
more important for firms in declining sectors but among large firms it
is more important for firms in growing sectors.
Table 4.8 Split by Size and Age
Dependent Variable
Case 1 pK	 < £50m; less than 12 years since first quotation
Case 2 pK2 < £50m; more than 12 years since first quotation
Case 1
	
Case 2
Number of firms
Number of observations
A(I/K) t,t-1
AQ1
A (X/K) I, t-1
m2
WT
Sargan
Instruments
99
450
0. 0935
(0.0610)
0. 0122
(0. 0099)
0. 2720
(0.0662)
-1.57
36.7 (15)
48.3 (72)
574
4370
0. 1939
(0.0342)
0. 0095
(0.0066)
0. 2242
(0.0302)
-0.97
88.4 (15)
100.7 (72)
I/K(2,1), Q(2,2), X/pK(2,1), Y/pK(2,1)
Notes. See notes to Table 4.4
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The final issue to be explored is the effect of age on the relevance of
cash flow. Table 4.8 reports the results obtained when, excluding large
firms, we distinguish between firms that have been quoted for more or
less than twelve years. Twelve years may seem rather long, but it is
imposed by the necessity of having enough observations in the "new"
firms category for the purposes of estimation. The results suggest that
cash flow is somewhat more important for new firms, although the
differences between the two categories are not large. Once again, it
should be noted that the category of new firms is very small, and that
the variables consequently tend to be less significant.
4.7 Conclusions
The results presented in this chapter suggest that in all cases cash
flow is significantly associated with investment. Stock measures of
liquidity do not play an important empirical role. The stock of debt
does appear to have a negative impact on investment, although the
significance of this term depends on the size of the sample. The
performance of Q is mixed. While it plays a significant role in the full
sample, there are subsamples, typically of small firms, in which it does
not appear to have an independent effect on investment. The results for
the full sample over different time periods suggest that the
significance of cash flow is not due solely to the fact that, in proxying
for demand, it is a better measure of fundamentals than Q, nor simply
that it contains new information not captured by beginning of period Q,
although more research is needed on this Issue.
Cash flow does appear to differ across firms in the magnitude of its
impact on investment. In particular, it appears to play a more important
role for large firms than for small firms. While this may be surprising
at first sight, there are several reasons why this effect might be
observed. For example, it may reflect the fact that large firms tend to
have a lower relative cash flow. In addition, it may reflect the
possibility that large firms have a more diverse ownership structure,
which tends to increase agency costs. Given size, the effect of cash
flow tends to be larger for firms in growing sectors, contrary to what
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one would expect since collateralizable net worth is likely to be larger
in this case and the risk of bankruptcy lower. However, firms in growing
sectors need to finance a higher rate of investment. Finally, when firms
are classified according to age, it appears that cash flow matters
somewhat more for newer firms, as would be expected since information
asymmetries are likely to be larger for such firms, and they need to
finance a higher investment rate.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF DATA
This appendix describes the calculation of the main variables used in
this thesis,and provides some summary statistics. There are two sources
of data for company information: company accounting records from
Datastream and share price and related data from the London Share Price
Database. A sample of 729 companies, whose principal activity was in
manufacturing was taken from those companies which could be Identified
as being available from both data sources. Companies were required to
have at least 4 continuous years of data. The companies were allocated
to 9 industry groups as shown in Table A.1.
Table A.1 Sample of companies by industry
Industry
1 Metals and metal goods
2 Other minerals and mineral products
3 Chemicals and man-made fibres
4 Mechanical engineering
5 Electrical and Instrument engineering
6 Motor vehicles, parts, other transport
7 Food, drink and tobacco
8 Textiles, clothing, leather and footwear
9 Other
SIC classes
21, 22, 31
23, 24
25,26
32, 33
34, 37
35,36
41,42
43, 44, 45
46,47,48,49
Number of
companies
43
34
54
162
87
27
76
128
118
Notes
1. 'Other' includes 'timber and wooden furniture', 'paper and
publishing', 'rubber and plastics' and 'other manufacturing'.
The number of years of data available for each of the companies is shown
in Table A.2.
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Table A.2 Sample of companies by period of data
Number of records per company	 Number of companies
	
4	 19
	
5	 13
	
6	 17
	
7	 22
	
8	 20
	
9	 35
	
10	 64
	
11	 174
	
12	 30
	
13	 44
	
14	 72
	
15	 88
	
16	 125
The variables used in the main part of this thesis were constructed as
follows; Datastream numbers are referred to as, for example, D435.
Investment: Total new fixed assets (D435). This item includes both
purchase of new assets and fixed assets of new subsidiaries: the split
between these two is rarely available.
Market value: An average price for the the three months preceding the
accounting year is constructed from monthly observations (on the last
day of trading in each month) on share prices from the London Share
Price Database. This average price is then multiplied by the total
number of issued shares at the beginning of the accounting year.
Adjustments sometimes need to be made for new share issues.
Output: A proxy is taken by using total sales from Datastream (DiOl),
deflated by the output price.
Cash Flow: This is a measure of the total funds available for investment
and distributions and is therefore defined as the sum of accounting
profit before dividends (D182) and the accounting depreciation charge
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(D136).
Debt: Long term debt is taken to include any loan with repayment due in
excess of one year (D321).
Replacement value of the capital stock: For most of the period
considered, accounts gave only historic cost information regarding the
value of the capital stock. Historic cost information on the historic
cost value of the capital stock split into plant and machinery (D328)
and buildings (D327) is first used to estimate the proportion of
investment in each category, as follows:
I P I	
HK-HKt	 t-i	 1
PtIt= PI4 HK1'-HK
	 It	 t-1	 t
lB	 I	 IP
p t I t = PI - pI
(A. 1)
(A.2)
where p' is the price of capital goods, us total investment, I is
investment in plant and machinery and I is investment in buildings, all
in period t, and HK1 is the historic cost value of plant and machinery
and HKR the historic cost value of buildings both at the end of period
The replacement cost value of the
perpetual inventory method, ie:
capital stock is calculated on a
P I I	 I P
RK p/p	 +pIt	 t-1 t t-1	 t
(A.3)
RK(1-63 )RK 1p/p 1 + p'I
where RK is the replacement cost value of the capital stock at the end
of period t,	 is the economic depreciation rate for plant and
machinery and is the economic depreciation rate for buildings.
Economic depreciation rates are taken from King and Fullerton (1984),
namely 8.19% for plant and machinery and 2.5% for buildings. This
method requires an initial valuation of the capital stock. For this an
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adjustment is made to the historic cost value in the first year of data,
multiplying by a factor reflecting price changes over the average life of
the capital stock (taken to be three years). This is similar to the
method used by King and Mairesse (1983), and also suggested by Wadhwani
and Wall (1986). To reduce the impact of this rather arbitrary
assumption on the estimates, the first three years of data (1968 to
1970) are excluded from the sample used in estimation.
Other assets: Other assets, including stocks and work in progress and
financial assets, must be included in the definition of Q; they must
either be deducted from the numerator of Q (so that the numerator is a
measure of the market value of the capital stock) or deducted
from the denominator (so that the denominator is a measure of the
replacement cost value of the entire company). Since we are concerned
here with the capital stock, these variables are deducted from the
numerator of Q.
Price indices: The output prices (p) are implicit value-added price
deflators for each of the 9 sectors of manufacturing industry. They were
constructed from current price GDP and constant price GDP figures
published by Industry in various Blue Books. The price of investment
goods (pt) was derived as an implicit price deflator for gross fixed
investment by manufacturing industry, taken from data in Economic Trends
Annual Supplement (1988).
Table A.3 presents some descriptive statistics of the relevant
variables. It shows (in two parts) the average value of each variable
across the whole of the sample in each year. The table closely follows
accounting conventions, dividing the variables according to where they
are found in company accounts. The second row of the table indicates how
many companies are available in each year. Note that there is a
significant jump in the size of the sample after 1975. This is because
this was the first year for which the London Share Price Database
provided the entire population of UK quoted companies. It should also be
noted that accounting records are Included in the average of the year in
which the accounting year end falls. All figures are in 1980 prices.
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79.8
34.3
5.0
6.4
7.3
33. 0
19. 0
13. 8
161.7
2. 5
9.7
5.8
1.9
7.7
81.3
33. 4
4.2
5.9
6.6
34. 5
17. 4
11. 1
157. 7
2. 3
9. 8
6.2
1.9
7. 9
82. 8
31.9
3. 2
4. 9
6.8
38. 8
15. 8
7.8
151.0
2. 1
9. 9
6. 4
1.9
8.0
88. 4
32.2
2. 9
4.9
6.9
56.4
15.0
5. 4
153. 1
2.3
10.4
6.8
2. 1
8.2
Table A.3(a) Variable means by year; Whole sample, 1973-1979 	 £m1980
Year	 1973	 1974	 1975	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979
No of companies	 374	 409	 431	 655	 673	 685	 693
Balance sheet assets
Capital stock	 113.7	 115.1	 114.9
Stock and WIP	 47.6	 56.4	 51.0
Intangible assets 13.4 	 12.0	 9.0
Financial assets	 11.5	 10.0	 9.2
Cash	 13.4	 17.7	 12.2
Balance sheet liabilities
Market value	 153.0	 114.6	 57.5
Long term debt	 35.9	 34.0	 29.6
Other liabilities 15.7	 17.5	 18.5
Profit and loss variables
Sales	 240.0	 256.2	 234.9
Interest paid	 3.8	 4.7	 4.3
Cash flow	 18.1	 17.1	 13.8
Profit	 11.1	 10.2	 7.9
Dividends	 3.7	 3.2	 2.8
Retentions	 14.4	 13.8	 11.0
Sources and uses of funds variables
New equity	 1.4	 0.4
	
1.7	 2.0	 1.5	 0.7	 1.1
New long term debt 3.4	 2.7
	
3.5	 2.2	 1.7	 1.0	 0.8
New short term debt 3.1 	 5.8	 -0.8	 -0.1	 0.5	 0.6	 1.4
New bank debt	 2.9	 5.9	 -0.9	 -0.1	 0.4	 0.5	 1.0
Investment	 22.2	 22.7
	
15.4	 11.9	 11.6	 10.2	 11.5
Other variable
Q	 1.6	 0.9	 -0.6	 -0.8	 -0.7	 -0.6	 -0.4
Notes
1. All variables are taken from Datastream accounting data apart from
market value and Q. The capital stock estimates (of the replacement
cost) are derived from the accounting data as described in the text.
2. All figures are in 1980 prices.
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102.3
29. 4
0. 7
5. 2
8. 3
109. 3
30.2
1.0
7. 0
9.4
117.7
29. 6
0. 9
6. 9
9. 4
129. 3
30. 1
1.3
7. 1
12. 2
	
48. 4
	 65.7
	
91.4
	 83. 8
	
13. 9
	
14. 6
	
15. 5
	
16. 8
	
6. 7
	
8. 2
	
8. 4
	
8. 9
153. 7
2. 6
9. 8
5.5
2. 0
7. 9
171.4
2.6
11.9
7. 1
2. 4
9. 5
178. 0
2. 9
12. 1
7. 1
2. 6
9. 5
186. 4
2.9
13.8
8.4
3. 1
10. 7
-0.5	 -0.3	 -0.2	 -0.1	 -0.2
0. 7
0.7
0. 7
0. 4
7. 5
1. 1
0. 8
0. 0
0. 0
8. 1
0. 8
0.7
1.3
1.1
9. 2
3. 0
1.5
0. 5
0. 5
10. 6
2.7
1.7
0.4
0. 5
11.9
Table A.3(b) Variable means by year; Whole sample, 1980-1986 	 £m1980
Year	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984	 1985	 1986
No of companies	 690	 673	 660	 639	 608	 565	 492
Balance sheet assets
Capital stock	 92.7	 96.4
	 98. 6
Stock and WIP	 31.4	 28.9
	
28.2
Intangible assets	 2.3	 1.4
	
1.0
Financial assets	 4.2	 4.4
	
4. 3
Cash	 5.4	 6.3
	
7. 1
Balance sheet liabilities
Market value	 43.5	 43.2
	
43. 1
Long term debt	 14. 1	 14. 1
	
13. 6
Other liabilities	 4.5	 4.2
	
4. 1
Profit and loss variables
Sales	 148.5	 145.5	 145.7
Interest paid	 2.8	 2.9	 2.9
Cash flow	 8.5	 7.9	 8.3
Profit	 4.9	 4.1	 4.3
DIvidends	 1.9	 1.8	 1.8
RetentIons	 6.6	 6.1	 6.5
Sources and uses of funds variables
New equity	 1.0	 0.9
New long term debt 1.3 	 1.3
New short term debt 1.8	 0.6
New bank debt	 0.9	 0.5
Investment	 9.4	 7.3
Other variable
Q-0.4	 -0.5
Notes
1.See notes to Table A.3(a).
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154. 5
58. 8
8. 6
12. 0
15. 0
162. 4
58. 8
7. 6
11.0
16. 1
165. 8
56. 3
5. 7
9.2
15. 0
178.8
57. 0
5. 1
8. 2
12. 9
	
60.4
	 66. 2
	
74. 5
	
106. 0
	
36. 7
	
35. 5
	
32. 1
	
30.3
	
25. 9
	
22. 3
	
15. 8
	
11.3
291.7
4. 6
18. 1
10. 5
3. 5
14. 6
294. 9
4. 4
18. 5
11.3
3. 6
15. 0
281.0
4. 0
18. 8
11.6
3. 5
15. 2
287. 9
4.3
20. 0
12. 8
4.0
16.0
	
4. 2
	
2. 9
	
1.2
	
1.7
	
4.4
	 3.9
	 2.0
	
1.2
	
0. 2
	
0. 5
	
1.4
	
2. 0
	
0. 1
	
0.3
	
1.4
	
1.0
	
23.4
	
22. 2
	
19.9
	
20.9
The variation In the size of the sample over time in Table A.3 makes it
difficult to assess the average movement of each variable over time.
Table A.4 therefore gives similar statistics for a balanced panel of 274
companies which have data for every year between 1973 and 1986.
Table A.4(a) Variable means by year; panel of 274 companies 1973-1979
£m1980
Year	 1973	 1974	 1975	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979
Balance sheet assets
Capital stock	 150.4	 150.1	 150.4
Stock and WIP	 55.4	 65.2	 59.5
Intangible assets 15.5 	 13.8	 10.4
Financial assets	 13.4	 12.4	 11.0
Cash	 17.2	 13.8	 12.1
Balance sheet liabilities
Market value	 195.5	 137.4	 73.6
Long term debt	 46.3	 43.6	 38.1
Other liabilities 20.6	 22.4	 23.5
Profit and loss variables
Sales	 298.1	 317.1	 289.6
Interest paid	 4.9	 5.9	 5.3
Cash flow	 23.1	 22.1	 17.8
Profit	 13.7	 13.0	 10.1
Dividends	 4.2	 3.9	 3.4
Retentions	 18.6	 18.2	 14.4
Sources and uses of funds variables
New equity	 1.8	 0.5	 2.4
New long term debt 4.5
	 3.6	 4.6
New short term debt 4.4
	 6.5	 -1.2
New bank debt
	 4.0	 6.3	 -1.2
Investment	 29.3	 28.7	 20.2
Other variable
Q	 1.4	 1.0	 -0.4	 -0.7	 -0.5	 -0.4	 -0.3
Notes
1. See notes to Table A.3(a).
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197. 9
9. 8
1.5
9. 8
14. 7
203. 8
13. 2
1.9
13. 2
16. 0
208.7
12. 1
1.6
12. 1
15. 0
216. 0
11.7
2.2
11.7
18. 1
	
87. 2
	
115.8
	
151.6
	
133. 0
	
27.0
	
26.4
	
26. 6
	
27. 6
	
13. 1
	
14. 9
	
14. 6
	
13. 9
280. 4
5. 0
18. 0
9. 8
3.5
14. 5
301.0
4.7
21. 0
12. 4
4. 2
16. 8
298. 4
4. 8
20.5
11.9
4. 5
16.0
293.7
4.6
22.0
13.4
5.0
17. 0
	
1.6
	
1.4
	
4.3
	
4. 4
	1.2
	 0. 5
	
2. 4
	
3.3
	
0. 1
	
2. 1
	 0.6
	
0.8
	
0. 0
	
1.7
	 0.7
	
0. 9
	17. 4
	
20. 8
	
23.3
	
25.5
0.0	 -0.1
-0.3	 -0.2
Table A.4(b) Variable means by year; panel of 274 companies 1980-1986
£m1980
Year	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984	 1985	 1986
Balance sheet assets
Capital stock	 186.7	 189.9	 192.9
Stock and WIP	 7.1	 8.2	 7.9
Intangible assets
	
3.7	 2.8	 1.7
Financial assets	 7.1	 8.2	 7.9
Cash	 10.9	 12.5	 13.7
Balance sheet liabilities
Market value	 85.4	 80.3	 78.8
Long term debt	 28.1	 28.5	 27.4
Other liabilities	 9.3	 9.2	 8.8
Profit and loss variables
Sales	 277.2	 268.9	 268.9
Interest paid
	 5.1	 5.4	 5.5
Cash flow	 16.7	 15.3	 15.6
Profit	 9.5	 7.9	 8.0
Dividends	 3.5	 3.3	 3.3
Retentions	 13.2	 12.0	 12.4
Sources and uses of funds variables
New equity	 2.2	 1.6	 1.3
New long term debt 2.3
	 3.2	 1.4
New short term debt 2.4
	 1.7	 1.2
New bank debt	 1.3	 0.8	 0.7
Investment	 20.1	 18.6	 16.3
Other variable
Q	 -0.3	 -0.4	 -0.4
Notes
1.See notes to Table A.3(a).
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APPENDIX B
THE UK CORPORATION TAX SYSTEM
This section describes in more detail the most important features of the
UK corporation tax system, and describes how they are treated by the
model briefly described in Chapter 1. The aim of the model is to provide
estimates of corporation tax and ACT liabilities for the sample of
companies considered, together with estimates of the relative size of
the various reliefs and allowances and estimates of the degree to which
companies in the data have faced either full tax exhaustion or ACT
exhaustion. None of this data is readily available from company
accounts. The main reason for the absence of tax liabilities is that
profit and loss statements include a provision for taxation which may
include "deferred" tax, rather than simply the tax due in the current
period. This deferred tax arose in particular because the generous
capital allowances of the 1970s and early 1980s exceeded the
depreciation rates normally charged in accounts. Accountants attempted
to estimate the tax that would have been due had capital allowance rates
equalled accounting depreciation rates, and this was the basis of the
charge against profit.
The approach taken is to apply, as far as possible, the actual rules of
the tax system to company accounting data on such items as profit,
investment and dividend payments. This approach has several benefits:
estimates of the importance of different provisions within the tax
system can be provided, and, in particular, estimates of the size of
losses carried forward and unrelieved ACT are made. In addition, the
model can be used to simulate the effects of tax reform, although in its
basic form, the model cannot make any allowance for behavioural change
as a result of reform. It is obvious that the model cannot fully
represent the whole of the corporation tax system - for example, only
two types of fixed asset are dealt with:plant and machinery and
industrial buildings. Thus, other assets with special regimes, such as
hotels, oil wells or motor vehicles are not treated separately. However,
modelling of such detailed parts of the tax system would be wholly
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unrealistic due to lack of data.
The model, and this description are divided into six parts,
corresponding to the main areas of the system. They are: capital
allowances, stock relief, taxable profit, ACT together with the
imputation system and income tax, double taxation relief and overseas
earnings, and the payments mechanism. In most of these cases, the model
mirrors the actual rules of the tax system as closely as possible. In
the last two areas, however, data problems or deviations in practice
from the precise rules of the sytem provide too great an obstacle for
such an approach. In these cases various estimates are made to overcome
the problems. In each part we outline the rules of the tax system and
provide an algebraic listing of the relevant parts of the model. A
complete variable listing is provided following the equations.
This section draws on Mayer and Morris (1982), which described an
earlier version of the corporation tax model. Various amendments have
been undertaken since the earlier paper. These have arisen partly
because of changes to the tax system and partly because of other
improvements which have been made in attempts to model the system more
precisely. The main changes from the earlier working paper are: the new
system of stock relief from 1981; various provisions arising out at the
1984 reforms; the modelling of payments and taxation of overseas
earnings; and, the extension of the losses carried back provisions. In
addition, parts of the model relating to investment grants and capital
gains have been dropped.
It should be mentioned that an implicit assumption needs to be made
regarding group relief. This is that any group of companies so arranges
its affairs in order to qualify for maximum relief in any year. This
means that losses in some companies can immediately be offset aginst
profits in other companies within the same group. This seems reasonable,
and is also the only assumption that could realistically be made given
that the data describes only company groups.
1. Capital Allowances
SInce 1945 there have been a wide variety of schemes within the tax
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system for encouraging investment in manufacturing industry. While some
incentives have taken the form of grants both national and restricted to
particular regions of the country, the tax system has had various tax
allowances, the main ones being in respect of investment in plant and
machinery and industrial buildings.
Considering first expenditure on plant and machinery, incentives have
included initial allowances, investment allowances, first-year
allowances and writing down allowances. The first three are a tax
deduction on a certain percentage of the initial capital expenditure,
which is treated as a deductible expense in computing taxable profits.
The only difference between them comes in the determination of writing
down allowances - the tax provisions for depreciation. In the case of
initial allowances and first-year allowances the expenditure on which
the depreciation provisions is based is computed net of the allowance,
whereas investment allowances are not subtracted from the purchase
price. Investment allowances operated in place of initial allowances
between 1954 and 1956 and in addition to investment allowances between
1959 and 1966 and during those periods the effective depreciation
provision was thus enhanced. In 1972, first-year allowances replaced
both investment and initial allowances, but they were phased out between
1984 and 1986. Below, IVAP denotes the rate of initial of first year
allowance on purchases of plant and machinery in period t and ITAP the
rate of investment allowance on purchases of plant and machinery in
period t.
Writing down allowances are determined by the tax depreciated value of
the investment in plant and machinery. An investment is viewed as
contributing to a pool of plant and machinery expenditure (PP) which is
depreciated at the rate assumed for tax purposes (d') and carried
forward to the next period. By applying the stipulated depreciation rate
to the pool of expenditure the writing down allowance is derived. If an
asset Is sold then a balancing charge is applied to the difference
between the tax written down value of the asset and the amount for which
it is sold. This will reduce the firm's initial and investment
allowances by the value of the sale over the amount carried forward in
the pool. The balancing charge thus presents no difficulty provided that
investment in plant and machinery is net of disposals. This is precisely
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the way in which it is recorded in acompany accounts.
Buildings have also enjoyed initial and investment allowances in the
post World War	 II	 period	 (at	 rates denoted	 ITAB	 and
IVAB. respectively). Depreciation allowances for buildings are
calculated on a straight-line basis over the life of the asset assumed
for tax purposes, denoted T. This life is computed net of initial
allowances but gross of investment allowances. Equations (B.1) to (B.5)
below describe the model calculations regarding capital allowances. A
full variable listing is given at the end of the Appendix.
a) Plant and Machinery:
CA = (IVAP + ITAP )
	
+ dPP
	
(B. 1)t	 t	 t t	 t t
pp = pp	 + IP(1 ITAP ) - d PP	 (B.2)t	 t-1	 t	 t	 t	 t-1
b) Buildings:
T
CAB = (IVAB +ITAB )1B + VdBIB
t	 t	 t t	 L	 ii1=1
for T t,
1-I TAB
whereT = ________
B
c) Total capital allowances:
CA = CA + CABt	 t	 t
(B.3)
(B.4)
2. Stock Relief
There were a variety of provisions for stock relief (sR) from its inception
in 1973 to its abandonment in 1984. The general structure remained
unchanged until 1981. During this period companies could treat as an
allowable expense the increase in the value of their stockholdlngs less
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a certain proportion () of their income 	 for that period. For the
years 1973
and 1974 this proportion was set at 10% but thereafter was increased to
15%. In the first two years income was defined as gross of capital
allowances but subsequently net of allowances.
Stock relief was not actually introduced until the Finance Act 1975,
where it was made retrospective for accounting years ending in 1973/4
and 1974/5. This raises problems for modelling when the relief actually
affected a firm's cash flow. There Is evidence that some relief was
received for mainstream tax payments In early 1975. However, the system
was not made permanent until 1976, and It is probable that many firms
claimed stock relief for earlier years only at this stage. These
problems relate to the payment, as opposed to the liability, of
mainstream CT, and are discussed in more detail below.
In the event of a fall in the value of stocks (Si) a company was liable
to a clawback on its previous relief. This, prior to 1979, was limited
to the lower of the previous relief unrecovered (URSR denotes relief in
period a unrecovered by period t) and the fall in the value of stocks
(S-S1). From 1979, however, relief given in 1973 and 1974 was deemed
unrecoverable and recoverable relief was restricted to a six year period
preceding the accounting year. T in equations (B.8) to (B.14) is thus
equal to 4 in 1979 and 5 in 1980. Earlier years' relief are recoved
before later years so that the series of equations (B.8) to (B.14)
determine the extent of any unrecovered stock relief and the amount of
clawback that can be recovered. In equation (B.6) clawback is then
diminished by the amount that remains unrecovered (USRCBT). In addition
post 1979 companies could defer the clawback less 5'!. of the opening
stock. This deferral is shown as DEFCB in (B.6).
The system was changed completely in November 1981. Stock relief was
then set at the opening value of stock less £2000, multiplied by the
increase in the all stocks index (ASI). Clawback and deferred clawback
were abolished, although any clawback already deferred remained payable.
Finally, stock relief was completely abolished in 1984, removing that
protection against inflation.
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a) 1973 to 1981:
SR = A. max[S -S -(TI -CA ),0]
t	 t t-1	 t	 t
+ (1-A)(S -s +USRCBT +r.IJEFCB )-DEFCB
	
(B.6)
t t-1	 t	 t	 t-1
where DEFCB = max[-(S--S1 + USRCBT + 0.05S), 0] 	 (B.7)
( iifs-s ?0I	 t t-1
and A =
0 ifS-S <0
( 0.1 if 1973	 t	 1974
=
	
0.15 if 1975 ' t	 1980
( 0 if t=1973 or t=1974
V =
1 if 1975	 t	 1980
	
( 0 if 1973	 t	 1978
r =
	
1 if 1979	 t	 1980
and USRCBT is computed from the following set of equations
URSR =max[URSRt1 + (1-A)(S -S )]t-T	 t-T	 t t-1
USRCB1=max[-(1-A)(S -s )-URSRt,0]t t-1	 t-T
URSR	 =max[URSRt1 - USRCB1, 01t-T+1	 t-T+1
USRCB2=max[USRCB1-URSRt1 , 01t-T+1
URSR	 max[URSRt1
 - USRCB(T-1), 0]t-1	 t-1
USRCBT=max [USRCB (T-1 ) -IJRSRt , 0]
URSR =ASRt	 t
(B.8)
(B.9)
(B. 10)
(B. 11)
(B. 12)
(B. 13)
(B. 14)
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( t-1973 if 1973't1978
where T =
t-1975 if 1979tS1978
b) 1981 to March 1984:
AS I
SR = (S -2,O00)(	 - 1) - r.DEFcB	 (B.15)t	 t-i	 ASI	 t-i
1	 1ft1982
where r = { 0 If t > 1983
c) From April 1984:
SR =0
	 (B. 16)
t
3. Taxable Profit and Corporation Tax Liabilities
Taxable profits (denoted lIT) are defined as gross income and chargeable
gains less allowable expenses. The expenses permitted for tax purposes
do not correspond exactly to those used in establishing accounting
profits. For example the entertainment of UK customers, political
donations and gifts do not qualify as expenses. In addition, capital
gains are included although effectively taxed after 1973 at a lower
rate. But of considerably more importance than these are the additional
items which can be treated as deductions against tax; these Include
capital allowances, stock relief and interest payments (r). The basic
definition of taxable profits in equation (B.17) is therefore operating
profit plus other income (denoted U) plus net interest received (r-r)
less stock relief and capital allowances. Other items are omitted
through lack of data.
The corporation tax rate is applied to taxable profits only if they are
positive (Til denotes the amount due to be taxed in period t). If there
is a net taxable loss (UT<O), it can then be either carried back to
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the previous year and set against last year's taxable profits, or
failing that carried forward to the next year. Losses carried forward in
period t are denoted LCF and losses carried back are denoted LCB.
Thus, (B.19) shows that the value of losses offset against the profits
of the previous period (LCBA1) may be no greater than the previous
year's taxable profit. After subtracting the loss carried back, taxable
profits from the last year are recomputed in the light of period t
information (denoted TII 1 ) as shown in (B.20). If taxable profits of an
earlier year are reduced by losses carried back, then that year's tax is
recomputed, including any ACT set off and carry back (see below).
In addition, from 1972, taxable losses due to capital allowances for
plant and machinery can be carried back up to three years. This is shown
in equations (B.21), (B.22) and (B.23), where LCBCA is the amount of
losses due to capital allowances which can be carried back to periods
t-2 and t-3. This additional carry-back is then compared with any
remaining taxable profit from those periods in order to determine the
level of any additional offset. Thus, for n=2 and 3, equations (B.24),
(B.25) and (B.26) summarise the amount that can be offset against
taxable profit of earlier periods (LCBA) and the value of any
remaining taxable profit from those periods not used in this way
(TTI). Total losses carried back from period t (LCB) are defined in
(B.27) as the sum of LCBA , for n=1,2 and 3. Hence:
t-n
a) Taxable profits and losses carried back:
UT	 =li +rR+rP_SR -CA -LFC _min[min[max(dP_dR,0),EFICF ]-LCF ,0] (B.17)
t	 t t t	 t	 t	 t-1	 t-1	 t-1
(B. 18)TI! =max(UT ,0)t	 t
if UT <0 then
t
LCBA =min[-UT, Tflt]t-1	 t-1
fll =rnax[T1T t_lLA ,0]t-1	 t-1	 t
(B. 19)
(B.20)
	
(i) if ITT +CAP >0 then LCBCA =ITT -LCBA
	
(B.21)
t	 t	 t-1	 t	 t
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(ii) if UT +CJ' <0 and UT +CAJ' <-LCBA then LCBCA =CA 	 cB.22)t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t-1	 t
(iii) if ITT +CAP <0 and UT +CAP >-LCBA then LCBCA =-LCBA -UT cB.23)t	 t	 t	 t	 t	 t-1	 t	 t
for n = 2,3:
LCBA =min[LCBCA	 flft1]
t-n	 t-n+1	 t-n
LCBCA =max[LCBCA	 _Tllt_l,O]
t-n	 t-n+1	 t-n
Tilt 
=max[TUt1-LCBCA	 -,0]t-n	 t-n	 t-n-1
LCB = V'LCBAt	 t-n
(B.24)
(B.25)
(B.26)
(B.27)
if LCB>0, equations (B.29) to (B.56) are recomputed for each year to
t-1
which losses are carried back, with TU	 substituted by TTIt-n	 t-n
There is one further complication which means that losses carried
forward are not simply the difference between the taxable loss and
losses carried back. This is that if a company is a net recipient of
dividends then the excess of receipts over payments of franked
investment income (ie. net dividends received: dR_dP) can be treated as
profits for the purpose of obtaining relief against trading losses
Therefore if tax losses cannot be fully relieved against past profits
(UT +LCB <0) then the firm will be able to realise at least a part of
the remaining tax loss if dividend receipts in the current period are
greater than dividend payments. The amount that the firm can realize as
the tax credit is equal to the ACT rate (the basic rate of income tax)
multiplied by the difference between the gross dividend receipt and the
gross dividend payment (ie. in both cases gross of ACT). The repayment
on the residual loss will therefore be the lower of the loss and the net
dividend receipts (EFI) multiplied by the basic income tax rate (t)
as shown in equation (B.29) and the last part of equation (B.31). The
remaining loss which the firm can neither carry back nor set against net
dividend receipts is carried forward to next year as shown in the first
part of (B.28).
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The dividend provision is a means of bringing forward the tax credit due
on net dividend receipts to a period in which a company is incurring a
trading loss. It is not therefore in practice a means of realizing the
taxable loss at all despite the fact that losses carried forward are
reduced accordingly. As a consequence when the firm becomes a net payer
of dividends once again, the trading loss is reestablished at a rate
equal to the excess of dividend payments until the original loss offset
has been exhausted (see the last bracket in equation (B.28). The
cumulative amount of net dividend receipts at any point in time which a
company has used to claim a tax credit in the past is shown by the
variable EFICF in equation (3.30) and the rate of increase of losses
carried forward in (B.28) is restricted to the lesser of current net
dividend payments and EFICF.
If a company is earning a taxable profit (1TT>0) then its corporation
tax liability is obtained by applying the corporation tax rate, t, to
its profits provided that its taxable profits (including dividend
receipts) are in excess of an upper band, Z. For companies with taxable
profits plus dividend receipts below a lower band, zL, the small
companies tax rate, applies. This lower rate is applied to the
taxable income of the firm which includes its profits and dividend
receipts. Between the lower and upper profits levels the average
corporation tax rate moves from its reduced to its full rate with the
result that in that band the marginal rate of Corporation Tax exceeds
(and is approximately equal to	 where e' is the small companies
marginal relief fraction, or SC}IR). Hence:
b) Losses carried forward:
LF(1_9,t )(_1TT_LCB_EFI)+min(max[dlD_dl ,0),EFICF )	 (B.28)t-1
where	 1 if ITT > 0
- 0 ifTlTt<0
t
c) Net dividends used as loss offset:
EFI=min(-TTT+LCB, max[dR_dT', 0])
	 (B.29)
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EFICF =EFICF +EFI -mm (max[dl'_dR,O),EFICF ) 	 (B.30)t	 t-1	 t	 t-1
d) Corporation tax liability before ACT and DTR offsets:
TU
CTLR=9jr ITT - 0' ( ZU_TTI +dR)t	 t t (TTI+dR)
t
	
+ 011(L [TU+dR]t TTT )'.
	
- (1-q )t EFI	 (B.31)C	 t t	 C tJ	 t p	 t
where 0' = { SCMR if Z
L<TII +dR<ZU
t t
0	 otherwise
1 if TIT
and 011=!
0 if Ill
4. Advance Corporation Tax, the Imputation System and Income Tax
Before the introduction of the imputation system in the UK in 1973
companies were required to deduct income tax at the standard rate on
gross dividends paid. On receiving dividends from other UK companies a
firm could set the income tax associated with the dividend receipt
against the amount due on its payments. If receipts exceeded payments
then no income tax was repayable and the excess could be carried forward
to future periods.
The above system continued to prevail after the Introduction of the
imputation provisions though the terminology employed and the precise
definition of some of the relevant variables was revised. The payment of
income tax on dividend distributions received the misleading title of
advance corporation tax, the 'standard rate' of income tax had by then
become the 'basic rate' and the rates of ACT payment were redefined in
terms of net as opposed to the previously gross distributions. Equations
(B.32) for the payment of ACT and (B.33) for unrelieved net receipts of
dividends carried forward (SdN) are, however, applicable to the entire
corporation tax period; the equations are defined in gross terms
throughout. The net franked investment income that can be set against
trading losses, EF1, is subtracted from the excess in determining the
carry-forward to the next year.
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Hence:
a) Advance Corporation Tax
ACT= max{tp (d '-d'-Sd5 O}
= max (d'_d'_SdN_EFI , 0)
t	 t t	 t	 t
(B.32)
(B.33)
The major reform in 1973 was, of course, the provision of setting
payments of ACT against mainstream corporation tax liabilities thereby
in theory avoiding the previous double taxation of distributions. In
practice this provision is complicated by the requirement that the gross
distribution that forms the basis of the ACT deduction should not exceed
the taxable profits against which they are being set. Until 1984, the
definition of taxable profits for this purpose included dividends
received from foreign subsidiaries, denoted FT1T. Then double tax relief
was allowed as a deduction before ACT, and hence ACT can now only be set
off against taxable profits net of double tax relief. In addition, even
before 1984, as discussed below, double tax relief was often effectively
offset before ACT.
Until 1984, under the UK system a company could set its ACT payments
against its mainstream liabilities of either of the two preceding years
as well as the current year, although always subject to the conditions
of the previous paragraph. From 1984, this was increased to include the
previous six years. Relief is paid against the nearest period's profits
first before carrying back to earlier years. These provisions are
depicted in the set of equations (B.36) to (B.40) which show the total
offsets against each year's liabilities (for example, OFST is the
offset of the ACT liability in period t claimed against taxable profits
in period t-n) and the residual amount which remains unrelieved and
carried forward to the next year (SACT). NOFST t is that part of the
ACT payment in year t not offset against corporation tax in the current
year or the previous n years and FTflt_l is the taxable profit in period
t-n
t-n against which ACT in period t can be set (le. after ACT from period
t-1 has been potentially set against It) which after 1984 includes gross
dividends received from overseas subsidiaries.
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Finally, if a company has brought forward the tax credit on a net
dividend receipt from a period of a trading loss its ACT liability when
it once more becomes a net distributor of dividends will be
correspondingly increased. Under the imputation system if it can then
offset the ACT payment against its mainstream corporation tax it will
have gained from what is intended to be merely a timing facility. To
avoid this possiblility, the ACT that it can offset against mainstream
is reduced (as shown equation (B.36)) by the amount of the tax credits
that the company has claimed in the past (EFICFP in equation (B.41)).
Hence:
b) Corporation tax liability net of ACT
Pre 1973:
CTL =CTLR
t	 t
Post 1973:
CTL = CTLR - (SACT +ACT -SACT ) + min(ACT ,EFICFP
t	 t	 t-1	 t	 t	 t	 t-1
where SACT is computed as follows:
OFSTt= min{SACT +ACT -min[ACT ,EFICFP ],rpTU}
t	 t-1	 t	 t	 t-1
NOFSTt = max{SACT +ACT -min[ACT ,EFICFP 1_tTT1O}
t	 t-1	 t	 t	 t-1
1
FTUt = —max{r FTU - SACT - ACT +min[ACT ,EFICFP1] ,O}
t	 •r	 p	 t	 t-i	 t	 t
p
and, more generally, for n m
OFSTt = min{OFSTt1 + NOFSTt 	 ,t FTU}
t-n	 t-n	 t-n+1 P	 trn-n
NOFSTt = NOFSTt	 - [OFSTt - OFSTt	 ]t-n	 t-n+1	 t-n	 t-n+1
(B.34)
(B.35)
(B.36)
(B.37)
(B.38)
(B.39)
(B.40)
FTIIt
	=	 (t FTUt_l _ OFSTt
	
(B.41)
t-n	 r	 p	 t-n	 t-n
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pSACT = NOFSTt
t	 t-m
2 for t	 1984 Qi
where m	 6 for t 1984 Q2
(B.42)
EFICFP = EFICFP	 + EFI - mm (ACT , EFICFP )	 (B.43)
t	 t-1	 t	 t	 t-1
Turning to income tax, in much the same way that companies are required
to deduct the personal liabilities of shareholders on dividends at
source, income tax is due on certain classes of interest payments, in
particular annual interest charges but not bank interest. Income tax is
assessed on the net interest paid; if a company is a net recipient of
the relevant interest it can set the tax credit associated with the
receipt against its corporation tax liability. If the corporation tax
liability is zero, then the tax credit is reclaimable (see (B.55)).
Treating ACT as a payment on behalf of shareholders, the firm's total
liability to income tax is shown as the sum of its interest and dividend
tax obligations (see (B.56)). Since income tax is deducted after
overseas earnings, the algebra is postponed until after the next
sect ion.
5. Double Taxation Relief and Taxation of Overseas Earnings
There are essentially three classes of double taxation relief (DTR). At
the most general level, any company resident in the UK that receives a
dividend from a non-resident company can deduct from its UK liability
the overseas tax liability that has been a direct consequence of the
dividend payment. But unilateral relief against the overseas taxes on
the profits underlying the distribution is only available for those
domestic firms that control at least 10 per cent of the voting power of
the overseas company. Otherwise DTR is restricted to the increment of
the overseas tax burden arising from the payment of the dividend itself.
Finally there are a number of bilateral agreements with individual
countries that have established specific arrangements.
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In all cases, the relief is limited to the lesser of the overseas tax
paid and the amount of UK tax which would otherwise have been chargeable
on the foreign income. Therefore the rate of DTR is restricted to the
minimum of the UK Corporation Tax rate (applicable to the firm's
liabilities) and the overseas tax rate incurred on foreign activities.
There is no provision for carrying forward or back DTR that cannot be
claimed in the current period.
There is an important difference regarding the taxation of earning by
overseas branches and overseas subsidiaries. Any branch of a UK company
which is based overseas is liable to UK corporation tax on its profits
in exactly the same way as if it had been in the UK. DTR is then
available to reduce this liability if the branch has also been liable to
foreign tax. However, a UK company is only liable to UK tax regarding an
overseas subsidiary on that part of the subsidiary's earnings that is
paid to the parent in the form of dividend payments. Again any UK tax
liability may be reduced by DTR.
Data deficiencies cause several problems in attempting to model such a
system. Some issues are as follows. First, does a company have either
branches or subsidiaries based overseas? Second, if it is a subsidiary,
what proportion of the group's accounting data (which is what is
available) is directly due to the subsidiary, and what dividend payments
has the subsidiary made to the parent? Third, how much tax has the
branch or subsidiary faced abroad? Fifth, does the parent launder its
DTR through a UK subsidiary so that it can claim a full amount even
though it has unrelieved ACT? (This last question only arises before
1984, when ACT had to be deducted from tax liabilities before DTR. Any
DTR that could not be deducted - because the mainstream tax liability
was zero - was lost. A common method of overcoming this was to offset
the whole DTR against a UK subsidiary's profits, thus reducing group
taxable profit before offsetting the parent company' s ACT payments.)
There are no clear answers to these problems. The method that the model
currently uses is to assume that all overseas earnings are through a
branch. Consequently the UK tax system is applied to the full group
accounts. Any DTR (which is shown in the group accounts) is deductible.
As noted in Devereux (1986), estimates of corporation tax liabilities
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making several alternative assumptions regarding foreign activity all
yielded similar results. In the absence of better accounting data it
therefore seems reasonable to use the simplest approach.
Makign this assumption, taxable profit does not need to be adjusted for
gross dividends received by subsidiaries, and so
	
Fill = TU	 (B.44)
t	 t
Similarly, no adjustments need be made to the definition of the tax
liability already derived other than to deduct double tax relief. Hence
CTA = Max (CTL -DTR , 0)	 (B.45)
t	 t	 t
Returning to income tax and the final mainstream corporation tax
liabilities, equation (B.46) summarises the taxes on income (dividends
and interest) withheld by the company, and (B.47) notes the reduction in
the mainstream corproation tax liability due to income tax already paid
on net interest receipts. The DCTI terms in (B.48) relfect changes in
the liability of previous years which result from losses carried back
from the current period.
Income tax:
PR
IT = ACT + max(t (r -r ), 0)
t	 t	 p
R P
CTI = CTA - max(r (r -r ), 0)
t	 t	 p
(B.46)
(B.47)
Final mainstream corporation tax liability:
if LCB<0: CT = CTI +DCTI +DCTI +DCTI	 (B.48)
t	 t	 t-1	 t-2	 t-3
	if LCBO: CT = CTI	 (B.49)
t	 t
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VARIABLE LISTING
ACT Advance corporation tax
ASI	 All stocks index
CA	 Capital allowances on plant, machinery and buildings
CAB	 Capital allowances on buildings
CAP	 Capital allowances on plant and machinery
CT	 Corporation tax liability with ACT, investment income, DTR and LCB
Offsets
CTA	 Corporation tax liability with ACT and DTR offsets
CTI	 Corporation tax liability with ACT, investment income and DTR
off sets
CTh	 Corporation tax liability net of ACT offset but gross of DTR offset
CTLR	 Corporation tax liability gross of ACT and DTR offsets
CTP	 Corporation tax payment due
DCTI	 Change in CTI for year t-n as a result of recomputation due to
losses carried back
DEFCB Deferral on clawback of stock relief
DB	 Depreciation rate allowed for tax purposes on industrial buildings
P
D	 Depreciation rate allowed for tax purposes on pool of plant and
machinery expenditures
DTR	 Double taxation relief
EFI	 Net dividend receipts which are set against taxable losses to
effect tax credit
EFICF Cumulation of past net dividend receipts on which tax credits have
been paid
EFICFP Cumulation of past payment of tax credits
dlD	 Gross payments of dividends
Rd	 Gross receipts of dividends
Fill	 Total of taxable profits on home activities and gross dividends
received from overseas subsidiary
lB	 Investment expenditure in industrial buildings
1PM	 Investment expenditure in plant and machinery
IT	 Income tax due (including ACT)
ITAB	 Initial allowance rate on industrial buildings
ITAP	 Initial or first year allowance rate on plant and machinery
IVAB	 Investment allowance rate on industrial buildings
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IVAP	 Investment allowance rate on plant and machinery
LCB	 Total losses carried back
LCBA Losses carried back and set against profits of year t-n
LCBCA Losses carried back up to three years because they are due to
capital allowances
LCF	 Losses carried forward to next year
NOFSTt ACT payments which cannot be offset against taxable income of
year t-n
OFSTt_fl ACT payments which can be offset against taxable income of year
t-n
U	 Gross trading profits including 'other income'
UT	 Taxable profits or losses
PP	 Pool of written down plant and machinery expenditure
Gross payments of interest
rR	 Gross receipts of interest
S	 Closing value of stocks held
SACT	 Cumulated value of ACT payments which remain unrelieved against
taxable income
SCMR	 Small companies rate of marginal relief
SdN	 Net excess of receipts of dividends over payments to be carried
forward to subsequent years
SR	 Stock relief
TU	 Taxable profits - constrained to be non-negative
URSRt_rl Recoverable, as yet unrecovered stock relief periods t-n
USRCBT Amount of destocking that remains unrecovered
Small companies marginal relief: lower profit limit
Z	 Small companies marginal relief: upper profit limit
PARAMETERS
Proportion of trading profits that are set against stockbuilding in
determining stock relief
'	 Determines whether profits in stock relief computation are gross or
net of capital allowances
r Determines whether clawback deferral is operative
tY Small companies rate of marginal relief
'' Determines whether company is liable to tax at the small companies
200
rate
A Dependent on whether company is stockbuilding or destocking
ç	 Dependent on whether corporation tax liability gross of DTR offset
is positive or negative
Full rate of corporation tax
Small companies corporation tax rate
r Basic rate of personal income tax (and thus advance corporation tax
rate)
Dependent on whether company is making taxable profit or loss
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